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WELCOME ADDRESS 
 
We are pleased to welcome you at the Seventh International Conference on 
Game Theory and Management (GTM2013) which is held in St. Petersburg University 
and organized by the Graduate School of Management (GSOM) in collaboration with the 
Faculty of Applied Mathematics & Control Processes and the International Society of 
Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter). 
The Conference is designed to support further development of dialogue between 
fundamental game theory research and advanced studies in management. Such 
collaboration had already proved to be very fruitful, and has been manifested in the last 
two decades by Nobel Prizes in Economics awarded to John Nash, John Harsanyi, 
Reinhard Selten, Robert Aumann, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson, Lloid Shapley, Alvin 
Roth and few other leading scholars in game theory. In its applications to management 
topics game theory contributed in very significant way to enhancement of our 
understanding of the most complex issues in competitive strategy, industrial organization 
and operations management, to name a few areas. 
Needless to say that Game Theory and Management is very natural area to be 
developed in the multidisciplinary environment of St. Petersburg University which is the 
oldest (est. 1724) Russian classical research University. This Conference was initiated in 
2006 at SPbU as part of the strategic partnership of its GSOM and the Faculty of 
Applied Mathematics & Control Processes, both internationally recognized centers of 
research and teaching. 
We would like to express our gratitude to the Conference’s key speakers – 
distinguished scholars with path-breaking contributions to economic theory, game theory 
and management – for accepting our invitations. We would also like to thank all the 
participants who have generously provided their research papers for this event. We are 
pleased that this Conference has already become a tradition and wish all the success and 
solid worldwide recognition. 
 
 
Co-chairs GTM2013 
Professor Sergei P. Kouchtch   Professor Leon A. Petrosyan  
Vice-Dean, Graduate School   Dean, Faculty of Applied  
of Management     Mathematics & Control Processes 
St. Petersburg State University 
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WELCOME 
 
On behalf of the Organizing and Program Committees of GTM2013, it gives us 
much pleasure to welcome you to the International Conference on Game Theory and 
Management in the Graduate School of Management and Faculty of Applied 
Mathematics & Control Processes of St. Petersburg University. This conference is the 
seventh of the St. Petersburg master-plan conferences on Game Theory and 
Management, the first one of which took place also in this city six years before. It is an 
innovated edition as to investigate the trend and provide a unique platform for synergy 
among business and financial systems, on one hand and industrial systems, on the other, 
in game-theoretic support of national economies in the recent process of globalization. 
Mathematical and especially game-theoretic modeling the globalized systemic structure 
of the world of the future, and managing its conduct towards common benefits is 
becoming a primary goal today. 
This conference held in new millennium is not unique as the Seventh   
International Conference on Game Theory and Management since parallel to the 
conferences GTM2007, GTM2008, GTM2009, GTM2010, GTM2011 and GTM2012 
other international workshops on Dynamic Games and Management were held 
worldwide. Because of the importance of the topic we hope that other international and 
national events dedicated to it will follow.  Starting our activity in this direction six years 
before we had in mind that St. Petersburg University was the first university in the 
former Soviet Union where game theory was included in the program as obligatory 
course and the first place in Russia where Graduate School of Management and Faculty 
of Applied Mathematics were established. 
The present volume contains abstracts accepted for the Seventh International 
Conference on Game Theory and Management, held in St. Petersburg, June 26-28, 2013.  
As editors of the Volume VII of Contributions to Game Theory and Management we 
invite the participants to present their full papers for the publication in this Volume. By 
arrangements with the editors of the international periodical Game Theory and 
Applications the conference may recommend the most interesting papers for publication 
in this journal. 
St. Petersburg is especially appropriate as a venue for this meeting, being   
“window to Europe” and thus bridging the cultures of East and West, North and South.  
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One Guaranteed Search Problem on Trees 
 
 
 
Tatiana Abramovskaya 
 
St.Petersburg State University, 
Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics, 
Universitetsky prospekt, 28, Peterhof, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia 
tanya.abramovskaya@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Keywords: Guaranteed Search,   -capture, Search Numbers 
 
Graph searching is a game in which a team of searchers is aiming at capturing 
an evader hidden in a graph. The trajectories of the players are continuous functions 
taking values in the graph. The evader can move arbitrary fast from his current position 
to another by following the paths (connected any two points in the graph either a vertex 
or an interior point of the edge) as long as he does not cross a set in the graph that is 
under control of the searchers. The evader has perfect knowledge of the position and 
further moves of the searchers. A set on the graph is contaminated if it may harbor the 
evader, and it remains cleared as long as every path from it to any contaminated point is 
guarded by at least one searcher. Otherwise recontamination occurs. The evader is 
caught if the whole graph is simultaneously cleared. The search number of the graph is a 
minimum number of the searchers that are able to catch the evader. 
There are many variants of graph searching, depending on the parameters of the 
search such as the special powers of the searchers, the visibility of the evader or his 
ability for counteraction etc. [Fomin and Thilikos, 2008] Tre are several very basic ideas 
that work for all of them such as “divide and rule” principle (that are closely related to 
path- and tree–decomposition) [Golovach et al., 2000]. On the contrary, a seemingly 
obvious intention to forbid the recontamination fail in formalizations that we are 
interested in. 
We consider   –capture that is graph searching game with an invisible evader, 
where the condition of the capture is as follows. The evader is caught by a pursuer if 
they are in a distance less than or equal to a given nonnegative radius of capture  . We 
focus on the case of trees not only because this class of graphs is extremely important 
but also the problem in general is very hard. 
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There is a sequence of examples disproving a hypothesis that on any planar 
graph one can guarantee the capture with the smaller radius by adding an extra searcher 
to a current team [Abramovskaya and Petrov, 2011]. It is known that this hypothesis is 
not true even for trees. We say that the tree T is non–degenerate if for each positive 
radius of capture one additional searcher ensures the capture with the smaller radius of 
capture. We will discuss several significant results on   –search problem on trees that 
are in close connection with the hypothesis mentioned above. One of them is as follows: 
the set of all non–degenerate trees is open and dense in the set of all trees of given 
combinatorial scheme. 
 
References 
 
[1] Abramovskaya, T. V. and N. N. Petrov (2011). Arbitrarily large jumps of the Golovach 
function for trees. Vestnik St. Petersburg University. Mathematics, 44(1), 59-65. 
[2] Golovach, P. A., N. N. Petrov and F. V. Fomin (2000). Search in Graphs. Proceedings of the 
Steklov Institute of Mathematics, 1, S90–S103. 
[3] Fomin, F. V. and D. M. Thilikos (2008). An annotated bibliography on guaranteed graph 
searching. Theoretical Computer Science, 399(3), 236-245. 
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Dynamic Stability of Strategic Alliances 
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1Bonn University, Germany  
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2St. Petersburg University, Russia 
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Keywords: Dynamic Stability Strategic Alliance, Joint Venture 
 
This paper summarizes previous researches and proposes an approach of 
strategic alliances dynamic stability on the basis of time consistency problem. In contrast 
with classical dynamic game theory, where the problem of cooperative solution finding 
is considered, in this paper the inverse problem is solved: testing the dynamic stability of 
existing cooperative solution. To prove this approach, the empirical analysis of the 
relationship between dynamic stability and the lifetime of strategic alliances is 
conducted. The analysis suggests that dynamic stability has significant effect on average 
strategic alliances’ lifetime. 
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The Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games 
 
 
 
Mikel Álvarez-Mozos1, Ziv Hellman2 and Eyal Winter3 
 
1University of Barcelona, Spain 
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2University of Tel Aviv, Israel 
ziv.hellman@mail.huji.ac.il 
 
3Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel 
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Keywords: Shapley Value, Political Spectrum, Restricted Cooperation, Axiomatic 
Characterization 
 
Assuming a ‘spectrum’ or ordering on the players of a coalitional game, as in a 
political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley 
value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the 
spectrum. This results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along 
the spectrum is critical. We present both a characterization of this value by means of 
properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it. In simple majority games, the 
greatest power accrues to ‘moderate’ players who are located neither at the extremes of 
the spectrum nor in its center. In supermajority games, power increasingly accrues 
towards the extremes, and in unaninimity games all power is held by the players at the 
extreme of the spectrum. 
The Shapley value [4] has for decades been one of the main indices used in the 
literature for measuring the relative power of players in voting situations. This value, 
however, does not take into account the ideology of the agents which is of key 
importance in political situations. Consider for example a parliamentary situation in 
which there are n players with the same number of votes and a simple majority of them 
is required to form a government. A straightforward application of the Shapley value 
grants each player 1/n, using symmetry considerations. In real-life parliaments, however, 
it is intuitively clear to all observers that not all members have equal power. It is highly 
unusual to see, for example an extreme right party joining an extreme left party in a 
coalition without any center parties also included in the coalition to bridge political 
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differences between them. As the above discussion indicates, part of the problem is that 
the standard Shapley approach assumes that all possible permutations of the players be 
used in forming coalitions. That means that even highly unlikely coalitions, such as 
those formed by an extreme left party joining with an extreme right party while by-
passing all the parties in between, including their most natural political allies, must be 
counted equally along every other coalition. Different approaches have been proposed in 
the literature to study situations in which not all coalitions are feasible or equally likely. 
In many papers, the problem is tackled by considering some structure on the set of 
players to describe the way in which players can form coalitions.  
Coalitional games together with these kind of structures are usually denoted 
games with restricted cooperation. We propose here an intuitive way to modify the 
Shapley value by taking the political spectrum explicitly into account. The incorporation 
of the ideological positions of the agents for the study of the power distribution of a 
decision making body was first done in [1]. In that work agents’ political positions are 
given as points in a high dimensional Euclidean space and a probability distribution on 
the set of all permutations is inferred from them. Then, a modification of the Shapley 
value is proposed based on two properties, namely that an ordering and its reverse 
ordering should have the same probability and that the removal of a subset of agents 
should not affect the probabilities assigned to the relative orderings of the remaining 
agents. As we show, our approach is much simpler, first because we can allow the 
positions to be one-dimensional and second, since we consider only a set of admissible 
permutations and assign the same probability to all of them. With regard to the 
properties of the [1] value, the value introduced here shares the first of those properties 
but not the second one. [5] also considered that the political positions of the agents 
should be taken into account and he proposed an asymmetric generalization of the 
Shapley value. This modification of the original Shapley value was also considered in 
[2] to study the optimal ideological position of candidates. Our proposal is based on very 
similar ideas; however, computing our value is much simpler and allows for a 
characterization of the value by means of a set of properties. In this work we assume that 
there exists a spectrum, from ‘left to right’ according to which the players are ordered 
linearly. We then impose the condition that as coalitions are formed a la Shapley, they 
must be connected with respect to the spectrum. Hence, we propose a novel way to 
generalize the Shapley value to games with restricted cooperation in which the 
restrictions arise from the position of the agents in a one-dimensional spectrum. This 
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leads to an interesting new value that may shed light on relative power values in 
situations in which there is a natural ordering of the players.  
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The talk is devoted to universal Nash equilibrium for n -player differential 
game with weakly coupled dynamics. We assume that the dynamics of the i -th variable 
are described by  
 
1
( , , , , ),     [0, ],     ,     .d
i i n i i i i
x f t x x u t T x u P      (1) 
Here 
i
u  is a control of player i . The purpose of the i -th is to maximize the 
terminal payoff 
1
( ( ), , ( ))
i n
x T x T  . 
We assume that sets 
i
P  are compact, functions 
i
f  and 
i
  are continuous, in 
addition assume that function 
i
f  are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the phase 
variables and satisfy the sublinear growth condition with respect to 
1
, ,
n
x x . 
Denote by x  and by u  the vectors 1( , , )nx x  and 1( , , )nu u  respectively. 
Further, let ( , , )f t x u  be a vector 1 1( ( , , ), , ( , , ))n nf t x u f t x u . 
Denote  
   1: 0, , { : [0, ] }.i i i nu T Pmeasurable u T P P measurable         
If u  , 0 0( , )t x  is an initial position then denote by 0 0(, , , )x t x u  the solution 
of initial value problem  
0 0( ) ( , , ( )),     ( ) .
dx t
f t x u t x t x
dt
   
We assume that the players use the control with guide strategies first proposed 
by Krasovskii and Subbotin for zero sum games [1]. The control with guide strategy of 
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player i  is a triple 0 0( ( , , ), ( , , , ), ( , ))i i i i iU u t x w t t x w t x 
 . Here the function 
i
u  
forms the control of player i . It depends on current position of the game ( , )t x  and on 
the i -th player's guide iw . The value of the function i  is a state of the i -th player's 
guide at time t  under condition that at time t  state of the system is x , state of the i -th 
player's guide is 
i
w . The function 
i
  initialize the guide of player i . 
The control is formed in the following way. Let 0 0( , )t x  be an initial position, 
and let Δ
0
{ }k r
k
t   be a partition of the interval 
0[ , ]t T . Further, assume that player j  
( j i ) chooses his control 
j j
u  . Denote by kx  the state of the system at time kt , 
also denote by k
i
w  the state of the i -th player's guide at time kt . The motion generated 
by the strategy of player i  iU  and the controls of other players ju , j i  satisfy the 
differential equations  
0 0[ ] ( , , ),     ( )
dx t
f t x u x t x
dt
   
with ( ) ( , [ ], )k
i k k i
u t u t x t w  for 1[ , )k kt t t  , here kiw  is a state of the i -th player's 
guide at time kt , 1 1( , , , )k k k k ki i iw t t x w
  , 0 0 0( , )
i i
w t x . 
Let U  is a collection of control with guide strategies 1, , nU U . We shall 
consider two cases.  
 • All player use the control 
i
U  and get the same partition Δ . Denote the 
corresponding motion by Δ
0 0
[ , , , , ]x t x U .  
 • All players except j -th one use the control with guide strategies 
i
U , and get 
the same partition Δ , when player j  use the control j ju  . This control can be also 
formed stepwise. Denote the corresponding motion by Δ0 0[ , , , | , ]
j
x t x U u .  
Definition 1 We shall say that the collection of control with guide strategies 
*U  is a Control with Guide Nash Equilibrium on a set [0, ] dnG T   if for all 
0 0( , )t x G  the following inequality holds for all 1,j n   
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Δ Δ 0 0
0
lim sup{ ( [ , , , | , ]) : ( ) , }
j j j j
x T t x U u d u

 

   
Δ Δ0 0
0
lim inf{ ( [ , , , , ]) : ( ) }.
j
x T t x U d

 

   
The main result of the talk is Theorems 1 and 2. In order to formulate them let 
us introduce the following notions. For *
j j
u P  put  
[ ] 0 0 * 0 0 1 *S ( , ; ) c { (, , , , , , , ) : , }.j
j j n i i
ol t x u l x t x u u u u i j      
Also,  
0 0 0 0S ( , ) c { (, , , ) : }.ol t x l x t x u u    
Theorem 1 Let a multivalued function  : [0, ] dn nS T Ã  satisfy the following 
conditions  
 • 
1
( , ) { ( ), , ( )}
n
S T x x x   ;  
 • for all ( , ) [0, ] dnt x T  , [ , ]t t T  , ( , )J S t x , 1,j n  and j ju P  
there exist a motion [ ] [ ]( ) S ( , ; )j j
j
y ol t x u   and [ ]' ( , ( ))jJ S t y t   such that 'j jJ J ;  
 • for all ( , ) [0, ] dnt x T  , [ , ]t t T  , ( , )J S t x  there exists a motion 
[ ]( ) S ( , ; )c j
j
y ol t x u   such that ( , ( ))cJ S t y t  .  
Then for each compact [0, ] dnG T   there exists a Control with Guide Nash 
Equilibrium on G . The corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff of player i  at the 
position 0 0( , )t x G  is an element of the 0 0( , )S t x .  
The construction of the Nash equilibrium strategies is based on Krasovskii-
Subbotin extremal shift rule [1].  
Theorem 2 There exists an upper semicontinuous multivalued function 
 2: [0, ] dnS T Ã  with nonempty images satisfying conditions of Theorem (1).  
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Let  G K  denote the graph consisting of 1-skeleton of a regular polyhedron 
K  in Euclidian space. The team of Pursuers 1 2, , , mP P P  and one Evader Q  play 
Pursuit-Evasion differential game moving along edges of the graph  G K . All points 
have equal maximal speeds. Let      1 2, , , mP t P t P t  and  Q t  be a current position 
of the participants of the game. The aim of the team of Pursuers is to reach the equality 
   iP t Q t  for some 1,2, ,i m   at some moment t , 0t  , independently of 
initial positions of points while the aim of Evader is opposite, i.e. to hold the condition 
   iP t Q t  for all 1,2, ,i m   and t , 0t  , when a process of pursuit-evasion 
begins from some initial positions. Other statements of the pursuit problems on the 
graphs were considered in [1,2]  
The formulated game can be strongly formulated based on the approach of [4] 
or [5] (see also [3]).  
Obviously, if m  is great enough then the team of Pursuers can win the game. 
The least value of m , that m  Pursuers win the game will be denoted  v K . 
Theorem 1.   2nv    for n  that is the regular n -dimensional simplex 
 1 0 1| 1, 0, 0,1, ,nn n ix R x x x x i n            3n  . 
Theorem 2.   2nv    for n  that is the regular n -dimensional octahedron 
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 1 2| 1nn nx R x x x         2n  . 
Theorem 3.   1
2n
n
v K
 
    
 for 
n
K  that is the regular n -dimensional cube 
 | 1, 1,2, ,nn iK x R x i n      ( 2n  ). 
Theorem 4.   2v G  , if G  is a regular dodecahedron or icosahedron in 3.R  
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The main task of the present stage of development of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
is to ensure macroeconomic stability, sustainable and balanced growth of the economy, 
the continuation of structural reforms, modernization and renewal of leading sectors of 
the economy through the increase of attracted investment. It is natural that in the current 
circumstances, «only the nation can declare itself that has among its priorities the 
continuous increase of investments in human capital, training of educated and 
intellectually developed generation, which, in today's world, is the most important value 
and a decisive force in the achievement of democratic development, modernization and 
renovation», – said the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov in his 
speech at the opening of the international conference» Preparing an educated and 
intellectually developed generation as an essential condition for sustainable development 
and modernization of the country» [1, 90]. Successive investments in human capital will, 
among others, facilitate high-quality education of contemporary youth. Young 
professionals of today must not only have expertise in the issues of the modern labor 
market, but also be able to cooperate with different people. Game theory is of interest as 
a theoretical foundation for finding optimal strategies for this cooperation.  
Analysis of the basic principles of game theory was suggested by John von 
Neumann in 1928. In his paper, Neumann focuses on the logical foundations of quantum 
mechanics. In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern published their work «The Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior», which marked the beginning of the development of 
mathematical methods for the study of games. 
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In Russian Federation, the study of game theory and the development of game-
theoretical problems began in Leningrad State University in the mid-fifties of the XX 
century under the leadership of Professor N.N.Vorobeva. It was he and his close 
associates who established the first school of the theory of games. Since then, 
L.A.Petrosyan, N.A.Zenkevich, E.V.Shevkoplyas and others have been regarded as 
globally recognized experts in the field of game theory. 
Game theory is a method of studying the best strategies in games, by which any 
process is meant where the parties are struggling to observe their interests. In the 
interpretation of the Israeli scholar Aumann game theory served as the scientific basis 
for building a strategy of economic development of the state. The game refers to the 
process which involves two or more parties who struggling for the realization of their 
interests. Each side has its own purpose and uses some strategy that can lead to the 
victory or loss depending on the behavior of others, taking into account the views of 
other participants and their possible actions. It is in economics that game theory is 
mostly applied; however, it also used in n other social sciences such as sociology, 
political science, psychology, ethics, and others. In economics, it is applicable not only 
to the solution of general economic problems, but also to the analysis of strategic 
business problems, development of organizational structures and incentive systems. 
Game theory is most closely associated with social and economic phenomena occurring 
in the concrete individual country and the world at large. It is based on the desire of 
people to achieve their goals. Therefore, only experts who are familiar with game theory 
can successfully manage staff of any organization. 
The theoretical basis for finding the optimal solutions in uncertain conditions is 
the theory of games. Game is a process model of functioning of system elements, in 
which the actions of its members occur according to certain rules called strategies. The 
basic rule of the theory of games is that any party of the system is of the same 
intellectual capacity as the operating party and makes every effort to achieve its own 
goals. If management decisions are made by one person and their results do not depend 
on the actions of others, the theory of optimal management and optimization can be 
successfully used as mathematical modeling. 
At the same time, in many real-world processes decision-making takes place at 
sufficiently large time intervals, where it is necessary to take into account the results of 
previous decisions at every current time and to develop appropriate management based 
on this. It is therefore necessary to ascertain that the appropriate process models can be 
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dynamic games that take into account the fact that the decision-making process can lead 
to conflicts and it is important to model it for a sufficiently long time interval. Modeling 
and decision-making using game theory is one of the most controversial issues in 
modern management science. Game theory as a tool of management instills the idea that 
it can display a unique solution with the best possible result for the players. In its 
scientific use game theory focuses on the logical forecast of the behavior of the parties 
which would be rational for all. It is always necessary to keep in mind that even if 
conditionally management decision is made by a single person, it is impossible to 
guarantee that the end result will not depend on the actions of others. Therefore, dynamic 
and differential games can prove useful models of many situations. 
Another nuance of the application of game-theoretical models is the principle of 
optimality. This basic idea of the principle is that decisions made by managers are 
reached by means of algorithms which are hard to define, where an optimal solution is 
chosen from the many emerging options. Two most important properties that will 
inevitably affect long-term decision should also be mentioned here. These properties 
were defined by professor L.A.Petrosyan: «The first property is the need to assess the 
quality of the decision against several criteria. The second one is different assessment of 
outcomes by different parties involved in the development of solutions» [2, 8]. At the 
same time, we must be kept in mind that the world is changing and possible steps for 
each player mainly depend on different factors. 
Game theory has significantly raised the current level of understanding of 
decision-making processes and can open wide horizons and patterns of decision-making 
in management. The development of management solutions involves the use of a certain 
amount of information. Depending on the completeness of initial information, 
management decisions can be reached under certainty, risk and uncertainty. Game theory 
is seen as the most economically viable element of organization theory and is a very 
complex area of knowledge. After all, each game has a goal or the end state sought by 
the players who choose the direction of actions allowed by the rules of the game. In 
some cases, the purpose of the game is to reach the goal with maximum efficiency. 
Decisions are made in conditions of certainty, when the leader knows the outcomes of 
each of the alternative solutions. 
Games can be classified based on the number of players, the number of strategies, 
the nature of the interaction of the players, the nature of the gain, the number of moves, 
the volume of information available, etc. Depending on the number of players there can 
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be games of two and n players. Games can be finite and infinite according to the number 
of strategies. If all the players in the game have a finite number of possible strategies, it 
is called finite. If at least one of the players has an infinite number of possible strategies, 
the game is called infinite. 
Depending on the nature of interaction, games can be: 
1) non-cooperative: the players are not allowed to enter into an agreement to form 
a coalition; 
2) cooperative: players can form coalitions. 
Depending on the nature of gains, games can be divided into games with zero 
sum and non-zero sum. Matrix game is the ultimate game of two players with a zero-
sum, in which the player's gains are expressed. For matrix games it is proved that any of 
them has a solution and it can easily be found by reducing the game to a linear 
programming problem. Games with one participant are games with no competition. The 
participant plays for score or for a goal. Competitive game is a game where there is a 
final state, which is sought by each player, but not everyone can achieve it. Bimatrix 
game is the ultimate game of two players with non-zero sum, in which the gains of each 
person are expressed by the matrices separately for the appropriate person. Continuous 
game is a game in which the payoff function of each player is continuous, depending on 
the strategies. If the function of gains is convex, the game is called a convex game. For 
such games, acceptable methods of solutions are developed that allow finding the 
optimal pure strategy for one player and the probabilities of application of clean optimal 
strategies of another player. Such thematic areas as strategic behavior, competition, 
cooperation, risk and uncertainty are central to the theory of games, and are directly 
linked with the managerial tasks. 
Therefore, the progress of economic development has proved the fruitfulness of 
application of methods of games. In fact, game theory is a theory of decision making, 
applicable to competitive situations and common analytical approach to modeling of 
social situations in which knowledge, possible actions and motivations of the actors, as 
well the effects and results of these actions are outlined in details. 
As society develops, more areas of application of the theory of games are 
emerging in a variety of ways. It is often necessary to introduce into practice new types 
of games. Competition for jobs is an example of such types. Suppose that some "firm" 
(e.g., admission to a university, selection of candidates for the national team in one or 
more sports, participation in bids, etc.) announced a competition to fill n number of 
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vacancies (to simplify, we assume that all jobs are equal), and m number of applicants 
are competing for the vacancy. If m n≤ , the situation is not cooperative, that is no 
game is possible. If m n> , participants enter into a game (competition) with a "win" or 
a "lose" result. This kind of game is close to the arbitrary schemes, but it has some 
peculiarities as well. For example, originally, the game can be non-cooperative, but in 
this case, the participants can form coalitions, and if there are several stages in the 
competition, the game becomes a multi-step one with a changing number of participants 
and the changing dynamics of coalitions. In a particular case, when after the next round 
we come to a situation of m n≤ , we get a cooperative game. When taking into account 
the quality indicators of the competitors, "the firm" may also be included in the game as 
a player as the party that seeks to maximize totals of those who have passed the 
competition. The paper will describe the mathematical model of competition in the form 
of a dynamic multi-stage game with a dynamic number of rounds and the players and the 
structure of coalitions, and an optimization algorithm for the "firm" will be suggested. 
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One of the major objectives of modern supply chain management is to deal with 
the growing decentralization among the involved entities and hence minimizing the 
double marginalization effect inside the chain, especially when the end-customers’ 
demand is not deterministic. Also, to improve the performance of the members as well as 
total chain in terms of accumulating more profit by the members of the chain, some kind 
of coordination mechanism is necessary. To address these issues, a three layer supply 
chain with one raw-material supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer trading over a 
single item over a single time period is developed and studied in this paper. The market 
demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be of completely stochastic nature with 
positive support. The productions of both the raw-material supplier and the manufacturer 
are assumed to be subject to random yield in the sense that they always produce 
quantities lesser than they initially plan to. The problem is to maximize profit(s) under 
different scenario. At the beginning, the centralized model is developed and solved 
where all the entities act together so that expected profit of the total chain may be 
maximized. Although impossible to ensure the existence and practice of such a business 
strategy in real life scenario, the solutions obtained solving the centralized model are set 
as the benchmark. Next, a very simple and practical scenario, called decentralized 
model, is considered where each of the acting entities aims at maximizing its own 
expected profit, without looking at others’ interest or even at total chain’s performance, 
and the model is solved by the Nash game strategy. It is shown that the performance of 
the total chain is lesser than that in the centralized system, which is due the double 
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marginalization effect. Aiming at establishing coordination among the entities so that the 
total expected profit of the chain may reach the benchmark case and also all the entities 
may be better paid off, we try to implement different coordination mechanisms on the 
model. We see that neither the revenue sharing nor the buyback contract coordinates the 
chain. We then start with a combination of buyback contract and sales rebate and penalty 
contract between the manufacturer and the retailer; it is seen that the above said contract 
coordinates the chain, but splits the total expected profit of the chain between the 
manufacturer and the retailer (and both are better paid off too) and leaves the raw-
material supplier with zero expected profit. The contract is then modified by 
incorporating a two part tariff contract in between the raw-material supplier and 
upstream entity (entities) which serves our purpose. Different probability distributions 
are studied in two numerical examples to verify the applicability and robustness of the 
model. 
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We study bad reputation games from the perspective of self-referentiality. In 
self-referential games players have the possibility of understanding opponents’ 
intentions, and this can mitigate the problem of bad reputation. We characterize the 
probabilities of the Stackelberg type required to overcome a bad reputation problem 
when there is a possibility that intentions can be observed directly. The complementarity 
between direct and indirect observation of opponents’ intentions is shown to be 
qualitatively different from games where all agents are long-lived. 
Most models of reputation establish that uncertainty about the long-run player's 
type implies a beneficial reputation effect as long as long-run player can exploit some 
commitment power. By way of contrast, Ely and Välimäki (2003) propose a novel 
example where reputation may be bad. With a bad commitment type, they find that in 
equilibrium the entire surplus is lost. Along the same line, an example which captures all 
features of their model is mitral valve surgeries. There are two types of surgeries, valve 
repair and valve replacement. Both surgical procedures are equally successful when 
appropriately conducted. The right type of surgery is known only by the surgeon. Think 
of the case where there are two broad categories: good and bad physicians. The bad 
physician always does valve replacement but the good one performs the necessary 
surgery. Since this example is analogous to theirs, the model predicts none of physicians 
would perform a surgery. In reality, however, we still observe the coexistence of bad and 
good physicians involve in long-run relationships with patients.* 
Humans are rarely perfect liars. They reveal -- even unintentionally -- their 
states of mind either through micro expressions (facial gestures, body posture, etc.) or 
                                                 
*In the US more than 40,000 mitral valve operations are performed every year. 
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tools such as pen-drumming.* In an evolutionary setting, Levine and Pesendorfer (2007) 
examine self-referential strategies which have the ability to recognize each other in the 
context of two player symmetric games. Intuitively, players have the chance of 
discerning whether opponents conform to a rule of behavior. To generalize this idea, 
Block and Levine (2012) define self-referential games in which players are able to 
understand opponents' intentions about chosen strategies by receiving informative 
signals. The self-referential nature of these games is characterized by the fact that 
players choose how they will play the game depending on signals they observe, and the 
choice of such strategies indeed determines the likelihood of those signals. (See also A. 
Kalai, E. Kalai, Lehrer and Samet (2010).†) 
In this paper we analyze bad reputation games from the perspective of self-
referentiality in order to study the connection between the two ideas mentioned at the 
beginning. We show how the possibility of observing opponents' intentions restricts the 
bad reputation effect, and we identify conditions under which such restriction applies for 
both weak and strong sources of information about intentions. 
In our model, myopic players play against a long-lived opponent whose life 
span is stochastic. We show that the possibility of fathoming other players' plan of 
strategies and the occasional renewal of the long-run player mitigate the bad reputation 
effect. That is, it is generally better to have myopic players with permanent uncertainty 
about types for the long-run player because this weakens how informative public 
histories full of bad signals are. Moreover, we are interested in showing how information 
about opponents' intentions may complement renewal. We characterize conditions on the 
self-referential game and on the relative likelihood of commitment types to assure that 
the bad reputation effect will not arise. 
Bad reputation games exhibit distinctive features from the bulk of the literature 
starting with the classic works of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982). We model bad reputation games borrowing the set-up developed by Ely, 
Fudenberg and Levine (2008) who give the first characterization of the limit between 
good and bad reputation identifying properties of this class of games. A long-lived 
opponent plays against a sequence of different myopic players. Participation of short-run 
                                                 
*Tools might be used for undercovering intentions as it is commonly seen in Poker games, players 
wear caps and sunglasses to masquerade a royal flush. Yet such accessories sometimes end up 
being evidence of a winning hand. 
†They study commitment devices which work very similarly to code-of-conduct in two-player 
games, however, they consider very precise signals. 
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players takes place if friendly actions are likely to be played. Since long-run player's 
actions are imperfectly observed, friendly actions may generate bad signals that can be 
interpreted as evidence of unfriendly actions. In addition, there exist temptation actions 
which result in good signals more often but they may be unfriendly. A numerous amount 
of bad signals points to an unfriendly type, hence a patient normal long-run player 
eventually chooses temptation actions. In contrast to Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2008) 
we focus on costly temptation actions, that is, it is costly to play actions that are more 
likely to generate good signals. While they find general conditions under which 
reputation is bad, their characterization does not include all possible commitment type 
priors. In contrast, we identify the whole set of priors where bad reputation is overcome. 
Our main departure from their setting is that the long-run player might be 
replaced every period. Short-run players remain ignorant about the long-lived player's 
type since they can observe neither the renewal nor the type. For instance, during a valve 
operation surgeons may shift every other couple of hours but the patient only knows his 
primary care surgeon. The possibility of switching types has been previously studied in 
reputation models but not in the class of bad reputation games. Renewal has a dual 
effect. First, since the long-run player is likely to be gone by tomorrow he has less 
incentives to play friendly and harvests the fruits of reputation. Second short-run players 
are unaware whether a replacement has occurred, this implies that a very unlucky history 
of bad signals weighs less frequently in the updating of prior probabilities. The latter is 
prevalent in reputation games, as in Ekmekci, Gossner and Wilson (2012). In Mailath 
and Samuelson (2001), the long-run player does not lean on a favorable history because 
players are uncertain whether he might have been replaced by a bad type. In contrast, in 
our model, the possibility of being renewed partially ``cleans up" a history plenty of bad 
signals. The reason why renewal may restore the short-run players' beliefs about the 
long-run player's type is similar to that in Liu and Skrzypacz (2009), consider short-run 
players having bounded recall. (See also Liu (2011).) Most of the literature on switching 
types is concerned about equilibrium dynamics (see for example, Hölmstrom (1999), 
Phelan (2006) and Wiseman (2008)). 
We first consider perfect information about opponents' intentions, and show 
that the precommitment friendly action outcome can be induced by a self-referential 
Nash equilibrium. In this self-referential equilibrium the long-lived player behaves 
friendly. We should stress that neither the level of patience nor the probability of being 
replaced of the long-lived player change any of the qualitative results. Intuitively, self-
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referential signals are so informative that they implicitly reveal the long-run player's 
type. Then, we can recover the good equilibrium in Ely and Välimäki's example if there 
is a bad commitment type. 
When this source of information is weak, the bad reputation effect still arises 
but under more restrictive conditions. In this case, our main result is that self-
referentiality strongly complements the probability of renewal of the long-run player. 
Adherence to the code-of-conduct relies on two critical forces: The long-run player is 
rewarded for playing friendly actions and is immediately punished for potentially 
playing a temptation action. When constructing the code-of-conduct in this proof we 
encounter two new difficulties in the study of self-referential games. One difficulty is 
that when there is a sequence of myopic players against a long-lived opponent, repetition 
does not complement self-referentiality as in the case of games with only long-run 
players. In addition, Block and Levine (2012) study a gift-giving game example with 
overlapping generations where inter-period connection facilitates the transmission of 
information.3 * Unlike that environment, here short-run players are not directly connected 
and therefore the negative externality generated when a myopic player decides not to 
participate in the game is still present. 
 
 
                                                 
3*See Johnson, Levine and Pesendorfer (2001). 
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It is well-known that pension fund participants can benefit from 
intergenerational risk-sharing, but that different generations have different incentives. 
This paper models intergenerational solidarity in closing funded pension plans as a 
bargaining process between generations. We consider generations which each are 
represented by members of the pension fund’s board. We model pension funds that differ 
in the degree of risk-sharing, as well as in the extent to which pension rights are 
guaranteed. The degree of risk-sharing is determined by the number of generations over 
which risk can be shared. For each type of pension fund, we determine the pension fund 
policy that follows from a bargaining process between the representatives of the different 
generations. We then compare the welfare effects of each type of pension fund. 
In the presentation, we propose a stable pension plan design of a closing 
pension fund. Pension funds invest the capital accrued by the working participants and 
pay pension benefits to the retirees. Collective defined contribution and defined benefit 
pension plans inherently induce intergenerational solidarity. Intergenerational solidarity 
may be beneficial to risk-averse individuals because it allows for redistribution of risk 
between generations (see, e.g., Gollier, 2008; Cui et al, 2009). However, redistributions 
of pension contributions and of risk should be sufficiently attractive for all generations. 
These generations may have different, possibly conflicting, objectives due to, e.g., a 
longer investment horizon. Therefore, as argued by Molenaar et al. (2008), age 
differentiation in pension funds would be desirable. We consider a setting in which 
different generations have representatives in the pension fund’s board. The pension fund 
35 
 
strategy is determined as the outcome of a bargaining process between these 
representatives. As some generations might be overrepresented in the board, we allow 
for heterogeneous bargaining powers of the generations. We compare the welfare effects 
for the different generations in a number of pension plan designs that differ in the extent 
of intergenerational risk-sharing as well as in the extent to which pension rights are 
“guaranteed” (e.g., defined benefit versus collective defined contribution plans). In each 
case, the pension fund’s board can affect the payoffs to the different generations via its 
choice of investment policy and payout policy. 
Our modeling approach is similar in spirit to Gollier (2008), but it differs in 
terms of the objective. Gollier (2008) considers a hypothetical social planner who aims 
at maximizing the discounted sum of the expected utility over the generations. One 
drawback of using the objective of a social planner to determine pension plan policy is 
that it can yield outcomes that are not individually rational for some generations, i.e., 
some generations may be better off by using a closed account without intergenerational 
risk-sharing. It also does not time into account that generations might differ in size and 
life expectancy. 
In the presentation, we propose a pension benefit strategy based on a time-
consistent Nash bargaining solution. This is a solution inspired by regular Nash 
bargaining solutions (Nash, 1950) in a dynamic context. The Nash bargaining solution is 
characterized by Nash (1950) and provides insight in the bargaining process of the 
generations. Time consistency implies that generations take into account that the pension 
contract will be renegotiated every period. In every period, the negotiations lead to a 
Nash bargaining solution. The disagreement point is time-varying and determined as in 
cooperative bankruptcy games. As leaving the pension fund is generally not optional in 
pension funds, a generation can only claim a minimal amount of the assets of the fund. 
In this outside option, generations can invest these assets in a closed account. This 
outside option is generally not Pareto efficient.  
Finally, we quantify the welfare effects in a realistic situation. We show that the 
pension benefit strategy differs quite heavily from the strategy according to a social 
planner as in Gollier (2008). Particularly, the oldest generations strongly benefit in the 
time-consistent Nash bargaining solution, which is due to higher bargaining power and a 
lower life expectancy. 
 
36 
 
References 
 
[1] Cui, J., F. de Jong, and E. Ponds (2009). Intergenerational risk sharing within funded pension 
schemes. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 10, 1–29. 
[2] Gollier, C. (2008). Intergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking of a pension fund. Journal of 
Public Economics 92, 1463–1485. 
[3] Molenaar, R., R. Munsters, and E. Ponds (2008). Towards age-differentiation in funded 
collective pensions. Work in progress. 
[4] Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
РОССИЙСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТА 
 
 
 
Главные редакторы: 
В.С. Катькало 
Д.Дж. Тисс 
 
 
Издательство Высшей школы менеджмента Санкт–Петербургского университета 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Investments in R&D under Trade Liberalization: 
Monopolistic Competition Model* 
 
 
 
Igor Bykadorov1, Sergey Kokovin2 and Evgeny Zhelobodko3 
 
1,2,3Sobolev Institute of Mathematics SB RAS 
Novosibirsk 
1,2,3NRU Novosibirsk State University 
Novosibirsk 
1,2,3NRU Higher School of Economics 
St. Petersburg 
 
 
 
Motivation, topic. Empirics on international trade shows that: (i) there are noticeable 
cross-countries differences in productivity and quality; (ii) firms operating in larger 
markets have lower markups (Syverson-2007); (iii) firms are larger in larger markets 
(Campbell-Hopenhayn-2005); (iv) larger economies export higher volumes of each 
good, a wider set of goods, and higher-quality goods (Hummels-Klenow-2005). Various 
explanations exist in the literature. We apply “monopolistic competition” approach. It 
suggests that a larger market motivates more R&D investment by a firm because of 
economies of scale. 
Background literature and our goal. (i) Monopolistically-Competitive (MC) models 
were introduced by Dixit & Stiglitz (1977), for trade Krugman (1979). (ii) MC model 
with specific utility was recently generalized to any utilities with variable elasticity: 
Zhelodobko, Kokovin, Parenti & Thisse (2012); the firm size was found to positively 
respond to the market size under all increasingly-elastic demands. (iii) Oligopolistic 
choice of technology in quasi-linear partial-equilibrium setting was studied by Vives 
(2008): firm's R&D investment was found to increase with the market size, while the 
number of varieties can increase or decrease. Our goal is to combine the choice of 
technology like in Vives - with general monopolistic competition like in Zhelodobko, 
Kokovin, Parenti & Thisse. The reason is that variable elasticity is crucial for the R&D 
effects, while general equilibrium is more relevant for trade than partial equilibrium. Our 
                                                 
* We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Russian government grant No 
11.G34.31.0059, Russian Foundation for Basic Research grant No 12-06-00174-a, and an 
individual grant 11-5231 from the Economics Education and Research Consortium (EERC, with 
funds provided by the Eurasia Foundation, the US Agency for International Development, The 
World Bank, the Global Development Network and the Government of Sweden). 
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first results in Bykadorov, Kokovin, Zhelobodko (2012) relate to a closed economy, now 
they are extended to trade, that required a new model. 
Monopolistic Competition trade model 
Assumptions are typical: (i) Increasing returns to scale in (identical) firms; marginal 
costs ( )c f  depend on investment cost f . (ii) Each firm i  produces one “variety'' as a 
price-maker, but its demand  , ,i i jx p p   is influenced by other varieties. (ii) Each 
demand function results from additive utility function   .ii NU u x di   (iv) Number 
of firms is big enough to ignore firm's influence on the whole industry/economy and free 
entry drives all profits to zero. (v) Labor supply/demand in each country is balanced, 
trade is balanced. 
Goods and consumers . There are HN firms (=varieties) in Home country, FN  firms 
(=varieties) in Foreign country, 
H
L  identical consumers in Home country, 
F
L  identical 
consumers in Foreign country. World population is ,
H F
L L L   countries’ shares are 
 / , 1 / .H Fs L L s L L    Consumer's elementary utility function is ( ),u x  and 
( )
i
x i x  () : [0, ]H Fx N N R    denotes the demand for i -th variety. Each 
consumer sells a unit of labor (numararie) and chooses an (infinite-dimensional) 
consumption vector ()x   in utility-maximization as follows 
in country { , } :K H F  
   
0 0 , 0
0 0
max
,
H F
HK FK
H F
N N
HK FK
i i
x x
N N
HK HK FK FK K
i i i i
u x di u x di
p x di p x di w

    
 
 
 
where MK
i
p  is the price of variety i  produced in country { , }M H F  and consumed in 
,K  while Kw  are wages normalized as Hw w  and 1.Fw    
Using a Lagrange multiplier 
K
  in country K and FOC, the inverse demand for i -th 
variety is 
   * , .
MK
iMK MK
i i K
K
u x
p x 


  
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Producers: Any i -th firm in country { , }K H F  knows both inverse-demand functions 
   * ,KK KK KK KKi i i i Kp x p x   and    * , ,KM KM KM KMi i i i Mp x p x   and chooses its output 
K KK KM
i K i M i
Q L x L x   where K M  and 1   is the iceberg trade-cost 
coefficient. Total cost, measured in numararie is     ,K K K K Ki i i iC Q w c f Q f    
where marginal cost  c   depends on investment ,Kif  and decreases: ' 0.c   A firm 
chooses  , Ki ix f  to maximize its profit: 
     , .K KK KK KK KM KM KM Ki i i K i i i M i ip x L x p x L x C Q K M      
FOC w.r.t. K
i
f  yield   1K Kc f Q    (we drop index i  further because of symmetry). 
Equilibrium is a bundle  , , , , , , , ,HH FH HF FF H F H Fx x x x f f N N w  satisfying all FOC, SOC 
and budgets, free entry and labor balances. 
Main Results. We find that in any situations: (i) Changing trade cost has the opposite 
impacts on number of firms (diversity) and productivity: when diversity increases 
productivity goes down. (ii) Under “Home-Market Effect” (disproportionally many firms 
in the bigger country), the country size also yields such opposite impacts: where 
diversity is bigger – productivity is smaller. 
Other effects like market integration/globalization (decreasing trade cost  ) – depend on 
the Arrow-Pratt measure of concavity defined for any function :g      g
zg z
r z
g z

 

. 
All markets are classified into those with increasingly-elastic demands (
u
r  >0) or 
decreasingly-elastic demands. Namely, in special case of small cost 1, 0.5s    we 
prove that: 
(i) Elasticities of R&D investments and outputs w.r.t.  have the same sign as .ur   
Moreover, investments and outputs are higher in the bigger country: 
 , 0.H F H F uf f Q Q r x      
(ii) Elasticities of masses of firms w.r.t.   has the opposite sign to .ur   Moreover, the 
mass of firms is smaller in the bigger country:   0,H F uN N r x    
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(iii) Elasticity of the bigger country’s wage w  w.r.t.  is positive. Thereby, the bigger 
country has higher wages. 
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Abstract Market wages reflect expected productivity by using signals of past performance and 
past experience. These signals are generated at least partially on the job and create incentives for 
agents to choose high-profile and highly visible tasks. If agents have private information about the 
profitability of different tasks, firms may wish to prevent over-investment in visible tasks by 
increasing their opportunity costs. Firms can do so, for instance, by using employee perks. 
Heterogeneity in employee types induces substantial diversity in organizational and contractual 
choices, particularly regarding the extent to which conspicuous activities are tolerated or 
encouraged, the use of employee perks, and contingent wages. 
Keywords: Multitask Agency, Employee Perks, Career Concerns, Organizational Heterogeneity  
 
Many studies have documented the existence of within-industry heterogeneity 
in organizational choice, corporate infrastructure, and contractual choice [see, e.g.,][for a 
survey]Gibbons2010. This heterogeneity is particularly visible in attitudes towards 
idleness at work as embodied in corporate investments in perks. Employees at Google 
have at their disposal a wide variety of on site services and sports facilities, such as 
tennis courts, a climbing wall, free catering in high-profile restaurants and cafeterias, and 
various entertainment facilities (such as table football). Additionally, they are allowed to 
use one workday per week for personal projects.† 
However, even within the same industry the provision of employee perks is by 
no means homogeneous. Google's founders state:  
                                                 
*We are grateful for comments from Andy Newman and the seminar participants at BU, CEU, 
Université de Lausanne, and Stony Brook Game Theory Meeting 2011. All remaining errors are, 
of course, our own. 
†Microsoft and Yahoo! also provide access to substantial perks, including free cafeterias, a game 
room, massage services, or lake access. Blizzard Entertainment is supposed to outfit its employees 
with digital equipment for its online game World of Warcraft. 
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We provide many unusual benefits for our employees, [...] We believe it is easy 
to be penny wise and pound foolish with respect to benefits that can save employees 
considerable time and improve their health and productivity.*  
In contrast, Chad Little, a former Apple employee, states the following:  
[At Apple] The cafe costs, [...] Every floor has a vending machine, which also 
costs [...] The gym also isn't free, [...] I recall one person asked Steve why these benefits 
were so low, and the main response was 'it's my job to make your stock go up so you can 
afford these things.'†  
This paper argues that workers' task choice is distorted by their career concerns, 
and firms' contractual and organizational choices react to this distortion. If employees 
are heterogeneous in their career concerns, companies that are very similar in technology 
and employee characteristics may nevertheless choose substantially different 
organizations, giving rise to within-industry organizational heterogeneity. 
We focus specifically on the determinants of firms investments in employee 
perks rewarding idleness. Idleness can be desirable for a principal if, because of career 
concerns, employees have an incentive to over-invest in complex, visible tasks that 
generate signals about the agent's ability. This issue is of particular concern in creative 
professions, if the agent has private information about the profitability of different tasks, 
that is, the agent has expert knowledge. 
To balance their employees' bias toward visible tasks, firms may distort their 
organizational investments toward employee perks that are complementary to idleness. 
That is, employee perks that seem to encourage idleness are actually meant do so. 
However, for agents who derive high value from generating signals on the job, the 
reward for idleness necessary to balance incentives may be very costly. In this case the 
optimal organizational form looks substantially different, and encourages agents to work 
on conspicuous projects while discouraging idleness, though it occasionally results in 
inefficient task choices. Therefore small differences in the strength of employees' career 
concerns can generate substantial variety in firms' organizational choices and in the 
extent to which they tolerate and reward idleness. 
PerlowPorter2009 provide empirical support for the relevance of career 
concerns on employees' tasks choice. They report on a four-years experiment at several 
                                                 
*Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Letter from the Founders: "An Owner's Manual" for Google's 
Shareholders, accessed from http://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-founders-letter.html  
†Retrieved from http://www.quora.com/Apple-Inc-2/What-is-the-internal-culture-like-at-Apple 
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offices of the Boston Consulting Group, where ``people believe that a 24/7 work ethic is 
essential for getting ahead, so they work 60-plus hours a week and are slaves of their 
BlackBerry.''* The treatment consisted of forcing people to take time off. Each member 
of the treatment teams had to leave the office without access to email or BlackBerry for a 
period of either one full day or one evening per week, depending on the version of the 
treatment. The paper describes at length the strong resistance toward the project from the 
consultants, who would have preferred to continue working. The effect of the treatment 
was that participants reported ``more open communication, increased learning and 
development, and a better product delivered to the client.† That is, incentives to generate 
signals appear to have determined working behavior and task choice, and may affect 
output. 
This reasoning applies to areas other than corporate organizational choice. For 
example, some health care plans in the United States explicitly reward physicians for 
inactivity by way of bonuses, fee withholds, and expanded capitation 
[see][]orentlicher1996paying.‡ In addition to contracts that reward inactivity, other 
forms (e.g., capitation or fee-for-service) are also widely used, generating substantial 
contractual heterogeneity. The argument also extends to cases where agents, instead of 
remaining idle, may pursue other productive tasks that do not generate any signal about 
the agents' abilities. Interpreting teaching as a routine task, academia seems a case in 
point; universities have substantial organizational heterogeneity with respect to 
incentives for teaching and research. 
To formalize our argument we use a principal-agent model. The agents' 
productivities are unknown, but their expected values are publicly observable. An agent 
chooses to perform one of two tasks. One task is routine and its outcome is independent 
of the agent's productivity; it may be interpreted as idleness. The other task is complex, 
its outcome is uncertain, and its probability of success depends on the agent's 
productivity. Its expected return is known only to the agent and may exceed or fall short 
of the profit of the routine task. Hence, the visible task can be interpreted as starting a 
                                                 
*PerlowPorter2009 page 1. 
†Ibid. page 4. 
‡Physicians may be motivated by their reputation among patients to over-prescribe treatments in 
the hope of increasing future revenue, a form of career concern. Bonuses, fee withholds, and 
expanded capitation work roughly as follows: if the total cost of treatments prescribed by a 
physician falls short of the prespecified amount, the physician receives a bonus payment. 
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new project, initiating a merger, or launching a marketing campaign. The task is visible: 
its outcome is publicly observable and generates a signal about the agent's productivity. 
Principals invest in two types of corporate infrastructure: productive perks (e.g., 
large office space or a powerful computer) that are complementary to the visible task, 
and employee perks (e.g., a swimming pool or a free cafeteria) that are complementary 
to idleness. Labor contracts need to respect limited liability and fall into one of two 
regimes: flexible contracts induce the agent to choose a task conditional on the tasks' 
expected profitabilities, while rigid contracts induce the agent to choose a specific task 
independently of its profitability. 
Because an agent lives for two periods, choosing the visible task when young 
affects the agent's expected productivity and payoff when old. That is, agents have career 
concerns, which are stronger the less informative the prior belief about their productivity 
is. In the labor market equilibrium the type of contract offered and the level and 
composition of corporate infrastructure depend on the market value and the strength of 
the agent's career concerns. Higher market value affects organizational choice because 
being able to generate signals on the job is part of an agent's compensation. Stronger 
career concerns increase the cost of satisfying incentive compatibility in a flexible 
contract. Hence, all old agents (who have no career concerns) obtain flexible contracts 
that maximize expected output. For young agents (who have career concerns), satisfying 
incentive compatibility may require the composition of corporate investments to be 
distorted. Given a young and an old agents of equal productivity who both obtain 
flexible contracts, employee perks are higher and productive perks are lower for the 
young agent than for the old agent. 
Career concerns generate heterogeneity in contractual and organizational choice 
for the young. Young agents who have high market value, high expected productivity, 
and thus relatively low career concerns (“proven talents”) receive flexible contracts. 
These contracts implement the profit-maximizing task choice and efficient investment. 
Young agents of intermediate expected productivity (”high potentials”) have 
intermediate market value and derive high value from generating a signal. For these 
agents, a flexible contract that rewards idleness to balance incentives is very costly to 
implement. They receive rigid contracts that implement the visible task regardless of its 
return. This regime corresponds to organizations with strong emphasis on long working 
hours, where idleness is discouraged. Finally, agents with low expected productivity and 
low market value but strong career concerns (”hidden gems”) receive flexible contracts. 
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Low market value and limited liability cause corporate investment to be distorted 
downwards, particularly for productive perks. The value of generating a signal may be 
high enough for these agents, such that using rigid instead of flexible contracts increases 
aggregate surplus. However, limited liability makes it impossible to compensate the 
principal for the loss in expected profit caused by switching to a rigid contract. Because 
the different regimes are determined by cut-off productivity levels, corporate investment 
in perks is discontinuous in employees' expected productivity. 
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Abstract. The paper proposes a mathematical model of coopetitive game that analyzes general 
asymmetric R&D alliances. The coopetitive point of view, which considers both collaboration and 
competition together, allows to analyze the functioning of alliances that arise between small and 
large firms. Starting from the economic models developed in managerial doctrine and from the 
model of coopetitive game introduced by David Carfì, we adopt an analysis paying attention to 
some of the most debated questions and some of the topics not yet covered in the literature. A 
mathematical model of coopetitive game is particularly suitable for exploring a complex type of 
asymmetric R&D alliances. We propose a formal coopetitive approach, where the coopetitive 
variable of the model is a real variable; a cooperative effort is required even though partners are 
potentially competitors in the marketplace and shape the common payoff space that they create.  
To maximize profit we have suggested; first of all, a complete Pareto analysis (David Carfì), 
secondly - to share conveniently and fairly the utilities - we propose a Kalai Smorodinsky solution 
of the bargaining decision problem, in which the decisional constraint is the Pareto boundary of 
maximum collective utility.  
Keywords: R&D alliances, coopetitive games, Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, win-win solutions 
 
Introduction  
We propose a mathematical model to determine possible suitable behaviors 
(actions) of the partners involved during their strategic interactions, from both the non-
cooperative and cooperative points of view. More in details, we apply the complete 
analysis of a coopetitive differentiable game (Carfì, 2009). To do so, we refer to a 
specific case: the R&D strategies of a well-established firm.  
Each firm competes in the market with all the other firms, but it may also 
choose to collaborate with the other firms on the market by adopting an innovative 
technology. 
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The idea of coopetitive game is already used, in a mostly intuitive and non-
formalized way, in Strategic Management Studies (see for example Brandenburgher and 
Nalebuff). 
The idea.A coopetitive game is a game in which two or more players 
(participants) can interact cooperatively and non-cooperatively at the same time. Even 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff, creators of coopetition, did not dene, precisely, a 
quantitative way to implement coopetition in the Game Theory context. 
The problem to implement the notion of coopetition in Game Theory is 
summarized in the following question: 
how do, in normal form games, cooperative and non-cooperative interactions 
can live together simultaneously, in a Brandenburger-Nalebuff sense? 
In order to explain the above question, consider a classic two-player normal-
form gain game   ( , )G f   – such a game is a pair in which f  is a vector valued 
function defined on a Cartesian product *E F  with values in the Euclidean plane and 
  is the natural strict sup-order of the Euclidean plane itself (the sup-order is indicating 
that the game, with payoff function f , is a gain game and not a loss game). Let E  and 
F  be the strategy sets of the two players in the game G . The two players can choose the 
respective strategies x  in E  and y  in F  cooperatively (exchanging information and 
making binding agreements); not-cooperatively (not exchanging information or 
exchanging information but without possibility to make binding agreements). 
The above two behavioral ways are mutually exclusive, at least in normal-form 
games: the two ways cannot be adopted simultaneously in the model of normal-form 
game (without using convex probability mixtures, but this is not the way suggested by 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff in their approach); there is no room, in the classic normal 
form game model, for a simultaneous (non-probabilistic) employment of the two 
behavioral extremes cooperation and non-cooperation. 
Towards a possible solution. David Carfi has proposed a manner to pass this 
impasse, according to the idea of coopetition in the sense of Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff. In a Carfi's coopetitive game model, the players of the game have their 
respective strategy-sets (in which they can choose cooperatively or not cooperatively); 
there is a common strategy set C  containing other strategies (possibly of different type 
with respect to those in the respective classic strategy sets) that must be chosen 
cooperatively; the strategy set C  can also be structured as a Cartesian product (similarly 
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to the strategy space of normal form games), but in any case the strategies belonging to 
this new set C  must be chosen cooperatively. 
The Model 
In this model we have three players that interact together. 
We assume that: 
- our first player is a Large Firm (LF) that, in order to develop new products, 
decides to cooperate with a Small Firm (the second player), operating in the 
same sector; 
- in order to achieve cooperation the first and the second players constitute a 
Research Joint Venture (RJV) which is our third player;  
- the Large Firm determines the amount x  of production to buy from the RJV; its 
revenues are given by the difference between the sale price and the purchase 
price of x  quantity of production; 
- the first player pays the sunk costs ’C  of the RJV and funding research of small 
firm ( ’’a y ); 
- revenues for the second player are equal to ’’p z , where ’’p  is the product price 
and z  is the quantity of production. Costs of the second player are represented 
by investment for research and they are equal to y . 
- the Research Joint Venture revenues are calculated as: 
’   (  – )p x p z x  
where ’p x  is profit from selling x  at price ’p  and 
(  – )p z x  
represents profit from selling  – z x  at price   ’p p . Lastly, the costs faced by the RJV 
are equal to 
 – ’’cz p z  
where cz  is the cost to produce the quantity z  and ’’p z  is the payment received from 
the small firm for the product z .  
- C’ is a positive constant for the RJV because the sunk costs are paid by the first 
player. 
To clarify the model we resume the principal features of our game: 
1) the real number x  is the production decided by the first player to buy from 
research joint venture (RJV), and it is assumed in [0,1]; 
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2) the real number y  represents money for research invested by the second player 
and it is assumed in [0,1]; 
3) the real number z  is the production decided by both players I and II (together) 
of the RJV, with constraint [0,4]; 
4) the payoff function of the first player is: 
1
( , , )  (  – ’)  – ’ – ’’f x y z p p x C a y  
where: 
- (  – ’)p p x  is profit from selling x  at price p  in the market and buying x  at 
price ’p  from RJV; 
- ’C  represents the sunk costs invested by the first player to RJV; 
- ’’a y  is extra-payment for research  y to the second player ( ’’ 1a  ); 
5) the payoff function of the second player is: 
2
( , , )  ’’   ’’  – f x y z p z a y y   
where: 
- ’’p z  is the payment received by RJV for the product z ; 
- ’’a y  is extra-payment for research y ( ’’ 1a  ) received by the first player 
(LF); 
6) the payoff function of the third player is: 
3
( , , )  ’   (  – )  –  – ’’   ’f x y z p x p z x cz p z C    
where: 
- ’p x  is the profit from selling x  at price ’p ;  
- (  – )p z x  represents the profit from selling  – z x  at price   ’p p ; 
- cz  is the cost to produce a quantity  z ; 
- ’’p z  is the payment received by RJV for the product z , where     ’’p c p  . 
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1.Introduction 
Altruistic lobbying is lobbying in the public interest or in the interest of the least 
protected part of the society. This “or” is the point: it is necessary to bear in mind that an 
altruist has a wide range of strategies, from behaving in the interest of the society as a 
whole to the support of the most disadvantaged ones. How can we compare the 
effectiveness of such strategies? The second question is: “Given a strategy, is it possible 
to estimate the optimal number of participants choosing it?” Finally, do the answers to 
these questions depend on the level of well-being in the society? For example, can we 
say that the poorer the society, the more important is to focus on the support of the 
poorest? We answer these questions within the framework of the model of social 
dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment [1–5]. 
Consider a society consisting of n  members (agents); each of them is 
characterized by a real scalar interpreted as the utility (or capital) level; a negative value 
is naturally interpreted as a debt. Let the initial distribution of capital be given. A 
proposal of the environment is a vector of increments of individual capitals. Let these 
increments be random variables; in the simplest case, we assume that they are 
independent and identically distributed with mean   and standard deviation  . The 
environment generates a series of proposals each of which is put to the vote. Every agent 
takes part in the voting and has one vote. With some voting procedure, the profile of 
votes is converted into a collective decision: the proposal is approved or rejected. The 
approved proposals are implemented: the participants get the capital increments 
specified in the proposal. Considering a large series of votes, one can explore the 
dynamics of the vector of agents’ capital: in different environments, with different social 
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attitudes, and with various voting procedures. An interesting version of the model is that 
with ruining: the agents whose capital values become negative are ruined. 
2. A study of altruistic lobbying  
Consider a society consisting of two categories of agents: selfish and altruistic 
ones. An egoist votes for a proposal if and only if this proposal increases his/her capital.  
As noted in the introduction, the altruists have a wide range of strategies. 
Consider the following type of strategy. We order all agents by the increase of the 
current capital value. Since the capital increments are real-valued random variables, we 
can assume that all capitals are different. Let an integer 
0
n n  be fixed. For the current 
proposal, one calculates the total capital increment of 
0
n  poorest agents. An altruist 
supports the proposal if and only if this total is positive, no matter what happens to 
his/her own capital. If 
0
n n , then the altruist supports those proposals that enrich the 
society as a whole. When 
0
n  is smaller, then she supports more or less numerous 
“lower” stratum of the society. 
Let K be the same initial capital of all the agents. Assume that the di. As a 
criterion of the effectiveness of this strategy we consider the relative number of 
participants that “survive” until the end of the game. Another important parameter is the 
number (percentage) of altruists in the society. 
We study the following question: “How the effectiveness of altruists’ strategy 
depends on their proportion and the threshold 0n  at various parameters µ  and σ ?” In 
other words, “What is the optimal proportion of altruists in the society and what is their 
optimal strategy in a favorable ( 0µ > ), neutral ( 0µ = ), and unfavorable ( 0µ < ) 
environment?” 
Some simulation results are as follows. Let the society consist of 100n =  
agents; the number of altruists, m , varies. The experiments are conducted at 12σ = ; 
game lasts 500 steps. On the two horizontal axes in Fig.1, we have the number of 
altruists, m , and their strategy parameter 0n ; along the vertical axis, the relative number 
of agents at the end of the game. In the diagrams, µ  and the initial capital K  of the 
agents are also shown. Some results are as follows. 
1. In a neutral environment ( 0µ = ) and with the support of the poorest agents 
( 0n  is small), the number of altruists should be small, or they waste their influence, 
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resulting in ruining players outside the “support screen”. At a high 0n , we have 
saturation with the increase of the number of altruists. With 40K = , the optimum is 
reached at 0 50n =  and 40m >  (at high values of m, saturation holds). In other words, 
altruists should support the lower half of the community. With the extension of the 
support screen, the effectiveness of the altruistic strategy declines. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. 
 
2. In an unfavorable environment ( 0.5µ = − ) and a high initial capital ( 130K = ), 
the picture is very similar. The only significant difference is that there is no pronounced 
effect of reducing the effectiveness of the strategy with the increase of the right border of 
the support screen. A maximum is reached at 0 30n =  and 10m = , but it does not change 
significantly with an increase of these parameters. 
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3. In an unfavorable environment ( 0.5µ = − ) and a lower initial capital 
( 40K = ), the maximum is reached at 0 80n =  and 60m = . This is a very interesting 
conclusion: in a really harsh environment, we have to support everyone! 
4. Finally, in a supportive environment with a high initial capital ( 0.5µ = , 
130K = ), the picture changes dramatically: we should support a thin layer of the 
poorest; the others will “resurface themselves”. 
The main conclusion is simple: in rich and affluent societies, support of the 
poorest is effective. The poorer is the society, the more “wasteful” is the support of the 
poorest. If you focus on this support, then the zone of trouble grows. A more detailed 
analysis of the results reveals some more subtle phenomena as well 
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After Parliament elections the situation when different parties that could obtain 
a positive number of sits have to decide which coalitions to join to create a majority is 
quite standard on the political podium. In real life it happens quite often that different 
majorities are feasible and several parties may choose among a number of alternatives. 
In such cases it is important to have a tool that may allow the parties to evaluate 
correctly their actual position under different possibilities and, therefore, to make the 
better decision concerning their own choice. On the other hand the same tool may be 
used by an external agent who wants to predict which coalition is more likely to form the 
majority. This problem is usually modeled from the game theoretical point of view as a 
simple cooperative game (often a weighted majority game is used for this purpose). A 
solution to such a game is called a power index. Several power indices are proposed in 
the literature in order to take into account different features of possible situations; for 
instance, indices emphasizing the importance of the ordering in the majority formation 
process (Shapley and Shubik, 1954), the possibility to form different majorities 
(Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971), the role played by parties in the majorities with 
minimal number of agents (Deegan and Packel, 1978; Holler, 1982). 
However, for creation of the majority not only the ability of parties to create 
winning coalitions is important. Also bilateral communication abilities of the parties, or 
in other words their social network relations, are of great importance. So, the social 
capital that highlights the importance of social network relations in social affairs needs 
to be evaluated. Assuming that interests of individuals (players) and their coalitions are 
represented by means of a cooperative game with transferable utility and players' 
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personal bilateral relations (social network) are introduced via an undirected 
communication graph, González-Arnagüena, Khmelnitskaya, Manuel and del Pozo 
(2011, yet unpublished) introduced a numerical measure of an individual social capital 
as an excess of the player’s payoff given by the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) over 
that given by the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). This difference provides a tool for 
revealing the influence of the player's social network relations to the outcome of the 
game. 
Besides, the evaluation of individual social capital of political parties also needs 
to involve into account the asymmetry of players represented via their personal weights. 
Simple example of a hypothetical parliament consisting of 99 members and composed 
by three parties that have correspondingly 49, 49 and 1 seats clearly demonstrates the 
importance of the inclusion of individual weights into the determination of the individual 
social capital. Indeed, while all these tree parties play equal roles in the creation of 
winning coalitions (any two-party coalition in this example is winning) the social 
evaluation and social respect of these parties is much different. However, the 
replacement of the Shapley and Myerson values in the definition of the social capital 
index by their weighted analogs is senseless, first, because the weighted Shapley value is 
not monotonic with respect to players' weights, and second, because of the strict increase 
of computational complexity. 
In this paper we propose to evaluate the individual social capital through the 
difference of the restricted weighted Deegan-Packel index over the weighted Deegan-
Packel index. Using the similar ideas to that staying behind the definitions of the 
weighted Shapley value and Deegan-Packel index, we define the weighted Deegan-
Packel index of a player as a sum of the player’s power shares in all minimal winning 
coalitions the player belongs to while the total power is equally shared among all 
minimal winning coalitions and within each minimal winning coalition it is distributed 
proportionally to players’ weights. Taking into account also the definition of the 
Myerson value, we define the restricted weighted Deegan-Packel similarly, but now via 
not all minimal winning coalitions but only via feasible ones. The new social capital 
index includes already information concerning the parties' ability to create winning 
coalitions, the communication graph structure and also the individual weights. 
Moreover, some preliminary computations allow us to observe that the new social 
capital index is possible to compute for essentially bigger communities than the old one. 
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The dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 bore three new sovereign states in 
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. They host 27.8 tcm of proven 
conventional natural gas reserves, which is 13.3% of the world total. However, being 
landlocked pipelines carrying Central Asian gas to distant markets have to cross multiple 
countries with different strategic interests. By virtue of the Soviet gas pipeline network 
the Central Asian countries rely on Russia to transport their gas westwards to European 
markets and Turkey. In the beginning of nineties the USA initiated the offshore Trans 
Caspian pipeline through Caspian Sea in order to mitigate the newly sovereign Central 
Asian countries’ dependence on Russia and to diversify imports of Southeast Europe and 
Turkey. Following the American example, in the last two decades different stakeholders 
in the region broached several pipeline projects which compete for transit of Central 
Asian gas to the West. However, in 2007 the Central Asian countries endorsed the 
Turkmenistan-China pipeline heading to the East in order to access the rapidly growing 
Chinese market. In this paper I question the Central Asian countries’ choice of 
gravitating eastwards to China instead of westwards to Europe and Turkey, and I study 
which pipeline project heading westwards benefit the Central Asian countries at most. 
The Central Asian countries have a number of pipeline options to diversify their 
transport routes as well as export markets. While there is only the Turkmenistan- China 
pipeline to reach eastwards, three routes extend from Central Asia to the West: via 
Caspian Sea, via Iran, and via Russia (see the Figure 1). However, each route has its own 
peculiar obstacle. Towards the East in order to reach China Turkoman gas has to travel 
long distances through two transit countries: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which are 
potential suppliers as well. Towards the West the route via Caspian Sea is blocked due to 
legal disputes over Caspian Sea’s status and demarcation. The route via Russia 
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strengthens Russia’s dominance on transport of Central Asian gas and exacerbates the 
Central Asian countries’ deadlock. The West’s protests and political uncertainties make 
investment in the route via Iran unlikely any time soon. 
A pipeline can increase the Central Asian countries’ (bargaining) power in two 
ways: it intensifies demand competition for their gas by linking them to new consumer 
markets, and it enhances transit competition for their gas by introducing a new transport 
route to their export markets or increasing capacities of existing transport routes. Players 
can act strategically in order to shape the pipeline network according totheir benefit. By 
endorsing a pipeline project a player can increase demand and/or transit competition for 
particular supplies and thus, can forestall investment in alternative pipeline projects 
which lessen its power. Moreover, a player can transfer a part of its power to other 
players in order to prevent their investment in a pipeline which weakens its power or in 
order to convince them for investment in a pipeline which subsides their power. If a 
player gains from a pipeline project, it can use the option to invest in the project as a 
bargaining chip in negotiations of gas prices, tariffs etc. with other players in order to 
derive a larger share of surplus (power) from the cooperation. 
Figure 1: The Network 
 
Those pipelines under construction or planning, which we consider in detail are dashed: 
Nord Stream in Blue, South Stream in Orange, and Nabucco-West in Magenta, Trans 
Adriatic (TAP) in Dark Green, Trans Anatolian (TANAP) in Light Green, Trans Caspian 
in Pink, the Persian in Yellow and the Turkmenistan-China in Red. White circles 
represent regions where we have a major transit node, which is linked to local 
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production, local customers and local LNG regasification plants if there is any (the nodes 
are not shown separately). Solid arrows represent the main pipelines as existing in 2009. 
Grey nodes and pipelines are taken into account for but not associated with a region in 
our analysis. 
In order to analyze the impact of the pipeline projects on the power structure of 
the Eurasian gas trade, I modify the disaggregated quantitative model introduced in 
Hubert & Cobanli (2012) slightly. I shift the focus of the model from the EU towards 
Central Asia by introducing non-European consumer markets and China which were left 
out in the referred paper. The cooperative game among the players are represented in 
value function form which captures essential economic features of the Eurasian gas 
trade, especially the architecture of the pipeline network. The Shapley value, which is 
referred as the power of the player as well, allocates the surplus from cooperation within 
the players by taking interdependencies among the players into account. Since 
introduction of a new pipeline alters the pipeline network, the value function and thus, 
the Shapley value of the players change accordingly. The difference between a player’s 
pre- and post-project Shapley values gives the pipeline’s impact on its power. 
My results confirm the Central Asian countries decision to uphold the 
Turkmenistan- China pipeline instead of the western pipeline projects aiming European 
and Turkish markets. However, for the main supplier in the region, Turkmenistan, 
gravitating to the West via the Caspian route is the most profitable option to diversify its 
transport routes and export markets. Surprisingly, carrying Central Asian gas further to 
European markets via the Nabucco-West pipeline or the TAP brings nothing to the 
Central Asian suppliers due to the number of transit countries on the route. If 
Azerbaijani gas is carried through the Southern Corridor to European markets, the 
leverage accruing to the European regions from additional Central Asian supplies is 
insufficient for an European investment in the Trans-Caspian pipeline. The South Stream 
pipeline benefits European consumers much more than the Southern Corridor, and 
contrary to European concerns, it cannot hinder investment in the route via Caspian Sea. 
Turkmenistan has enough spare production capacity to serve Western and Chinese 
demand simultaneously. Thus, there is no demand competition between the West and the 
East. 
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Abstract The main aim of this paper is to discuss power in game theory, in order to model the 
asymmetries of forces among the players of the game. The starting point is that games are 
strategic interactions between rational individuals in a social environment and the players don´t 
have equal forces. Game theory has increased hugely in the last number of years, including 
several new branches; however, the concept of power in game theory has not been explored to any 
great extent. Indeed, power is a broad concept that has no clear definition. This paper formalize a 
model taking account the asymmetric forces between players. It is given some examples, using 
some well-known games, to illustrate this relation involving power. As a result, this paper presents 
an approach in two scientific areas still distant, sociology and game theory. 
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Some kinds of words or concepts don´t have a precisely meaning. Power is one 
of these words. It is said that the president of a nation has power, while the civilian 
people don´t. In other hand, in a democratic environment, the coalition of people is a 
source of power, because is exactly the coalition that will decide who will be the 
governor. The director of a company has power, while the works don´t have, but one of 
these works could be a leader of union, and he could be as powerful as the director. A 
teacher has power over his students, because he can assign grade to students. All know 
that in recent times Europe and the United States have been losing of its economic power 
to China. 
In fact, power is an abstract noun as love. It is impossible to see, to touch or to 
measure it, but it´s possible to feel it. Nye (2011) says that is very common compare 
power with other things, like energy (physics) or money (economy). Both these 
comparison are mistaken. It´s impossible compare power with energy due this one can 
be measured, and also with money, because money is liquid and interchangeable.   
To understand the “nature” of this word, different theorists and sciences, 
including sociology, psychology, politics and economics, have been developing different 
or complementary concepts of power and its relation to society. Power, in fact, is a broad 
concept, involves different sciences and has a long historical approach. Hobbes, for 
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instance, was one the first philosophers that analyzed the mean of power in the modern 
ages – 17th Century. These ideas were published in the Leviathan. To him, power is the 
ability to secure well-being or personal advantage to obtain, in the future, some apparent 
good.  
After Hobbes, a huge number of understandings were developed, but the 
meaning is the same: the asymmetries of forces. It is clear that power has different view 
and that differs according with time and space. Power, in fact, is an important concept 
within the society, and arises from the interaction between people. In this sense, power 
could be thought like different views, including sociological, anthropological, 
international politics, economic, for instance.  
In these senses, the aim of this paper is to discuss power in game theory, in 
order to model the asymmetries of forces among the players of the game. The starting 
point is that games are strategic interactions between rational individuals in a social 
environment and the players don´t have equal forces. Game theory has increased hugely 
in the last number of years, including several new branches; however, the concept of 
power in game theory has not been explored to any great extent. Indeed, power is a 
broad concept that has no clear definition. This paper formalize a model taking account 
the asymmetric forces between players. Beside this introduction, this paper discusses 
two specific topics, the concepts about power and the presents a model of game that 
include power, after that is presented the conclusions. 
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The theory of contests analyzes conflicts where agents spend resources in order 
to obtain a prize. But the theory never explained what happens if an agent spends 
repeatedly resources and never gets the prize. It is likely that this agent, sooner or later, 
will be bankrupted and will face liquidation. In this paper we analyze a two period 
contest in which agents may become bankrupt at the end of the first period. A bankrupt 
agent is not present in the second period of the game. We prove that a subgame perfect 
equilibrium in pure strategies exists for almost all parameter configurations and show 
that bankruptcy may happen in equilibrium. In particular, we distinguish between bold 
strategies (risky) strategies where the agent might be bankrupt in the second period and a 
prudent (safe) strategy where she is never bankrupted. We prove that poor and impatient 
agents have incentives to play bold strategies. Finally, we provide historical examples of 
contests in which bankruptcy played a paramount role. 
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Recently Prof Shapley won his long overdue Nobel Prize in Economics Science 
on Gale-Shapley algorithm in matching theory (American Mathematical Monthly 
(1962). Since the publication of above seminal paper the matching frame work has 
received a great deal of attention of many great economist and mathematicians all over 
the world.  
A matching, as the name suggests, is the pairing up of elements from two sets. 
The ‘marriage market’ seeks to match men and women. The ‘admissions market’ tries to 
allocate students to schools or colleges. The matching framework even applies to 
unusual things, such as kidney exchange, where kidney donors are matched with 
recipients for transplant surgery. Many of these markets existed in the US during the 
decade of 1950s, but functioned inefficiently. This was either due to imperfect credit 
market, bounded rationality and asymmetric information. However, mostly these 
markets also functioned badly because of a failure of coordination between the two sides 
of the transaction, and the underlying rules that encouraged gaming of the system. For 
example, the market for medical residents was established in 1952, in which the 
hospitals competed with each other to offer residency positions to medical students. 
Initially, there were very few students and a very few rules. The intense competition for 
them led hospitals to make offers even as much as two years in advance. Students, on the 
other hand, benefited from waiting as long as possible, in case a better hospital happened 
to offer them a position. This led to market failure as both the students and hospitals 
remained unmatched. The hospitals made fewer offers than they had positions open, and 
students routinely strategized their applications for residencies and efforts to streamline 
the process proved useless. Prof Shapley proposed a mechanism that was guaranteed to 
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produce a stable matching. It had the added benefit of encouraging truth-telling by both 
parties meaning thereby revealing their true preferences.  
The original case made by Gale and Shapley described a marriage market, but it 
was immediately clear that their proposed solution the Deferred Acceptance (or DA) 
Algorithm would apply equally well to other situations, like public school matching, 
college admission problems, speed dating, matching kidneys, etc. This algorithm was 
successfully implemented in matching US medical school graduates with hospital 
residency programs. A more dynamic version of the same study in the job markets where 
employees and employers are in the constant search for hiring, firing, moving in, moving 
out according to their expectation rankings have lead to the Nobel prize in Economics 
(2012).  
In subsequent papers on marriage markets it has been shown that the first mover 
will get the best match and should the player failed to reveal their true preferences it 
would lead to inefficient outcome. I proposed a dating game and show that both the 
players are better off (a Pareto superior outcome) if they do not truly reveal theory 
preferences.  
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We consider models of multistage bidding between two agents for shares of two 
type risky assets. Liquidation prices of shares are integer random variables with 
distributions p  over 2 , known to both agents. Before the bidding starts a chance move 
determines the liquidation prices of shares for the whole period of bidding. Player 1 is 
informed on these prices, Player 2 is not. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. 
At each subsequent step both players simultaneously propose their bids for each 
type of assets. The maximal bid wins and one share of corresponding type is transacted 
at this price. Only integer bids are admissible. Each player aims to maximize the value of 
his final portfolio (money plus liquidation value of obtained shares). 
These n -stage models are reduced to repeated games ( )nG p  with incomplete 
information of Player 2 with countable state and action spaces 2  correspondingly. This 
is a discrete bivariate analog of the model introduced in De Meyer B., Moussa Saley H. 
(2002) On the Strategic Origin of Brownian Motion in Finance. Int. J. of Game Theory, 
31, 285-319. 
If share prices have finite variances, then values ( )nV p  of n -stage games are 
bounded from above.This makes reasonable considering games ( )G p∞  with unlimited 
beforehand number of steps. We cannot solve n -stage games but we solve infinite 
games. We begin with constructing solutions for "elementary" games with two and three 
states. 
We construct symmetric representations of probability distributions p  over 2  
with given mean values as probability mixtures of distributions with the same mean 
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values and with not more than three-point supports. The probabilities of three-point 
distributions are proportional to areas of corresponding triangles. These decompositions 
allow us to construct optimal strategies of Player 1 for infinite games ( )G p∞  in general 
case as combinations of his optimal strategies for "elementary" games. As a pattern for 
imitating we take the symmetric representation of univariate distributions. 
Decomposition of bivariate probability distributions. W.l.o.g. we construct 
this decomposition for the set (0,0)Θ  of centered distributions. Let 
1 2
0
,zp z  and 1 2 3
0
, ,zp z z  
be probability distributions over 2  with zero mean values and with supports 1 2{ , }z z  
and 1 2 3{ , , }z z z  respectively. 
Sets of triangles. Consider a set of non-ordered triples 1 2 3( , , )z z z   
0
1 2 3 1 2 3= {( , , ), (0,0) : (0,0) ( , , )}.iz z z z z z z∆ ≠ ∈∆  
We denote 0 1 2 3 1 2 3Int = {( , , ), (0,0) : (0,0) Int ( , , )}iz z z z z z z∆ ≠ ∈ ∆  and 
0
1 2 3 1 2 3= {( , , ), (0,0) : (0,0) ( , , )}iz z z z z z z∂∆ ≠ ∈∂∆ . If 01 2 3( , , )z z z ∈∂∆ , then there is an index i  
such that 1det[ , ] = 0i iz z + . In this case 1arg = arg (modi iz z π+ + 2 ) , the point 1(0,0) [ , ]i iz z +∈  
and the distribution 
1 2 3
0
, ,zp z z  degenerates into the distribution 1
0
,zi ip z +  with the support 
1{ , }i iz z + . 
Sets of complementary couples. For [0,2 )ψ π∈ , let Rψ  be the half-line 
= { : arg = )}R z zψ ψ . With each [0,2 )ψ π∈  we associate three sets of non-ordered couples 
1 2( , )z z   
0 0
1 2 1 2( ) = {( , ), (0,0) : ( , , ) }.iz z z z R z z zψψ∆ ≠ ∀ ∈ ∈∆  
We denote 0 01 2 1 2Int ( ) = {( , ), (0,0) : ( , , ) Int }iz z z z R z z zψψ∆ ≠ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∆  and 
0 0
1 2 1 2( ) = {( , ), (0,0) : ( , , ) }iz z z z R z z zψψ∂∆ ≠ ∀ ∈ ∈∂∆ . We take, that points 1 2( , )z z  are 
indexed counterclockwise. 
Constructing the principal invariant. Now we introduce the value that is a 
bivariate analog of the quantity 
=0
( )
t
t p dt
∞
⋅∫ , for our symmetric representations of 
distributions over 2 . Set  
1 2 1 20 0Int
1( , ) = ( )det[ , ] ( ) ( ).( ) ( )2
p z z p dz p dzψ ψ ψ∆ ∂∆Φ +∫ ∫  
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Theorem 1. For any distribution (0,0)p∈Θ  the quantity ( , )p ψΦ  does not 
depend on ψ , i.e. this is an invariant ( )pΦ  of the distribution (0,0)p∈Θ . 
Remark. For any distribution (0,0)p∈Θ  the quantity ( , )p ψΦ  has the 
following invariant representation:  
3
1 1 2 30 0Int
=1
( 1 / 2 ) det[ , ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) = .
1 (0,0)
j j
j
z z p dz p dz p dz
p
p
+∆ ∂∆
+
Φ
−
∑∫ ∫
 
Let pµ  be the probability measure over 0∆ , such that 
3 3
=1 =1
({ }) ( )p j jj jdz p dzµ ∝∏ ∏ , for 01 2 3( , , ) Intz z z ∈ ∆ ; 
3 3
=1 =1
1({ }) ( )
2p j jj j
dz p dzµ ∝∏ ∏ , for 
0
1 2 3( , , )z z z ∈∂∆ . 
Corollary. The expectation of the area 1 2 3( , , )S z z z  of a 1 2 3( , , )z z z∆  by the 
measure pµ  is given with the formula  
0
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 0
( )(1 (0,0))[ ( , , )] = [ ( , , ) | ( , , ) ] = ,
2 [ ]pp p
p pS z z z S z z z z z zµ
Φ −
∈∆
∆
 

 
where 0[ ]p ∆  is the proportionality coefficient determining the measure pµ . 
The main decomposition theorem. 
Theorem 2. Any distribution (0,0)p∈Θ  has the following symmetric 
decomposition into a convex combination of distributions with not more than three-point 
supports:  
3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
=11 2 3
( , , ) 0= (0,0) (1 (0,0)) ({ })., ,[ ( , , )] z p jjp
S z z zp p p p dzz zS z z zµ
δ µ
∆
⋅ + − ∏∫   
Here the term  
3
1 2 3
0 1 2 3
=11 2 3
( , , ) 0 ({ }), ,[ ( , , )] z p jjp
S z z z p dzz zS z z zµ
µ
∂∆ ∏∫   
1 2
2 1( 1 2( )
( , ) 0= ( ) ( ),, ),( , )( ) ( ) rR Rp
R
p r r p p dr p drrp tp dtψ ψ π
ψ π
ψ
ψ ψ π+Ψ
+
∂Φ +
+Φ∑ ∫ ∫ ∫
 
where ( )pΨ  is a not more than countable set of values of polar angles ψ , such that the 
measures ( )p Rψ  and ( )p Rψ π+  of the half-lines Rψ  and Rψ π+  are more than zero. 
Conditional probabilities and optimal strategies for Player 1. We regard 
coefficients of decomposition as probabilities of distributions with two-, and three-point 
supports in the symmetric representations of distributions (0,0)p∈Θ . This allows to 
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calculate the conditional probability of any extreme distribution given the point z  in its 
support:  
1 2 1 2
1 2
det[ , ] ( ) ( )0{ | } = ,, , ( )p z
z z p z p zP p zz z pΦ
 
0
,
=1
( , ) ( ){ | = } = .
( ) ( )
p kw lw
t
p w l p lwP p z kw
p t p tw
− ∞
∂Φ ⋅ −
⋅
Φ ⋅ −∑
 
Now we construct the optimal strategy for Player 1 making use of the obtained 
decomposition for the initial distribution p . 
a) If the state chosen by chance move is (0,0) , then Player 1 stops the game. 
b) Let the state chosen by chance move be =z kw  or =z lw− , where ,k l∈  
and w W∈ . For definiteness let be =z kw . Then Player 1 chooses either a point 2 =z lw−  
or a pair of points 2 3,z z  by means of lottery with corresponding conditional probabilities. 
c) Player 1 plays the optimal strategy *( | )zσ ⋅  for the state =z kw  in the chosen 
two- or three-point game. 
This study was partially supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic 
Research, projects 10-06-00348-a and 13-01-00462-a. 
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Abstract Hamiache proposed a matrix approach to communication situations. In this work, a 
generalization of this matrix approach to union stable structures is illustrated. First we define an 
efficient Myerson value and show a characterization of this new value. Next, two new families of 
values are introduced axiomatically by associated consistency property.  
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A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by 
cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, shortly 
TU-game, being a pair consisting of a finite set of players and a characteristic function 
on the set of coalitions of players assigning a worth to each coalition of players. In 
practice, since the cooperation restrictions exist, only some subgroup of players can form 
a coalition. One way to describe the structure of partial cooperation in the context of 
cooperative games is to specify sets of feasible coalitions. Algaba, et al [1] considered 
union stable systems as such sets. A union stable system of two intersecting feasible 
coalitions is also feasible, which can be interpreted as the follows: players who are 
common members of two feasible coalitions are able to act as intermediaries to elicit 
cooperation among all the players in either of these coalitions, and so their union should 
be a feasible coalition. And a TU game with a union stable system is called a union 
stable structure. Besides, the union stable structure is a generalization of games with 
communication structure and games with permission structure, which are respectively 
proposed by Myerson and Gilles.  
Hamiache presented a matrix approach to construct extensions of the Shapley 
value on the games with coalition structures and communication structures. This paper 
aims to generalize this matrix approach to union stable structures, a generalized 
communication structures. Note that the partition system proposed by Bilbao is the same 
to the union stable system we discuss here, if we ignore whether or not the empty set is 
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feasible. What worth mention here is that the hypergraph communication situation 
proposed by Nouweland is also belongs to union stable system. 
Definition 1 A matrix A  is called a row (column)–coalition matrix if its rows (column) 
are indexed by coalitions S N⊆ in the lexicographic order. And a row-coalition 
matrix ,[ ]S TA a= is called row-inessential or inessential if , ,[ ]S T i T
i S
A a a
∈
= = ∑ for 
all S N⊆ . 
Definition 2 A union stable system is a pair ( , )N  with 2N⊆ verifying that 
{ }i ∈ for all i N∈ and for all ,S T ∈ with S T∩ ≠ ∅ ,  S T∪ ∈ holds. 
Definition 3 Let 2N⊆ be a set system and S N⊆ . A set T S⊆  is called a 
component− of S  if it is satisfied that T ∈ and there exists no 'T ∈  such 
that 'T T S⊆ .  
Proposition 1 The set system 2N⊆ is union stable if and only if for any \S N⊆ ∅  
with ( )C S ≠ ∅ , components− of S is a partition of S . 
In order to give the formal definition of the efficient Myerson value, two 
matrices closely related to union stable structures are constructed. 
Let us define a {0,1} -square matrix P of order 2 1n − , which is related to union 
stable structure ( , , )N v  . So that for all , 2 \{ }
NS T ∈ ∅ ,  
1, if ( )
[ , ]
0, otherwise
T C S
P S T
∈
= 

  
Next, we shall make a slight modification of the matrix, and define the 
matrixQ as follows, 
1 if
[ , ] 1 if ( \ )
0 otherwise
T S
Q S T T C S S
=
= ∈


  
Lemma 2 Given a union stable structure ( , , )N v  and the intermediate game ( , )vββ  in 
which 1 2{ , ,..., }rB B Bβ = , the vector of weights are 1 2( , ,..., ),rw b b b= l lb β= for all 
{1,2,..., }l r∈ . Then for all lB β∈ and all players li B∈ , 
1( ( ) )[{ }] ( , ( ) ) ( ( , ) ( ))
l
w
L i B l
l
M Q P v i Sh N Q P v Sh v v B
B
ββ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ = −  
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Theorem 3 The efficient Myerson value is the unique value on NUS that satisfies 
efficiency, additivity, average fairness, point anonymity, redundancy equality and 
superfluous property. 
Also the axioms of theorem 1 are logically independent as shown by the six 
alternative solutions.  
Lemma 4 P P P⋅ = and Q Q Q⋅ = . 
Lemma 5 L LP M M⋅ = and L LQ M M⋅ = , where LM is the coefficient matrix 
corresponding to the inessential game ( , )LN v . 
Given a union stable structure ( , , )N v  , the similarity matrix 
is ( ) ( , )F Y I aY Y P Q= + = , and , 1a a∈ ≠ − , define its associated game ( )F Yvλ by the 
following: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
F Y av I Y M I aY v
aλ λ
= − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ =
+
  
 
2
[ ]
1 1
a aM aM Y Y M Y M Y v
a aλ λ λ λ
= + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
+ +
 (1) 
For any given parameter a∈ , 1a ≠ − , the detailed expression of the limit game is 
( ) 1( ) ( )
1 1 1
F Y
L L L L
a av I Y M I aY v M v M Y v
a a a
= − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
+ + +
. 
In the following, we provide the definition of two families of values for union 
stable structures and make a list of the axioms that will be used to characterize these two 
families of value. 
Definition 4 Given a union stable structure ( , , ) NN v US∈ , for any , 1a a∈ ≠ − , we 
define two types of solutions ( ) ,F Yφ where { , }Y P Q∈   
( ) 1( , , )
1 1
F Y aN v Sh
a a
φ ρ= +
+ +
  , 
where ,ρ ϕ η=  if ,Y P Q= respectively.  
Inessential game property For all inessential games ( , )N v with union stable 
systems ( , )N  , the solution verifies ( , , ) ({ })i N v v iφ = for all i N∈ . 
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Associated consistency For all games with union stable systems ( , , )N v  and 
the corresponding associated game ( )( , , )F YN vλ  with 0 2 / nλ< < , we 
have ( )( , , ) ( , , )F YN v N vλφ φ=  . 
Continuity For all convergent sequence of games with union stable 
systems 1{( , , )}m mN v
∞
= , the limit of which is game ( , , )LN v  , 
then lim ( , , ) ( , , )m Lm N v N vφ φ→∞ =  . 
Theorem 6 For any given , 1a a∈ ≠ − , there is a unique value 
( ) ( , , )( { , })F Y N v Y P Qφ ∈ on NUS verifying inessential game property, associated 
consistency and continuity. 
Next we show the relationship existing among these four types of values, 
Myerson value, efficient Myerson value, two families of values ( )F Qφ and ( )F Pφ . For any 
given , 1a a∈ ≠ − , two families of values ( )F Qφ , ( )F Pφ and the Shapley value are linked 
by the relationship of “similarity” are obvious.  
Proposition 7 For the square matrix ,Y P Q= defined in first page, we have  
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
1L L
aI M I Y I Y I aY I M I Y I
a
− ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − =
+
 
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
1L L L L
aI M I Y I Y M I aY I M I Y M Y
a
− ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − = ⋅
+  
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In an earlier paper (Dragan, 2005), we introduced the Inverse Problem for the 
Semivalues of Cooperative TU games as follows: given a Cooperative TU game, a 
weight vector, and a Semivalue associated with this weight vector, find out the set of all 
games for which the given Semivalue associated with the given weight vector is 
obtained for all games in the set. A class of Semivalues, which generalizes the Banzhaf 
value, and it is called the Binomial Semivalues, has been introduced in an earlier paper 
by A.Puente (2000). In this case, the weight vector depends on one parameter, so that the 
results of our previous paper are greatly simplified. In the new paper we derive the 
solution of the Inverse problem without using the previous solution, following a 
somehow different path. The solution is illustrated by the Banzhaf value which is 
obtained for the value one of the parameter. 
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A two-sided assignment market (or game) (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is 
defined by two finite and disjoint sets, usually representing buyers and sellers, a 
valuation matrix that gives the profit of every partnership formed by a pair of agents 
from opposite sectors and a vector of reservation values that represent the profit of an 
individual when remaining alone. Since utility is assumed to be fully transferable, the 
core of the assignment game consists of the set of payoff vectors that efficiently allocate 
the profit achieved by an optimal matching of buyers to sellers in such a way that no 
individual or mixed-pair can improve upon. When utility is not transferable and the only 
data is the strict preference list of each agent over the set of agents of the opposite sector, 
the core of a two-sided matching market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) consists of those 
matchings that are individually rational and pairwise stable, which means that no pair of 
a buyer and a seller would prefer to be matched together than keeping their actual 
partners. Although both models are apparently distinct, almost parallel properties hold 
for the cores of the two markets, such as non-emptiness, the lattice structure and the 
polarization of interest between both sides of the market. 
Axiomatizations of the core of two-sided markets, both with or without 
transferable utility, appear in the recent literature. Sasaki (1995) provides a first 
axiomatization of the core of the assignment game by means of consistency, continuity, 
couple rationality, individual rationality, Pareto optimality and weak pairwise 
monotonicity. Toda (2003) gives another axiomatization, by adapting to the assignment 
game the axioms that characterize the core of the coalitional games in Peleg (1986), that 
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are (Davis and Maschler) consistency, individual rationality, Pareto optimality and 
superadditivity.Two additional axiomatizations for the core of assignment games are 
also provided by Toda (2005) by means of Pareto optimality, (submarket) consistency, 
pairwise monotonicity and individual monotonicity (that can be substituted by 
population monotonicity). It is observed (Toda, 2006) that the cores of the discrete two-
sided matching markets are characterized by axioms that almost overlap with the axioms 
characterizing the core of the two-sided assignment games. In this setting, Toda 
characterizes the core by means of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and 
Maskin monotonicity (that can be substituted by a consistency axiom). And the same 
axioms characterize the core of one-to-many matching markets, that is, when agents on 
one side are allowed to establish partnerships with more than one agent on the opposite 
side. However, as far as we know, no attempt has been made to axiomatically 
characterize the core of multisided markets, those where more than two sectors exist and 
partnerships are formed with exactly one agent of each different sector. In this paper, we 
focus in the transferable utility setting and provide two axiomatizations for the core of 
the multi-sided assignment game. 
The difficulty in extending the axiomatizations of the core of two-sided 
assignment games to the multi-sided case, lie in the fact that multi-sided assignment 
games may have an empty core. These means that most of the monotonicity properties 
used to characterize the core in the two-sided case cannot be straightforwardly extended. 
We may have a multi-sided assignment game with a non-empty core but when raising 
the worth of one matrix entry, or new players entering the market, the resulting market 
may have no core elements. As for the consistency axioms, it was already noted by 
Owen (1992) that the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game of an assignment game 
at a core allocation, may not be an assignment game. However, this reduced game can be 
replaced with the derived game, since they both have the same core. In fact, this derived 
game is also used in Toda (2003). On the other hand, Toda’s (2005) consistency axiom 
can be easily generalized to the multi-sided case. Therefore, we give a first 
characterization of the core on the domain of balanced multisided assignment games by 
means of non-emptiness and the aforementioned consistency axioms: derived 
consistency and submarket consistency. As a consequence, we also obtain a new 
axiomatization of the core of the two-sided assignment game only using the two 
consistency axioms.  
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Finally, on the general domain of multi-sided assignment games, we give 
another axiomatic characterization of the core in terms of three axioms: unanimity, 
individual anti-monotonicity and derived consistency. This individual anti-monotonicity 
axiom is a weaker form of the anti-monotonicity property introduced by Keiding (1986) 
to characterize the core on the class of cooperative games with non-transferable utility, 
and it is also used by Toda (2003) to characterize the core of two-sided assignment 
games with non-linear utility functions. 
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The growth of the complexity of external environment and conditions of 
business management, namely, high development of information and communication 
technologies and competition boost, predefines the identification of new sources of 
development of companies’ competitive abilities and ways to increase management 
effectiveness. This fact causes the necessity of innovative approaches to strategic 
decision-making, instruments and tools that help them to reach the leading position in 
mid-term and long-term perspective. One of the instruments that allow increasing 
company’s competitiveness is the improvement of the service quality. Contemporary 
approaches to company management are based on the analysis of the adding value 
framework. The value of the service for the consumer is highly defined by its quality. 
Therefore, the problem of quality level choice under competition is a very important 
element of the strategic management. The appropriate choice of service quality level and 
price provides a company with necessary conditions to maintain high competitiveness 
and stable development. The evolution of theoretical and applied methodology of quality 
management under competition is not possible without studying the consumer 
satisfaction and companies’ strategic interaction in the market. Therefore, research 
objectives are: 
• analysis of consumer satisfaction with the service,  
• development of game-theoretical models of service providers’ 
interaction,  
• definition of the strategy of service quality level choice, 
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• development of practical recommendations for Russian companies to 
implement the strategy. 
The goal of the research is to develop theoretical basis (models) and practical 
methods of the service quality level evaluation and choice which is made by the service 
provider. 
The survey was conducted in St. Petersburg and defined consumer preferences 
and satisfaction in two different industries: mobile service market and fitness industry. 
The survey and game-theoretical analysis of St. Petersburg industrial market allowed 
finding current and equilibrium service quality levels.  
The models allowed evaluating the change in market shares for mobile 
operators and Fitness clubs of St. Petersburg. 
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We consider a two-level control system that consists of one element in top level 
and one element in bottom level. The top level has some resource the amount of which is 
assumed to be equal to one. The top level assigns a part of the resource to the bottom 
level (a purpose use) while the other part it keeps for the non-purpose use. In turn, the 
bottom level assigns a part of the received resource for the purpose use while the other 
part it keeps for the personal non-purpose use. Both levels take their parts of payoff from 
the purpose use of resource. The model is built as a game of two players where a 
Stackelberg equilibrium is sought. The payoff functions of both players include two 
summands: a payoff from the personal non-purpose activity and a part of payoff from the 
purpose activity of the whole system. So, the payoff functions have the form:  
1
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) (1 , ) ( , ) ( , ) maxug u u a u u b u u c u u= − + ⋅ → ; 
2
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( ,1 ) ( , ) ( , ) maxug u u a u u b u u c u u= − + ⋅ → . 
subject to  
0 1, 1,2,iu i≤ ≤ =  
and the following conditions for ,a  ,b  and c  are satisfied:  
0; 0, 0, 1,2, 0; 0, 1,2, 0, 1,2.i i ii i
i j i i i
a a b ca i b i i
u u u u≠
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≥ ≤ ≥ = ≥ ≥ = ≥ =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Here index 1 relates to the characteristics of the top level, index 2 to the 
characteristics of the bottom level respectively; iu  is a part of resource assigned by the 
                                                 
*This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Researches under grants 
No.12-01-00017 and 12-01-31287. 
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i -th level for the purpose use (respectively, the rest 1 iu−  is assigned for the personal 
non-purpose use); ig  is the i -th level payoff function; ia  is the i -th level personal 
payoff from the non-purpose activity; ib  is a part of the payoff from the purpose activity 
of the whole system received by the i -th level; c  is a payoff from the purpose activity 
of the whole system.  
Functions ia  and c  can be linear, power, exponential or logarithmic ones of the 
variables 1u  and 2u  are cumulative ones in the sense  
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2(1 ), ( (1 )), ( ).a a u a a u u c c u u= − = − =  
The relations 1 1 1 2 2 1 2(1 ), ( (1 ))a a u a a u u= − = −  reflect a hierarchical structure of 
the considered system. A payoff of the top level from the non-purpose activity does not 
depend on the part of resource assigned by the bottom level to the purpose activity. In 
the same time, a payoff from the non-purpose activity of the bottom level depends on the 
part of resource received from the top level.  
The following classes of functions ib  are considered:  
1) a uniform one when both players take the equal parts in the payoff from the 
purpose activity:  
1 , 1,2
2i
b i= =  
 2) a proportional one when the parts of common payoff received by both 
players are proportional to their assignments in the purpose activity:  
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
, ,u ub b
u u u u
= =
+ +
 
In general case, 1 2 1b b+ ≤  , i.e. a situation is possible when the common payoff 
from the purpose activity is not distributed completely between the players.  
In the paper it is supposed that the payoff is distributed completely:  
1 2 1b b+ =  
This model is a Stackelberg game with two players. The strategy of the i -th 
player is a part iu  of his resource assigned to the purpose activity. The top level player 
makes the first move, i.e. he chooses 1u , and informs the player of the bottom level 
about the choice. After that the second player chooses the optimal value of 2u . 
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The research aim is to study how the game solution depends on the relation of 
the functions 1 2 1 2, , , ,a a b b c . 
Consider as an example the parameterization 1 1 2 1 1( , ) (1 )a u u a u= − , 
2 1 2 2 1 2( , ) (1 )a u u a u u= −  , 1 2 1 2( , ) ( )kc u u u u=  where c  is a power production function. 
Let 0 1k< < . (power production function). 
Then 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2( , ) (1 ) ( )kg u u a u b u u= − + , 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( , ) (1 ) ( )kg u u a u u b u u= − + . . 
The optimal strategy of the second player is equal to  
1
2 1
* 2
2
1
( )
.
ka
kbu
u
−
=  
The first player maximizes his payoff function  
* 2 1
1 1 2 1 1 1
2
( , ) ( ) (1 )
k
kag u u b a u
kb
−= + −  
As the function 1g  decreases on 1u  then *1 0u =  . 
Thus, in the majority of the considered models in the economic setting 
(impulsion) the leader behaves egoistically, i.e. assigns all the resource to the non-
purpose use ( *1 0u = ). For the choice of the top level player of a strategy either 
compulsion (explicit constraint in the form 1 1ˆu u≥ ) or the volunteer choice of a positive 
strategy by some non-economic incentives is required.  
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Let be N the set of players and M the set of projects. The multicriteria 
coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects is formalized as family of 
games with different fixed coalitional partitions for each project that required the 
adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players. The players' strategies 
are decisions about each of the project. The vector-function of payoffs for each player is 
defined on the set situations in the initial noncooperative game. Players forms coalitions 
in order to obtain higher income. Thus, for each project a multicriteria coalitional game 
is defined. In each multicriteria coalitional game it is required to find in some sense 
optimal solution. We reduce the multicriteria coalitional game to a coalitional game with 
scalar payoffs. Solving successively each of the coalitional games, we get the set of 
optimal n-tuples for all coalitional games. It is required to find a compromise solution 
for the choice of a project, i. e. it is required to find a compromise coalitional partition. 
As an optimality principles are accepted generalized PMS-vector and its modifications, 
and compromise solution. 
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An epidemic of infectious disease occurs when virus population undergoes 
genetic mutations or new species of viruses are introduced into host population, and the 
host immunity to that change in the virus population is suddenly reduced below certain 
threshold. Hence, the epidemic modeling should take into account not only the 
population dynamics of the host population but also those of the viruses. In traditional 
epidemiological models, differential equations are used to capture the dynamic evolution 
of different classes of host populations. In particular, the susceptible (S) is the class of 
people who are not infected; the infected (I) is the class of people having the disease; the 
removed or recovered (R) represents deceased or immune people. The commonly used 
SIR model is used to describe the population migrations between these three classes of 
models. In order to capture the interdependencies between virus and host populations, 
we establish a system framework that combines the SIR model with evolutionary models 
that describe virus mutations. 
Mathematical model of virus infection in a population can be used to study 
those factors, which influence the epidemic growth for improving existing treatment and 
evaluating new effective prevention measures and treatment. In earlier research in the 
literature, it has been shown that during epidemic season, influenza virus can mutate, and 
during the epidemic season, several types of influenza virus circulate in human 
population. Different mutations of the influenza virus affect human beings with different 
intensities, and the epidemics evolve depending on the virus type and its intensity. Since 
viruses are able to adapt to hostile environment, medical treatments may invoke 
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mechanism of mutations in virus population. In our model, we consider two types of 
viruses with different strains and fitness functions. Both types of viruses spread in urban 
populations, and hence during the epidemic process, different parts of population will be 
infected. Characteristics of the two viruses initiate different characteristics of 
survivability and adaptability in human population over time. Thus, in this work, we 
focus on imitation dynamics dynamics to describe the evolution of mutation process 
within the virus population. Imitation dynamics allow us to include stochastic 
mechanism of virus adaptation in human population under the influence of intensive 
treatment. Various medical treatments (pharmacological products, quarantine policies, 
etc.) of the preventions can be applied to reduce the infection rates and the number of the 
infected in the population and eventually protect the entire population. 
Different from the work done in the past, this paper considers a coupled system 
framework composed of the SIR epidemic model and the evolutionary dynamic model 
for virus mutation. This framework is motivated by the fact that the epidemic spread of 
the virus can facilitate the virus mutation, strengthening the virulence of the virus, which 
will in turn expedite the spread and worsen the epidemics. The SIR epidemic model with 
virus mutations can capture this complex interactions between the virus and the host, and 
allows us to explain more complex phenomena through analysis. We couple together 
two dynamic processes, i.e., the evolution of virus mutation and the epidemic process in 
human population as one dynamical system. Complex problem is formulated as an 
optimal control problem for epidemic process in human population, and virus mutation 
process is described by imitation dynamics. 
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Every year epidemic disease occur when epidemic threshold has been passed in 
human population, what means that the number of infected is over than definite fixed 
value. Epidemic diseases in human population can be described by classical SIR model, 
where total population is divided into three subgroups: Susceptible, Infected and 
Recovered. Susceptible is group where people are not infected, Infected is a group of 
people having the disease, and Recovered is group, where all members have immunity to 
the disease. 
During the years many medical methods such as preventive measures, intensive 
treatment, etc. were developed to protect entire population during annual epidemics. 
Different from the previous works, in this paper, total population is ranged to different 
social groups such as children, retired, professional, and students. Those groups possess 
various incomes and risks of complication of diseases, and also speed of the infection 
spreading. Let us suppose that every person may choose one or couple of medical 
methods such as preventive measures, quarantine, and intensive treatment, to avoid the 
disease. Moreover we suppose that chosen decisions may depend on the individuum's 
social group. In our model we consider two possible decisions such as vaccination or 
intensive treatment. 
In current research we present extended SIR model, that includes the 
relationship between social groups and establish vaccination company as a optimal 
control program that influence on the SIR model and allow to reduce quantity of infected 
during epidemics. This paper estimates how the social position influences on the human 
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decision about methods of treatment and how external factors impact to the spreading of 
epidemic in different social groups. 
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The classical bankruptcy problem originating in the Talmud has drawn the 
attention of game theorists a long time ago. In the original Talmudic version, there is a 
dying man who has three wives. Upon his death his estate is to be divided among the 
wives who have claims over the estate, where it is assumed that the sum of these claims 
exceeds the worth of the estate. The question is how this division or allocation should be 
done, based on the claims of the players. The game theoretic relevance of this issue was 
first noticed by O'Neill (1982), who has transformed the original problem into a 
cooperative game. 
The entire literature on bankruptcy games assumes that the value of the estate, 
as well as the value of the claims, are deterministic. However, prior to the bankruptcy 
situation, typically these values are stochastic as they depend on currently unknown 
future market values. Nevertheless, coalitions of players can form prior to the resolution 
of uncertainty and they can discuss divisions of the estate conditional on its value and 
conditional on their claims. In this paper we therefore introduce the class of stochastic 
bankruptcy games. 
A stochastic bankruptcy game is a special case of a transferable utility game 
with uncertainty, or briefly TUU-game. A TUU-game is a two-period cooperative game. 
In period 0, agents may decide to cooperate or not, facing uncertainty about the state of 
nature in period 1. In period 1, one state of nature materializes and a state-dependent 
TU-game is played. When applied to bankruptcy games, we have that the worth of the 
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estate and the claims of the agents (wives) my depend on the state of nature; i.e. in each 
state of nature a different bankruptcy game may be played. 
In a classical, static cooperative game it is implicitly assumed that the players 
can make fully binding agreements on the allocation of payoffs. When such an 
assumption is made in our stochastic setting, then coalitions can make fully binding 
state-contingent allocations of payoffs in period 0, and the game becomes formally 
equivalent to a non-transferable utility game. 
We, on the other hand, study the case where agents cannot make such fully 
binding agreements. Instead, agents will not stick to their agreements concerning the 
future if after the resolution of uncertainty, they are better off when deviating. Hence, we 
only allow for self-enforcing agreements. 
An agreement is said to be self-enforcing if there is no coalition of players with 
a credible deviation in some period. All deviations by singleton coalitions that lead to 
higher utility are credible. More generally, credible deviations are inductively defined by 
the requirement that a deviation is credible in some period if there is no further credible 
deviation by any sub-coalition, now or in the future. In static transferable utility games, 
the set of deviations and the set of credible deviations coincide (Ray, 1989). 
In our setting, credibility plays a crucial role and leads to the concept of the 
Weak Sequential Core, introduced by Kranich, L., A. Perea, and H. Peters (2005) for 
finite deterministic sequences of TU-games, by Predtetchinski, A., P. J. J. Herings, and 
A. Perea (2006) for two-period exchange economies with incomplete markets, and by 
Habis, H., and P. J. J. Herings (2011) for TUU-games. Moreover, Habis, H., and P. J. J. 
Herings (2011) give a characterization of the Weak Sequential Core, and show its non-
emptiness if all the state-contingent games played in period 1 are convex. Since 
bankruptcy games are convex, the Weak Sequential Core of stochastic bankruptcy games 
is non-empty. 
Similarly to core-compatibility in a static problem, we use the Weak Sequential 
Core to test the robustness to uncertainty of the most important allocation rules 
suggested in the literature; the Proportional rule, the Adjusted Proportional rule, the 
Constrained Equal Awards rule, the Constrained Equal Losses rule, and the Talmud rule. 
It is well-known that all rules are stable in a deterministic bankruptcy game, being an 
element of the classical core. In a stochastic setting, however, each of them is unstable, 
with the exception of the Constrained Equal Awards rule. 
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We consider how the structure of the underlying social network can affect the 
way people make decisions about collective action. Suppose there are n  senior vice-
presidents at a company, each of whom must decide whether to propose replacing the 
unpopular CEO at the next day's board meeting. It would be disastrous to do so without 
sufficient support from the others. Each person has a personal threshold which represents 
her willingness to participate. A threshold of µ  means ''I will show up for the protest if I 
am sure that at least µ  people in total (including myself) will protest.'' 
 
Fig. 1 
The links in the social network represent ties of trust. Every player is informed 
about the network (who is linked to whom), but - due to the risky nature of the protest - 
is only informed about the threshold of her neighbors. Given a network and a threshold 
distribution, how should we reason about what is likely to happen? Consider the 
following 4  players example in Figure 1. which is taken from Chwe [1]. Assume each 
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agent's threshold is = 3µ . 1914b.jpg Each node in the network has a threshold for 
participation, but only knows the threshold of itself and its neighbors. Consider the 
situation from u  's perspective (it is symmetric for all nodes). She knows that each v  
and w  have a threshold of 3  such that the three of them could safely protest. She also 
knows, however, that v  and w  don't know each others threshold, and so they can't 
engage in the same reasoning that she can. Chwe [1] argues that it is not safe for u  to 
protest for the following reason. Since u  doesn't know x  's threshold it could be very 
high, say 5 , if x  would never - under any circumstances - join the protest. In that case 
w , seeing neighbors with thresholds of 3  and 5 , would not join the protest. The same 
holds for v . Anticipating this behavior u  does not initiate protest. Interestingly, all 
players have threshold 3  and know that there is sufficient support in the network but no 
one can be sure that the others know that. We are interested in the game when it is 
played sequentially. Here, the action of u  can represent a communication device. Since 
w  doesn't know v 's threshold, and u  knows that, the initiation of protest could signal to 
w  that the threshold of v  is not higher than 3 . 
Now assume x  has threshold 5  such that he never joins the protest. 
Interestingly, if we now decrease u 's threshold collective action of the remaining 3  
players is less likely to happen. Note that v  and w  are not linked such that they must 
rely on the signal of u  to draw conclusions about each other. Fix u 's threshold at 
= 2uµ . The problem is that the action of u  is not a reliable signal anymore as u  is 
already satisfied with participation of just one of her neighbors. This is how v  could 
reason: '' u  would also revolt if I am led to believe that w 's threshold is at most 3 . If this 
were the case u  will also revolt when wµ  is 4 . Hence, I need not belief that 3wµ ≤  and 
u  can revolt only when = 2wµ . But then it is in my interest to join if u  revolts ''. Note 
that this cycling vanishes if we make the link between u  and v  one-directed such that v  
can observe u  but not the other way around. Here, there is no way u  can trick v  into 
action. Hence by restricting communication player v  is more likely to join the protest. 
We analyze these games with the framework of a sequential binary decision 
game with incomplete and imperfect information. The equilibrium concept under 
consideration is that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We characterize the equilibria for 
the games arising from general classes of networks. In particular, we are interested in 
characterizing games with a full collective action equilibrium. This research contributes 
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to the broad literature on diffusion of behavior and coordination in networks (for an 
overview see e.g. Chapter 7-9 in Jackson [3]). It can be seen as extension of the work of 
Chwe [1] in the sense that players communicate with each other not only by direct 
contact, but also indirectly through the actions they have taken. By adding this kind of 
implicit communication, we show that the condition of achieving collective action may 
differ from the model without implicit communication as in [1] and [2]. 
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We consider a model of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints 
originated in papers of Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1925). We consider the market 
for some homogeneous product with a continuous strictly decreasing consumer’s 
demand function ( )D p  here are two firms in the industry 1, 2i =  each with a limited 
amount of productive capacity Si such that 1 2(0)D S S> +  Firms choose prices pi and 
play non-cooperatively. The firm quoting the lower price serves the entire market up to 
its capacity and the residual demand is met by the other firm. All consumers are identical 
and choose the lower available price on a first-come-first-serve basis. Following Shubik 
(1959) and Beckmann (1965) we assume in our analysis that the residual demand to the 
firm quoting the higher price is a proportion of total demand at that price. If duopolists 
set the same prices firms share the market in proportion to their capacities. Formally we 
define the payoff functions of players to be: 
( )
{ }
( )
1 1 1 1 2
1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
1 2
1
1 1 2 2 1 2
2
, ( ) , 
, , ( ) , 
( )
, max{0, } , 
( )
p min S D p p p
Su p p p min S D p p p
S S
D pp min S D p S p p
D p


<
  = =  
+ 
   − >   
. 
The concept of Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (EinSS) was proposed in (Iskakov M . 
(2005) and Iskakov M., Iskakov A. (2012)) as the generalization of Nash equilibrium. 
Below we provide principal definitions of EinSS for the game ( , , )i iG p u i N= ∈
  . The 
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concept of equilibrium is based on the notion of threat and on the notion of secure 
strategy. 
Definition 1. A threat of player j  to player i  at strategy profile s is a pair of 
strategy profiles '{ , ( , )}j jp p p− such that 
'( , ) ( )j j j ju p p u p− >  and 
'( , ) ( )i j j iu p p u p− < The strategy profile s is said to pose a threat from player j  to 
player i . 
Definition 2. A strategy ip  of player i  is a secure strategy for player i  at 
given strategies ip−  of all other players if profile s  poses no threats to player i . A 
strategy profile p  is a secure profile if all strategies are secure. 
In other words a threat means that it is profitable for one player to worsen the 
situation of another. A secure profile is one where no one gains from worsening the 
situation of other players. 
Definition 3. A secure deviation of player i with respect to p is a strategy 
'ip such that 
'( , ) ( )i i i iu p p u p− > and ( )'( , ' , )i i j ij iu p p p u p− ≥ for any threat 
' '{( , ( ' , , )}i j j ijp p p p− of player j i≠  to player i . 
There are two conditions in the definition. In the first place a secure deviation 
increases the profit of the player. In the second place his gain at a secure deviation 
covers losses which could appear from retaliatory threats of other players. It is important 
to note that secure deviation does not necessarily mean deviation into secure profile. We 
assume that the player with incentive to maximize his or her profit securely will look for 
secure deviations. 
Definition 4. A secure strategy profile is an Equilibrium in Secure Strategies 
(EinSS) if no player has a secure deviation. 
It is well known that the model of Bertrand-Edgeworth may not possess Nash 
equilibrium (see e.g. d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz (1980)). Our aim is to solve original 
problem in terms of the equilibrium in secure strategies. It coincides with the Nash 
Equilibrium when Nash Equilibrium exists and takes into account the intention of 
players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against the actions of 
other players. This approach reflects the natural logic of behavior of players in this 
model. We will show that in some of these cases there is an EinSS. However for some 
(big enough) capacities EinSS does not exist either. We prove the following basic result:  
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Proposition. Let the receipt function ( )pD p  be strictly concave and reach its 
maximum at Mp . Then in the game of Bertrand-Edgeworth with the mentioned above 
payoff functions there is an * *( ; )EinSS p p , where * 1 2( )D p S S= + , if and only if 
( ){ }
( ){ }
*
10
*
20
max
max
p
p
arg pD p S p
arg pD p S p
>
>
 − ≤


− ≤

. 
If * Mp p≥  it is a Nash equilibrium. There are no other EinSS in the game. 
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A joint investment cooperative problem is described as the one where agents are 
endowed with some amount of input (resources, labor, capital,...) so that they can pool 
them and obtain some amount of output through a technology (production function) with 
increasing returns to scale. This is a simple but interesting model of a one input-one 
output production system, already quoted by Lemaire (1984,1991), Mas-Colell et al. 
(1986) and Izquierdo and Rafels (2001). 
The increasing returns provide incentives to cooperate and the core of this 
cooperative situation turns out to be always nonempty. That is, we can found a feasible 
and efficient allocation of the total output obtained such that no subcoalition of agents 
can block it upon. The proportional distribution with respect to the amount of input 
contributed arises as a natural distribution within the core.  
In this paper we address the study of the behavior of the core of this model 
when some agents vary their contributions of the amount of input; we study resource 
monotonicity properties of the core.  
The monotonicity of the core has been already studied in a general cooperative 
game theory framework by Young (1985). This author states the incompatibility between 
the requirement for a solution of lying in the core of the game (core selection) and the 
fact that the solution increases the payoff to the members of some coalition whenever the 
worth of this coalition has increased while the worth of other coalitions remain the same 
(coalitional monotonicity). Meggido (1974) and Calleja et al. (2009) have studied 
monotonicity properties with respect to the worth of the total coalition. Other authors 
have examined monotonicity in restricted domains like convex games (Hokari, 2000) or 
veto balanced games (Arin and Feltkamp, 2005).  
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We first concentrate on the resource monotonicity of the core when only one 
agent increases his or her contribution. In this case, the core behaves monotonically, that 
is, any core allocation of the initial problem can be represented in the core of the new 
problem so that the payoff to that agent increases. Surprisingly, this property does not 
hold when two or more agents increase their contributions at the same time. As a 
consequence, we determine a necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation in the 
core of the problem to fulfill resource monotonicity.  
Furthermore, we also study a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees 
that not only the payoff of the agents that have increased their contribution increases, but 
also guarantees that the payoff of the rest of agents will not be lowered; we call this 
property strong resource monotonicity. This analysis is important in dynamic 
frameworks where an agreement on a previous core allocation serves as “staquo quo” for 
negotiating modifications on the contributions of players. Finally, we state a sufficient 
condition on the production function that ensures that, for any core allocation and any 
increasing of the contribution of agents, the strong resource monotonicty property holds.  
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Most scientific publications on the subject of solution concepts for cooperation 
problems only analyze these concepts from a mere mathematical game theoretic point of 
view.But it is often disregarded whether these mathematical solution concepts can be put 
into economic practice. One example of a possible use of such solution concepts for 
cooperation problems in economic practice is the fair distribution of collectively earned 
profits in a cooperation of legally independent corporations. This contribution yields to 
analyze whether solution concepts of cooperative game theory are able to solve 
thispractical problem not only in a formally correct but also in an economically adequate 
manner. 
In the first part of this contribution two mathematical solution concepts of 
cooperative game theory are compared from formal point of view. The first of these two 
cooperative solution concepts is the widely known Shapley value that can be described 
as a rather “classic” solution concept of cooperative game theory. The second is a 
younger, more innovative solution concept called χ  -value. These two cooperative 
solution concepts are compared relating to the conditions and assumptions they are based 
on and the characteristics of their resulting solutions, e.g. the stability of the solution. 
This comparison is made from a mostly game-theoretic point of view. 
In the second part a practical example is used to illustrate the calculation of 
these two solution concepts to analyze them from an economic perspective afterwards. 
Therefore criteria for a successful use of game theoretic solution concepts applied on 
distribution problems in economic practice are introduced. These criteria concern for 
example information requirements. Special attention is drawn to the fairness aspect 
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because a solution concept can only be successfully used in practice if all business 
partners accept a solution for a distribution problem as fair. 
The findings of this contribution are of threefold kind. Firstly, the variety of 
solution concepts and their results is shown by the comparison of the Shapley value and 
the χ  - value. Secondly, with the help of the practical example it is revealed which 
information requirements and which other criteria have to be fulfilled to use the 
presented solution concepts of game theory in economic practice. Thirdly, it is analyzed 
whether one of the focused solution concepts is likely to be put in practice successfully. 
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We dene the new cooperative function and get the extensive partial cooperative 
game with multi-coalition structure. By backward induction we build the concept of 
solution in the partial cooperative game and get the corresponding optimal path. The 
model in this paper overcomes the limitation in the classic game models in which only 
simple coalition structure can be formed at any node on the game tree. 
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We consider transferable utility games and introduce a new method to allocate 
payoffs to players. In general, there are two possibilities to do so. The first method is to 
find an allocation under the presumption that the grand coalition forms, the second one is 
to specify an allocation for each partition of the player set. The first one includes 
classical solutions as the Core [5] or the Shapley value [7]. Solutions of the second type 
contain for instance the Kernel [4] or the Bargaining set [1]. We will follow the tradition 
of the latter one. 
Our motivation is the following: Consider a player i  in a player set N  and 
assume that there is a partition of the set { }\N i . If i  joins any coalition S  of this 
partition or stays alone, it has two effects. First, he is making a marginal contribution to 
the value of the coalition he joins. Second, he has opportunity costs as he is not joining 
the other coalitions. The first effect can easily be calculated by the characteristic function 
of the game. However, for the second one we need some work to do. A vector x  which 
specifies for each player his payoff in each partition is called a payoff configuration. 
Hence, if a payoff configuration is given, we know for each player in each coalition in 
each partition his marginal contribution and opportunity costs. If we consider now a 
coalition S  of worth ( )v S , we are facing a bargaining problem [6]: Players in S  have 
to allocate the value ( )v S  among them and use a disagreement point to do so. The 
disagreement point itself depends on marginal contribution and opportunity costs. It is 
not guaranteed that the sum of disagreement points is less than the coalitions value, 
hence, in some case we consider a bankruptcy problem [3] rather than a bargaining 
problem. 
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We see that each payoff configuration specifies a set of bargaining problems, 
namely one bargaining problem in each coalition of each partition. The solutions of these 
bargaining problems are payoff configurations on their own. Hence, bargaining leads to 
a payoff configuration, and a payoff configuration leads to a new bargaining problem. 
The natural question which arises is the following:  
Is there a payoff configuration x  such that x  is the solution of the bargaining 
problem defined by x ?  
Obviously, the answer depends on the bargaining solution we chose to solve the 
bargaining problems. Therefore, we call such x  stable with respect to the respective 
bargaining solution. The interpretation is straightforward: Given a stable payoff 
configuration x , players will not re-bargain their payoffs because re-bargaining would 
lead to x . We show that for all bargaining solutions which satisfy very weak 
assumptions such a payoff configuration exists. We analyze the properties of these 
payoff configurations depending on the properties of the underlying bargaining solution. 
After we have found a stable payoff configuration x  we can transform the 
original game into a hedonic game with externalities [2]. In the last part of the paper we 
investigate whether or not we can find stable partitions in these games. We will show 
that under weak conditions we can guarantee the existence of a partition into 
individually and internally stable coalitions. 
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This talk postulates a natural question: what weaker analogous of Sobolev 
theorem (1975) can be proved? This theorem (improved by Orshan at 1994) 
characterized the prenucleolus by three properties: ETP (equal treatment property), COV 
(covariance) and CONS (consistency). Two firsts looks very natural and probably cannot 
be removed. 
So we are interesting in weaker variants of Davis-Mashler consistency property. 
There is an evident way to make such property: to create some restriction on players 
which can be removed from the game. But what kind of restriction can we consider? 
This talk proposes the next answer: we can remove a player if after it the game remains a 
member of some class of games. 
For example, if we consider the class of veto-rich games, then the veto-player 
cannot be removed, because the resulted game will be outside of this class. 
In this talk we will prove the Sobolev theorem for the class of veto-balanced 
games, also we will show that for some subclasses of this class the proposition of 
theorem is not true and discuss the question what analogues of this theorem can be 
proved. 
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This study explores whether market competition between firms owned and run 
by managers favors overconfident managers. We study this question in a linear duopoly 
setting with differentiated products. The main result is that when there is complete 
information about the competitor’s type, evolutionary market selection forces will 
always favor a positive degree of managerial overconfidence. This result is robust to 
both the form of the strategic interaction and the nature of product differentiation. We 
also study the case of incomplete information about the competitor’s type under quantity 
competition and show that evolutionary forces may still favor overconfident managers if 
market selection is driven by relative rather than absolute profit performance. 
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In classical cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players 
may form. However, in many practical situations the collection of feasible coalitions that 
can be formed is restricted by some social, economical, hierarchical, or technical 
structure. The study of games with transferable utility (TU) and limited cooperation 
represented by means of undirected communication graphs was initiated by Myerson. In 
an undirected communication graph on the set of players, a link between two players is 
interpreted as the players’ ability to communicate bilaterally with each other and 
therefore only connected coalitions are feasible. For such games, Myerson introduces the 
Myerson value which is equal to the Shapley value of the induced restricted game. 
In this paper we consider communication structures introduced by means of 
directed graphs (digraphs) which represent partial orderings of the players. For a directed 
link in an arbitrary digraph there are two possible different basic interpretations. One 
interpretation is that a link is directed to indicate which player has initiated the 
communication but at the same time it represents a fully developed communication link 
where players are able to communicate in both directions with each other. In such a case 
it is natural to assume that there is no subordination of players and to focus on 
component efficient values. Another interpretation of a directed link assumes that a 
directed link represents the only one-way communication situation. In this case we have 
again different possibilities for the interpretation of a directed link. The first option is 
when the communication between players is supposed to be possible only along the 
directed paths in the digraph, for example a flow situation. Another option is to assume 
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that the digraph represents the subordination of players such that after each player any of 
his subordinates may follow as long as this does not hurt the total subordination among 
all players prescribed by the digraph. An example of such a situation is a sequencing 
problem when the tasks that have to be performed are not necessarily linearly ordered 
but the ordering of the tasks is represented by some directed graph.Suppose at every 
moment only one task can be performed. When some task is completed, the next task 
can be any of the tasks that are immediate successors in the digraph or one among those 
of which the performance is independent of the task and does not block the performance 
of any immediate successor of that task. 
In this paper we abide by the latter interpretation of a directed link. The main 
advantage of this approach is to introduce a single-valued solution for the class of TU 
games with limited cooperation represented by directed communication graphs which is 
component efficient. To define such a solution, we first introduce for any directed graph 
the set of so-called covering trees. The root of a covering tree of a digraph is one of the 
undominated players (nodes) of the digraph. The root has one of the undominated 
players in every component of the remaining players as immediate successors in the tree. 
On its turn each of these latter players has as immediate successors one of undominated 
players in each subcomponent of the remaining players in the component the player 
belongs to, and so on. Since every digraph on a finite set has at least one undominated 
node, the collection of covering trees defined in this way is nonempty. In every covering 
tree of a digraph, the dominance relation between players in the graph is preserved. The 
average covering tree value of a TU game with digraph communication structure is the 
average of marginal contribution vectors that correspond to all covering trees of the 
underlying digraph. We also give a convexity-type condition under which the solution is 
an element of the core and therefore cannot be blocked by any subset of connected 
players. 
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A situation in which a finite set of agents can obtain certain payoffs through 
cooperation can be described as a cooperative game with transferable utility or simply a 
TU game. In classical cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players 
may form. However, in many practical situations the collection of coalitions that can be 
formed is restricted by some social, economical, hierarchical, communication, or 
technical structure. The study of TU games with limited cooperation introduced by 
means of undirected communication graphs, further called graph games, was initiated by 
Myerson (1977). The best know solution concepts for TU games and graph games 
respectively are the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and Myerson value (Myerson, 1977), 
which in turn is the Shapley value for the Myerson restricted game. Behind the Shapley 
value stays the following probabilistic distribution mechanism: the players enter a room 
one by one in arbitrary order given by some permutation of players and each player as a 
payoff gets his expected marginal contribution to all his predecessors who entered the 
room before him, while all permutations are equally probable. 
In the paper we consider a class of oriented graph games for which an oriented 
graph, that is a directed graph without directed cycles of length 2, prescribes 
subordination of players. It is assumed that for oriented graph games the cooperation 
among players is not restricted, i.e., all coalitions are feasible, but the subordination 
structure puts limitation on the coalition formation when the players want to form bigger 
coalitions, in particular, the grand coalition – each player may join only a coalition not 
containing his superiors. A typical example of such a situation is given by two firms, a 
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market leading big firm and a small firm in some industry producing a homogenous 
good. The problem is how to distribute the monopoly profit after merging. The 
alternative for merging is the Stackelberg duopoly game where the big firm is the leader 
and receives by not cooperating the Stackelberg leader profit and the other firm receives 
the Stackelberg follower profit. This situation can be modeled as an oriented graph game 
where the big firm dominates the small firm. On the class of oriented graph games we 
introduce a new solution concept, the so-called Shapley value for oriented graph games. 
Similar to the Shapley value for TU games we define the Shapley value for oriented 
graph games assigning to each player as a payoff the average of the player's marginal 
contributions to coalitions of his predecessors, but now with respect not to all but to all 
consistent with the given oriented graph permutations of the player set. A permutation is 
consistent with an oriented graph if it does not violate the subordination of players 
prescribed by the graph.  
We show that the Shapley value for oriented graph games satisfies efficiency, 
linearity, restricted null player property, restricted equal treatment property and is 
independent of inessential links. We also introduce a convexity type condition that 
guarantees the Shapley value for an oriented graph game to belong to the core of the 
given TU game. This convexity type condition is weaker than convexity that for TU 
games guarantees stability of the Shapley value. 
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We develop a two-factor, one-sector monopolistic competition model involving 
a variable elasticity of substitution. The goal is to show how market integration affects 
firm pricing policies, factor prices, and individuals' welfare. We study it with 
comparative statics of equilibria w. r. t. the country factor endowments that imitates 
market integration (shift from autarky to free trade). 
The questions of gains for labor and capital from market integration or trade 
liberalization are traditional in international trade and agglomeration theories. Do 
workers or/and capital owners benefit in both countries from lowering the trade barriers, 
or these gains are subject to certain properties of demands, costs and market structure? 
What are the mechanisms of these gains/losses, what happens with number of firms, 
outputs, prices, and interest rates?  
In our paper we develop a variable elasticity of substitution monopolistic 
competition model with only one sector and two production factors - labor and capital. 
Though having in mind trade and agglomeration topics, at this stage we develop a model 
imitating complete market integration. It means studying a closed economy and behavior 
of its equilibrium variables in response to increase in the market size (number of workers 
or capital owners), interpreted as integration of two countries, identical in preferences 
and technology. Besides, our comparative statics may mean the cross-countries 
comparisons.  
There are two types of individuals, workers and capital-owners that share 
identical preferences and own one unit of labor and capital correspondingly. Producers 
bear a fixed cost in capital and a variable cost measured in labor. The utility function is 
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additive, and taken from a wide class of functions that included HARA and CES 
functions  
Our results include price changes. Increasing in labor endowment yields 
increasing both product and capital prices. On the other hand, when capital endowment 
increases product and capital prices are decreasing functions. In case increasing labor 
endowment impact on individuals' welfare is clear. Welfare of each worker decreases 
and welfare of each capitalist increases. In opposite, under increasing capital supply 
workers' welfare increases but welfare of capital owners behaves ambiguously. Not clear 
behavior of capital owner's utility could be explained as follows. From the one hand, 
increasing in capital endowment decreases capital price through more tough competition 
on capital market. From another hand, this increasing in capital endowment increases 
number of avaliable varieties at the market and it increases capitalist's welfare. The 
additional result is comparative statics of individual consumption of both agent types. 
Under increasing labor endowment capitalist individual consumption increases and 
workers individual consumption decreases. When capital endowment increases capitalist 
individual consumption decreases but behavior of workers individual consumption is 
ambiguous. 
The next steps of research are: 
- Study three agent types model adding middle class. Each middle class agent 
owns one unit of labor and 1α <  units of capital (less than each capitalist ownes). 
Comparative statics w.r.t. number of middle class agents and share of capital α  could 
show significancy level of middle class on equilibrium variables.  
- Consider a trade model and study general trade equilibrium with Heckscher-
Ohlin approach of differences in factor endowments between countries that involving in 
trade. 
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In this paper I look at the game of two-sided asymmetric information where 
agents make a collaboration decision not knowing types of each other. Intermediary has 
full knowledge about the types of agents and can make a decision that brings information 
to some types. However, once he puts information on the table agents are not committed 
to pay him, what undermines his incentive to participate in the first place. I find that 
intermediary still is welfare-improving and restores efficiency. He either brings 
information to the most vulnerable type or to nobody. 
The situation is drastically different when I look at two informed intermediaries 
that compete in prices. In this case there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Nonexistence in its sense is similar to that of screening models, though standard ways to 
deal with it (e.g. reactive equilibrium concept) do not work here. Once the competition 
between intermediaries sufficiently increases equilibrium happens to exist again. In this 
equilibrium there is partial specialisation between intermediaries - every pair of 
intermediaries set different wage and concentrate on some particular match. My model 
gives interesting insights into the market of talent agents. The concept of PBE stable to 
bilateral deviations is developed and applied in the paper. 
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Motivation, literature and our goal. The patterns of urbanization in economic 
history and in contemporary economy allow for various explanations (see Handbook of 
Regional and Urban Economics, 2004). In particular, Anas (2004) developed a 
monopolistic competition model with CES utility describing such evolution. There the 
socially optimal distribution of population among cities of any closed country (or the 
globe) followed a dispersion patterns: each city size always decreases under growing 
population, because the number of cities grow disproportionally fast. Similar pattern 
arise when the trade costs decrease (globalization). The reason is that the only 
agglomeration force here is the economies of scale inherited in monopolistic 
competition, whereas related marginal payoff to a big city declines with the population 
size or globalization. By contrast, the dispersion force in the model – large commuting 
cost as a price of big city – remains unaffected by population of the globe or 
international trade. However, the model prediction – only vanishing cities – clearly 
contradicts the facts of historical urbanization. Anas used this contradiction in his 
reasoning about proper urban theory as an impossibility theorem: urbanization cannot be 
explained by firm-level economies of scale only, instead city-level economies should 
serve as the main explanation: externalities, public goods, etc.  
Our hypothesis was that this methodological conclusion was incorrect, just 
vanishing cities followed from too restrictive simplifying assumptions of the Anas’s 
model; notably, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and very specific space 
representation: all the cities trade with each other through the “center”, i.e., common 
hub. This suspicion motivated us to generalize the model in these two and other 
113 
 
directions. Our hypothesis turned out wrong, we justified Anas’s idea in broadersetting 
and we looked for new effects. 
The methodological background for such generalization is the recent method of 
studying general monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution: 
Zhelobodko et al. (2012), who extend the monopolistic competition model from Dixit 
and Stiglitz J. (1977), Krugman (1979). Expanding the new method from a closed 
economy – to the system of cities, we obtained several results. 
International trade model with n cities. 
Assume, population P of the world (identical consumers) is divided equally 
among n cities, so that N=P/n is the city size. Whenever each (i-th) city produces l 
varieties (k ≤  l) of the differentiated good, a consumption of this variety by a consumer 
located in city j is denoted as xikj, and the price is pikj. Each citizen’s utility maximization 
in this city i takes the form (each integral denotes summation across cities/varieties, to 
make n,l continuous variables): 
( )
0 0 0 00
max : ,
n l n l
ikj ikj ikjx
u x dkdj p x dkdj I
≥
 → ≤


∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
Here I is a disposable income that remains from the endowment of 1 unit of 
labor – after subtracting the commuting cost C(N), that increases with the city size. By 
symmetry of cities, indices i,j can be dropped, but the varieties are divided into Home 
(domestic) consumption xh and Foreign (imported) consumption xf, the main variables of 
trade equilibrium.  
Each of (identical) producers in each city bears marginal costs c, fixed cost f, 
and solves w.r.t. (xh,hf) the profit maximization problem 
( ) ( )( ) ( 1) ( )h h f fN p x c x n N p x tc x fπ = − + − − −  
Here t is the (iceberg) trade cost coefficient and p denotes the inverse demand 
function derived from the consumer’s optimization. Under given P,n, a trade equilibrium 
is a bundle ( ), ,H Fx x l  satisfying all FOC, SOC, budgets, free entry condition π =0 and 
labor balances. (Second-best) social optimum is such number of cities n that maximizes 
each consumer’s welfare under given world population P and respective trade 
equilibrium. This model differs from Anas’s one by general utility u(x) instead of u=xr 
and general increasing commuting cost C(N) instead of a square root. 
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Main Results. (i) We find in our generalized model the same Anas’s effect of 
vanishing cities: when there is more than 1 city, their optimal size decreases w.r.t. world 
population P and/or decreasing trade cost t, tending to the “minimal admissible city 
size”. This fact confirms, that agglomeration models generally need some city-level 
economies of scale, this need being independent of the functional forms of utilities and 
commuting costs. 
(ii) We expanded the same conclusion to a version of the model where the cities 
trade with each other not through the common hub but in natural circular space. 
(iii) By simulations with a broad class of utilities, we expanded the same 
conclusion to a version of the model where the cities sell their manufacturing goods not 
only to each other, but also to some immobile agricultural population, evenly distributed 
on the circular world. 
(iv) The by-product of this study is the hypothesis (and a sketch of the proof) 
that the system of cities governed by their selfish “city developers” and migration – 
arrives at the same (second-best) social optimum as the world governed by a social 
planner, even under very general specifications of utilities. 
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Russian government 
grant No 11.G34.31.0059, Russian Foundation for Basic Research grant No 12-06-
00174-a. 
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We consider a game-theoretic bargaining model with incomplete information 
related with deals between buyers and sellers. A player (buyer or seller) has a private 
information about his reserved price. Reserved prices are random variables with known 
probability distributions. Each player declares a price which depends on his reserved 
price. If the bid price is above the ask price, the good is sold for the average of two 
prices. Otherwise, there is no deal. Two types of Bayes equilibrium are derived. One of 
them is a discrete form, another one is a solution of a system of differential equations. 
When concluding deals on the market auctions are held. The participants are the 
sellers and buyers. There are different mechanisms of such auctions [1-6]. We research 
bargaining model, suggested by Chatterjee K. and Samuelson W. [1] and developed by 
Myerson R. [2,3]. 
This model is a game with incomplete information. Each player (buyer or 
seller) has private information about his reserved price [0,1]b∈  and [0,1]s∈  
accordingly. Reserved prices have distribution functions ( )F s , ( )G b , and density 
functions ( )f s , ( )g b . Players declare prices ( )S s  and ( )B b . If S B≤  then the good is 
sold for the average price ( ) / 2B S+ . 
In [6] we derive differential equations for Bayes equilibrium with continuous 
strategies  
 1 ( ( ))'( )
2( ( )) ( ( ))
G U tU t
t V t g U t
−
=
−
, (1) 
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 ( ( ))'( )
2( ( ) ) ( ( ))
F V tV t
U t t f V t
=
−
, (2) 
where 1V S −= , 1U B−=  are reversed functions. 
Now we find finite difference schemes for (1)-(2), giving equations for Bayes 
equilibrium with piecewise constant strategies. 
The work is supported by Russian Fund for Basic Research (project 13-01-
91158-ГФЕН_a) and the Division of Mathematical Sciences of RAS (the program 
"Algebraic and combinatorial methods of mathematical cybernetics and new information 
system"). 
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Current economic conditions are characterized by quantitative and qualitative 
changes in the processes of interaction and cooperation of economic entities. This 
conclusion applies equally to both large corporations and relatively small companies. 
Problems and difficulties that are produced by the global trend of business climate 
deterioration, inevitably generate incentives for companies to seek for new forms of 
cooperation. Constructive analysis of these new forms suggests, itself, the development 
of economic and mathematical methods of the Cooperative Game Theory. It provides 
one with an adequate description cooperative interaction in the present world 
circumstances. Admittedly, a serious obstacle to the practical implementation of 
cooperative game-based models is the assumption of the characteristic function being a 
set of determined values/ 
This problem can be solved by switching from deterministic to stochastic 
cooperative games. Possible approaches to this class of games are considered in [1,2]. 
By the stochastic cooperative game we mean a pair of sets ( , )I vΓ =  , where 
 {1.. }I m= — a number of participants (players); 
 ( )v S — random variables with known densities ( ) ( )v sp x , which are interpreted as 
the income (utility payments) players obtain participating the corresponding 
coalitions S I⊂ . 
The imputation in a stochastic cooperative game to a certain level of probability 
α  can be defined as a vector ( ) nRα ∈x , satisfying the conditions: 
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(a) ( ) { ( ) ( )}ii I x v iα α∀ ∈ ≥ ≥P   (1) 
– the stochastic analogue of individual rationality in the "classical" cooperative game, 
(b) 
1
{ ( ) ( )}
m
i
i
x v Iα α
=
≤ ≥∑P   (2) 
– the stochastic analog of group rationality. 
In essence, in the condition (1) i -th component of vector ( )αx  compared with 
α -quantile ( ) ( )v iF x — distribution function of the random variable ( )v i . If we put 
1
( )( ) ( )v iv i Fα α
−=

, then conditions (1)–(2) will take the form 
(a) ( ) ( ) ( )ii I x v iαα∀ ∈ ≥ , (3) 
(b) 
1
( ) ( )
m
i
i
x v Iαα
=
≤∑ . (4) 
In terms of modern Risk Management ( )v iα  is VaR (value at risk) – the value of 
the characteristic function for i -th player. Thus, the proposed approach to the definition 
of concepts imputations offers great opportunities for meaningful interpretation of the 
subsequent results of studies the properties this class of games and concepts to determine 
their decisions. 
Developing the proposed approach, we can introduce the concept of a stochastic 
analogy α –core (core in the game ( , )I v  to the level of probabilityα ), defining it as a 
set of imputations (i.e. vectors ( ) mx Rα ∈ , that satisfied conditions (3)–(4)), for which 
performed 
 ( , , ) ( ) ( )S I S S I x S v Sα∀ ⊂ ≠⊄ ≠ ≥  (5) 
or 
 
( ) { | , , : ( ) ( );
( ) ( )}.
mC v R S I S S I x S v S
x I v I
α α
α
= ∈ ∀ ⊂ ≠⊄ ≠ ≥
≤
x
 (6) 
For the particular case of stochastic cooperative games, in which we assume that 
( )v S  are random normally distributed variables 
 2( ) ( ( ), )Sv S N v S σ∈ , (7) 
with 0.5α >  we have 
( ) ( )v S v Sα > . 
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Furthermore, by comparing the conditions to be met by the division of belonging core of 
nonstochastic game with characteristic function ( )v S , with condition (5), defining them 
as belonging to α –core of stochastic game, we come to conclusion that 
( , ) ( )x S x Sα > , 
where ( , ) ( )ii Sx S xα α∈= ∑ — a sum, distributed among members of the coalition S  
with imputation ( )αx . Thus, with a probability level 0.5α >  
 ( ) ( )C v C vα ⊂  (8) 
or, in other words, α –core encapsulated in the core. Aspects that influence the degree of 
this restriction are the standard deviation sσ . Roughly speaking, the grate the value of 
sσ , is (i.e. risk characteristics of deviation of realization random values from their 
expectations) the smaller the α –core becomes. 
We are of the opinion that, it is quiet promising field of research to identify the 
scale which alterations in α  affect the volume α –core. In essence, we have an 
additional tool to analyze the impact of risk factors on the «size of the area», in which 
there are opportunities to achieve the objective uncontested agreements between 
potential participants of economic alliances with a given level of probability. 
This information is particularly significant and essential for situations in which 
the results, which collaborating participants obtain, depend on many imponderables. 
 
References 
 
[1] Konyukhovskiy P.V., Solovyeva M.Y. (2010) Stochastic cooperative games as an instrument 
for modeling of relations of public private partnership.//The Fourth International 
Conference Game Theory and Management. GTM2010. 28–30 June, 2010. 
St.Petersburg. P.99–101. 
[2] Konyukhovskiy P.V. (2012) The application of stochastic cooperative games in studies of 
regularities in the realization of large-scale investment projects. // Contributions to Game 
Theory and Management. GTM2011. St. Petersburg. Graduate School of Management 
St. Petersburg University. 2012. P. 137–146. 
 
120 
 
Experiment with Efficient Groves-Ledyard Mechanism for 
Resource Allocation 
 
 
 
Galina Boldyreva1, Nikolay Korgin2 and Vsevolod Korepanov3 
 
1,2Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University) 
1,2,3V.A.Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences 
 
 
 
Keywords: Resource Allocation, Effective Groves-Ledyard Mechanism, Experiment 
 
The research is supported by the grant 12-07-31244 of Russian Foundation for 
Basic Research. 
We consider the problem of resource allocation – a limited amount 1R +∈  of 
an infinitely divisible good should be allotted among finite number of agents from the 
society {1,..., }N n= . Each agent i N∈  has an utility function ( ) :iu • 1+ →  : 
1. concave and 2C ; 
2. it is not efficient to allocate all the good to one agent - that 
is 2{ , }i j N∀ ∈  
(0) ( )ji
i j
uu R
x x
∂∂
≥
∂ ∂
; 
3. there is exist possibility to transfer utility among agents. 
Principal tries to maximize the total utility of all agents (effective resource 
allotment): 
( ) maxi i x A
i N
u x ∈
∈
→∑ , 
but he doesn’t know the agent’s utility function. 
To solve this problem it is proposed mechanism ( ,( , ))i N iS S x tρ ∈= = ×  which is 
an extension of Groves-Ledyard mechanism (see [1, 2]): 
{ : }ni i ji
j N
S s s R
∈
= ∈ ≤∑  – a space of agent’s actions, 
1
1( ) ,
n
i ij
j
x s s
n =
= ∑  
1
( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i j
j
t s p s p s
n
α
=
= − ∑  – a balanced transfers, 
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where 2
1
( ) ( ( ) ) .
n
i j ji
j
p s x s sβ
=
= −∑  
It was previously shown that the mechanism ρ: 
− yields efficient allotment as the only Nash equilibrium [3] in game 
,( ) , , x tN S fρΓ =< > , where , 1{ ,..., }x t nf f f=  – profile of preferences of agents 
determined by their utility profile u U∈  and procedure ( )x • : 
( ) ( ( )) ( )i i i if s u x s t s= − , i N∈ ; 
− Nash equilibrium is reachable in Iterative bargaining process if agents 
behaviour is Cournot dynamics and holds some inequality on β [3]. 
We conducted a series experiment sessions for that mechanism with students, 
using the experimental software Ztree [4]. 
The games results showed that students’ behavior is often different from the 
Cournot dynamics and game’s outcome was effective only in some cases – primarily in 
cooperation of all students. Among models of behavior were cooperative, constant, 
Cournot dynamics and some others. 
In this paper we present a models of students’ behavior observed and properties 
of the mechanism when this behavior occurs. 
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In recent years the research in the field of strategic alliances has been focused 
on the problem of assessment of alliance performance. Different indicators of the 
performance are considered: profitability, alliance duration, alliance termination, 
achievement of strategic goals and also alliance stability. However, there is no common 
definition of alliance stability or instability in the scientific community. In the paper a 
game theory concept of time consistency (dynamic stability) is proposed to be 
implemented to real world strategic alliances. 
In contrast to real life situations, in a direct theoretic problem of time 
consistency the dynamic cooperative game is supposed to be given. We consider a 
reverse problem: how to make conclusions about strategic alliance time consistency on 
the basis of their performance observations along cooperative trajectory. In the paper 
three cases of strategic alliances are considered: Renault-Nissan, Sony-Ericsson Joint 
Venture and DaimlerChrysler Company. 
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In European fisheries, Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) has not been 
achieved for all economically valuable fish stocks. According to Facts and Figures on 
the Common Fisheries Policy (2012), only 11 fish stocks in the Atlantic shoreline and 21 
fish stocks in the Mediterranean are fished at MSY. Most of the other fish stocks are 
outside the safe biological limits and overfished. This implies that some of the current 
fish stocks are not harvested at MSY levels and hence one of the most important 
environmental objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), sustainable fish stock 
levels, has not been achieved. In the current reform proposals, one of the main topics is 
related to the achievement of MSY for all fish stocks. According to the CFP reform, all 
fish stocks should be harvested at MSY levels after 2015. The basic idea behind the 
reform proposal is that fishing is also an economic activity and hence maximum benefit 
for all agents in the fishing industry should be achieved given the sustainability 
requirement of fish stocks. 
How can we achieve the MSY for all fish stocks? Firstly, we know that precise 
data about the structure of a given fish population is required to manage the fish stock at 
MSY. Then, we show that a well-designed rights-based management system is needed to 
align the interests of all agents in the fishing industry to implement the MSY. Given that 
MSY is calculated for a given fish stock, we present a rights-based management 
mechanism implementing the MSY levels in a simple age structured fish population 
model with three age classes, and without loss of generality with two fishing agents with 
different fishing technologies. The agents have different fishing technologies, which 
affect the by-catch ratio. In other words, the agents target the oldest age class but they 
also catch young immature fish due to imperfect fishing selectivity. We show that not 
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only biological limitations due to structure of the fish population but also composition of 
fisheries or different catch technologies should be taken into consideration in 
determination of maximum catch limits (or property rights). We also show that initial 
allocation of quotas does matter to achieve the MSY and sustainable fisheries. 
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In this paper, the authors continue the study of a model zero-sum differential 
game [1,2,3], in which three objects 1P , 2P , and E  move in a straight line. The 
dynamics of the pursuers iP , = 1i , 2 , and the evader E  are described by the relations  
 
0 0
= , = ,
= ( ) / , = ( ) / ,
( ) = 0, | | , ( ) = 0, | | .
P P E Ei i
P i P P E E Ei i i
P i i Ei
z a z a
a u a l a v a l
a t u a t vµ ν
− −
≤ ≤
 
   (1) 
Here, Piz  and Ez  are the coordinates of geometric positions of the objects; Pia  
and 
2P
a  are their accelerations; the controls iu  and v  have bounded absolute values; 
iµ , ν , Pil , and El  are parameters of the problem. 
Let us fix two instants 1T  and 2T . At the instant iT , we compute the miss of the 
pursuer iP  with respect to the evader E :  
 ( ) =| ( ) ( ) |, = 1, 2., i E i P iP ii
r T z T z T iE −  (2) 
Suppose that the pursuers act together. Therefore, we can join them into one 
player, which governs the vector control T1 2= ( , )u u u . Let us call it as the first player 
and let the evader E  be the second player. The resultant miss is computed as  
 1 2
1 2
= min{ ( ), ( )}, ,P Pr T r TE Eφ . (3) 
                                                 
* This work was supported by Program of Presidium RAS \Dynamic Systems and Control Theory" 
under financial support of UrB RAS (project No.12-II-1-1002) and also by the Russian Foundation 
for Basic Research under grant No.12-01-00537. 
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At any current instant, both players know exactly phase coordinates 
1P
z , 
1P
z , 
1P
a , 
2P
z , 
2P
z , 
2P
a , Ez , Ez , Ea . The first player generating his feedback control 
minimizes the miss φ , the second player maximizes it. 
This work deals with constructing optimal strategy of the first player, which is 
composed of the pursuers, for the following cases of the game: 1) each pursuer has 
dynamic capabilities exceeding the ones of the evader; 2) each pursuer is ``weaker'' than 
the evader; 3) one of the pursuers is stronger and another one is weaker than the evader. 
In all mentioned cases (they are strictly defined by values of the parameters iµ , ν , Pil , 
El ), the optimal feedback control of the first player can be generated on the basis of 
switching lines depending on time and located in the two-dimensional state space of one-
dimensional coordinates of the forecasted final misses (zero-effort miss coordinates). 
Statements are given that characterize stability of the suggested control method 
with respect to small inaccuracies of numeric constructions of the switching lines and 
informational errors of measurements of the state position during generation of the 
control by the first player. 
From the point of view of general theory of differential games [4], the obtained 
results show how in the framework of specific problems, optimal feedback control can 
be built on the basis of switching lines. These results can be useful during generating and 
analyzing non-orthodox guidance laws for the interception of maneuvering anti-surface 
missiles [5]. Also, they can widen modern area of studies of group pursuit games (multi-
agent systems) [6,7,8,9]. 
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The assignment game is a coalitional game that represents a two-sided market 
situation. In this market there exists a finite set of sellers, each one with an indivisible 
object on sell, and a finite set of buyers willing to buy at most one object each. Each 
agent has a reservation value that is what he or she obtains if not matched with an agent 
on the opposite side. Every buyer-seller pair (i,j) is attached to a real number aij that 
represents the value that this pair can attain if matched together. From these valuations, 
we obtain the assignment matrix A. The worth of each coalition is the total profit that 
can be obtained by optimally matching buyers and sellers in thecoalition. When 
reservation values are null and the assignment matrix is non-negative, our game is the 
one introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972). Coalitional game theory analyzes how the 
agents can share the profit of an optimal pairing, taking into account the worth of all 
possible coalitions. The most studied solution concept in this model has been the core, 
the set of efficient allocations that are coalitionally rational. Shapley and Shubik prove 
that the core of the assignment game is non-empty and it can be described just in terms 
of the assignment matrix, with no need of the associated characteristic function. Other 
solutions have been considered for the assignment game: Thompson’s fair division point 
(1981), the kernel or symmetrically pairwise bargained allocations (Rochford, 1984), the 
nucleolus (Solymosi and Raghavan, 1994), the Shapley value (Hoffmann and Sudho ̈lter, 
2007) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (Nunez and Rafels, 2009). 
However, as far as we know, axiomatic characterizations of solutions in this framework 
have been focused on the core. Axiomatizations of the core of assignment games are due 
to Sasaki (1995) and Toda (2003 and 2005). 
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On the general class of coalitional games, the prenucleolus (that for the 
assignment game coincides with the nucleolus) has been axiomatized by Sobolev (1975) 
by means of covariance, anonimity and the reduced game property of Davis and 
Maschler (1965). Potters (1991) also characterizes the nucleolus on the class of balanced 
games by means of the above reduced game property. However, both aforementioned 
sets of axioms do not characterize the nucleolus on the class of assignment games since 
the Davis and Maschler reduced game of an assignment game needs not remain inside 
this class. Moreover, it seems desirable an axiomatization of the nucleolus of the 
assignment game in terms of axioms that are not stated by means of the characteristic 
function but by means of the data of the assignment market. 
In the present paper, on the domain of assignment games, the nucleolus is 
uniquely determined by only two axioms: derived consistency and complaint 
monotonicity on sectors’ size. Derived consistency is based on the derived game 
introduced by Owen (1992). Roughly speaking, complaint monotonicity on sectors’ size 
only requires that at each solution outcome, the most dissatisfied agent on the short side 
of the market is at most as well off as the most dissatisfied agent on the large side of the 
market, where we interpret the dissatisfaction of an agent with a given outcome as the 
difference between his reservation value and the amount that this outcome allocates to 
him. 
As a by-product of the axiomatization of the nucleolus, we obtain a geometric 
characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical 
characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, 
showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain 
bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this 
means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum 
amount that can be transferred, without getting outside the core, from one agent to 
his/her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he/she can receive 
from this partner, also remaining inside the core (Rochford, 1984; Driessen, 1999). We 
now state that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring 
this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for 
optimally matched coalitions. 
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In this contribution we formulate and study a class of stochastic positional 
games using the game-theoretical approach to finite state space Markov decision 
processes with average and discounted costs’ optimization criteria. We consider Markov 
decision processes that may be controlled by several players. The set of states of the 
system in such processes is divided into several disjoint subsets which we regard as the 
position sets of the corresponding players. Each player has to determine which action 
should be taken in each state of his position set in order to minimize his own average 
cost per transition or discounted expected total cost. The cost of system’s transition from 
one state to another in a Markov process is given for each player separately. In addition 
the set of actions, the transition probability functions and the starting state are known. 
We assume that players use stationary strategies, i.e. each player in an arbitrary position 
uses the same action for an arbitrary discrete moment of time. In the considered 
stochastic positional games we are seeking for a Nash equilibrium. Our main results are 
concerned with the existence of Nash equilibria in the considered games and an 
elaboration of algorithms for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players. 
Additionally we consider the antagonistic stochastic positional games and formulate 
conditions for determining the saddle points in such games 
We formulate he stochastic positional game with average payoff function using 
the framework of a Markov decision process ( , , , )X A p c  with a finite set of states X  a 
finite set of actions, a transition probability function : [0,1]p X X A× × →  that satisfies 
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the condition , = 1, ,
a
x yy X
p x X a A
∈
∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  and a transition cost function 
:ic X X R× →  (see [1]). For the non-cooperative game model with m  players m  
transition cost functions : , = 1,ic X X R i m× → , where ,
i
x yc  expresses the cost of 
system's transition from the state x X∈  to the state y Y∈  for player i  are given.  
 In addition we assume that the set of states X  is divided into m  subsets 
1 2= ( ) = , )m i jX X X X X X i j∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∅ ∀ ≠ , where iX  represents the position set 
of player i . We consider the stationary game model. We define the stationary strategies 
of players we define as m  maps: : ( )i is x a A x→ ∈  for , = 1, .ix X i n∈  If the players fix 
their stationary strategies 1 2, , , ms s s  then we obtain a situation 1 2= ( , , , ).ms s s s  This 
situation induces a simple Markov process determined by the probability distributions 
,
( )is
x y
xp  in the states , = ,ix X i i m∈ . If we denote by ,= ( )
s s
x yP p  the matrix of 
probability transitions of this Markov process and take into account the transition cost 
matrix ,= ( )
i i
x yC c  for each player then for a given starting state 0x  we can determine the 
average cost per transition 1 2
0
( , , , )mx
iM s s s  for = 1,i m . So, if on the set of situations 
1 2= mS S S S× × ×  we define the payoff functions 
1 2 1 2
0 0
( , , , ) = ( , , , ), = 1,m mx x
i iF s s s M s s s i m   then we obtain a discrete game in normal 
form. For this game we have proven the following results [2,3]: 
- If an arbitrary situation s S∈  induces a probability matrix sP  that 
corresponds to a Markov uni-chain then for the stochastic positional game with an 
average payoff function there exists a Nash equilibrium; 
- For an arbitrary antagonistic stochastic positional game with an average 
payoff function there exists the saddle point. 
The stochastic positional game with discounted payoff functions can be defined 
in a similar way as the previous game. If for an arbitrary situation 1 2= ( , , , )ms s s s S∈  
we consider the Markov process induced by the probability matrix ,= ( )
s s
x yP p  then for a 
given starting state 0x  and given discount factor (0 < < 1)λ λ  we can determine the 
expected total discounted cost 1 2
0
( , , , )mx
i s s sσ   with respect to each player i . In such a 
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way we can define the functions 1 2 1 20 0( , , , ) = ( , , , )
m m
x x
i iF s s s s s sσ   for = 1,i m . 
These function determine a discrete game in normal form. For this game we have proven 
the following result [2,3]: For an arbitrary stochastic positional game with discounted 
payoff function there exists Nash equilibrium. For the considered stochastic positional 
games elaborated algorithms for determining the optimal strategies of the players have 
been elaborated. Additionally the computational complexity aspects of the problem of 
determining the optimal strategies in stochastic antagonistic positional games have been 
studied [4]. 
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One of the problems of cooperative games is to find formal decisions 
acceptable to all game participants. Among the most popular solutions is the Shapley 
value, which determines the weight of each player in the game [5]. In this paper, we 
have found the Shapley value for the game with a partially ordered set of players and 
have shown how the methods of cooperative game theory can be applied for assigning 
weights in testing. 
Testing as an instrument of measuring the knowledge level is used in teaching 
successfully for a long time. During the last years the interest to this problem has 
increased significantly, this interest being caused by the formalization of the educational 
process and the development of computer-based control of knowledge. The emergence 
of mathematical models of Rush, Birnbaum and others have substantially developed the 
theory and has made possible to use advanced mathematical models such as the item 
response theory [1], statistical games [3]. 
One of the problems of the item response theory is the determination of the item 
weights in test. It is important if we want to compare the students who had different 
tests. 
A cooperative game is designed to assign weights to the test items. Value of the 
characteristic function on any subset of the test items is a time that is required for a 
student to find answers for items of this subset. In case of tree structure of the test a 
Shapley value and a Banzhaf power index are found by authors in [4]. The constructed 
Shapley and Banzhaf values are similar to the values proposed by Littlechild S.C. and 
Owen G. A. [2] for “Airport game”.  
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Let a set { }1 2,  ,..., nA α α α=  be a set of parts of studying course and a set of test 
items. We define two functions: ( )S α , aα . A set ( )S α  is a set of parts that precedes 
straightly the part α . A number aα  is the time needed to learn the part α  if the student 
has learnt the test items from the set ( )S α . 
Definition. If there are a sequence of test items (course parts) 
1 2, ,..., kα γ γ γ β= =  for a test (course) { }1 2,  ,..., nA α α α=  such that 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 3 1,  ,..., kS S Sα γ γ γ γ β−∈ ∈ ∈  then we write α β<  and say that the item α precedes 
the item β . 
We denote by { }( ) |V Aα β β α= ∈ <  a set of test items (course parts) preceding 
the item α  and by { }( ) |V Aα β α β= ∈ <  a set of test items (course parts) following after 
the item α . For a set of item K  we denote by { }( ) ( ) | ( )K
K
V K V A α
α
α β β α∈
∈
= = ∈ ∃ <

 the 
set of test items preceded to items from the set K . 
For a studying course A  with two functions ( )S α , aα  we define a cooperative 
game ,AΓ = v  with characteristic function given by 
 
( )
( )
K V K
K aα
α∈ ∪
= ∑v  (1) 
Therefore the value ( )Kv  is a time needed for learning course parts from the set 
K . 
Theorem. If in a cooperative game ,AΓ = v  the characteristic function has the 
form given by eq.(1) and the number ( )m Vα α=  is the power of set ( )V α  then 
components of Shapley value can be found by the formulae 
 
{ } ( ) 1V
a
w
m
β
α
β α α β∈ ∪
=
+∑  (2) 
The Shapley value has the following probabilistic interpretation. The 
component wα of Shapley value (weight of test itemα ) is the mathematical expectation 
of time needed to a student for learning part α  if all programs of the course studied have 
equal probability. A program of the study is a permutation of test parts 1 2,  ,..., nα α α .  
 
135 
 
 Example. The test 
A  consists of 6 items. Its 
structure is defined by a graph 
(see Fig.). The numbers 0ia ≥ , 
1,6i =  determine the time that 
is necessary for studying the 
part i  under the condition that 
all the previous parts of course 
have been studied. So the time 
needed for studying all the 
parts of course is 
1 2 6( )A a a a= + + +v . 
According to the graph it is 
easy to construct function ( )S α . 
It is given by the following 
formulae: ( )1S α =∅ , ( ) { }2 1S α α= , ( ) { }3 1S α α= , ( ) { }4 2S α α= , ( ) { }5 2S α α= , 
( ) { }6 3 4 5, ,S α α α α= . For function ( )S α on the set of the course we defend a ratio of the 
following items. It is not reflexive. Characteristic function ( )Kv  is constructed by (1) for 
all 64 subsets of set A . 
The components wα  of the Shapley value can be found by formulae (2) and 
numbers 
5 4 3 26 0, 1, 3m m m m m= = = = = . They are given by 
1 1 6w a= ; 2 1 26 4w a a= + ; 3 1 36 2w a a= + ; 4 1 2 46 4 2w a a a= + + ; 
5 1 2 56 5 2w a a a= + + ; 6 1 2 3 4 5 66 4 2 2 2w a a a a a a= + + + + + . 
 
References 
 
[1] Handbook of Modern Item Response Theory. Edition Win. J. van der Linden, R.K. Hambleton, 
1997, Springer – Verlag, New York, p.510. 
[2] Littlechild S.C., Owen G. A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case// 
Management Sci., 20, p.370-372. 
[3] Lutsenko M. M., Shadrintseva N. V. Reliability of test score, Proceedings of Petersburg 
transport university, ISSN 1815-588X, 2(31), 2012 сс. 178-186 
α1 
α2 
α3 α4 
α6 
α5 
a3 
a1 
a6 
a4 
 
a5 
Fig. 
136 
 
[4] Lutsenko M. M., Shadrintseva N. V. The Shapley and Banzaf values for different courses of 
study, the Sixth International conference Game Theory and Management, Abstracts, St. 
Petersburg, 2012, p. 165-169.. 
[5] Weber R. Probabilistic Values for Games // The Shapley Value (Essays in Honor of Lloyd S 
Shapley/ A.E.Roth (ed.). 101-119, Cambridge Univ. Press. Cambridge, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ВЕСТНИК САНКТ–ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА 
 
Серия 8  
МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ 
 
 
Ответственный редактор серии: 
Ю.Е. Благов 
 
 
Издательство Высшей школы менеджмента Санкт-Петербургского университета 
 
 
 
137 
 
Game-theoretic Solutions for Bargaining Problem 
 
 
 
Andrey Lyapunov 
 
St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics 
Russian Academy of Science,St.Petersburg, Russia 
anlyapunov@yandex.ru 
 
 
 
Keywords: Bargaining Problem, Shapley Value, Fixed Point 
 
The surveys of the bargaining problems are contained in [1-2]. 
Let nX +⊂   be the set such that it is convex, bounded, closed and there is 
x X∈ , 0x > . Moreover, X  is comprehensive: if x X∈  and 0 y x≤ ≤ , then y X∈ . (The 
point status quo is 0). The Pareto boundary of the set X  will be denoted by ( )X . in Let 
: nϕ + +→   be the calibre function of the set X :  
( ) inf{ 0 | }.x x Xϕ α α= ≥ ∈  
Let be {1, , }I n= … . For nx∈ , S I⊂  denote by Sx  the vector with components  
, if
0, if
iS
i
x i S
x
i S
∈
=  ∉
. 
Let be ( )x X∈ . Define the cooperative game:  
( , ) ( ).Sv x S xϕ=  
Properties of the function v . 
1. ( , ) 1v x I =  for ( )x X∈ . 
2. 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )v x S S v x S v x S≤ +∪ . 
3. If 1 2S S⊂  then 1 2( , ) ( , )v x S v x S≤ . 
4. For 0α ≥  ( , ) ( , )v x S v x Sα α= . 
Denote by ( )W x  the Shapley value for game ( , )v x ⋅ . 
Theorem. On ( )X  exists a fixed point *x  for map W : * *( )x W x= . 
Definitioin. This fixed point is called the Shapley value of the bargaining 
problem. 
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We consider a two stage game in which in stage one two firms with private 
information regarding their cost of production participate in an auction to get the license 
to enter the other firm's market and in stage two there is Cournot competition between 
the winning firm and the losing firm. In such setting the post auction policy of 
information revelation regarding the bids of the firms have impact in the Cournot 
competition between the firms. We consider four types of information revelation 
scheme: i) Post auction no information regarding the bids of the firms is revealed and 
only the winning firm is privately asked to pay the bid. ii) All the bids are publicly 
announced. So all the firms participating in the auction come to know about the bids of 
the other firms. iii) Only the bid of the winning firm is publicly announced. iv) Only the 
bid of the losing firm is publicly announced. In scheme i), the post auction Cournot 
competition is still incomplete information game in first price auction and all pay 
auction. In second price auction, the post auction Cournot competition turns out to be 
asymmetric information game. In scheme ii), the post auction Cournot competition is 
complete information game in all these three auction formats. In scheme iii) and iv), the 
post auction Cournot competition is asymmetric information game in first price and all-
pay auction. The post auction Cournot competition in second price auction is complete 
information games in scheme iii) and asymmetric information games in scheme iv). The 
pay-off of firms are different in these schemes of information revelation. Thus, the 
expected pay-off in stage one will be different in these four schemes of information 
revelation. Therefore, the bids will depend on the schemes of information revelation 
followed. 
We look for symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in first price, 
second price and all-pay auctions in each of these four schemes. Our analysis assumes 
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the types of the firms is denoted by their cost function ( constant marginal cost)and 
uniformly distributed. We get that the expected revenue is higher when only the bid of 
the losing firm is revealed than when no information is revealed. The symmetric pure 
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not exist in scheme ii) ( when all information is 
revealed) and scheme ii) (only bid of the winning firm is revealed). It may be considered 
as an answer to the question why information regarding amount of payment made while 
lobbying is not revealed. 
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The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The instruments used in the fight, however, are different. The target of the 
European Commission is merely the firm and its profits, while in the US managers are 
punished more directly and individual sanctions, including imprisonment, can be 
imposed. The aim of this paper is to highlight the effectiveness of different types of 
punishment in deterring cartels. To this goal we consider different types of fines leived 
on managerial firms: profit-based fines as opposed to delegation-based fines (hitting the 
managers more directly). The results suggest that the more suited instrument is related to 
the power delegated to managers: if delegation to managers is high, then a fine hitting 
them more directly is more effective in deterring cartel formation. If the fines have to be 
revenue equivalent, a non-distorsive profit based fine is more suited to deter cartels. 
Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed an increase in price-fixing, market-sharing and 
bid-rigging cartel behaviour across the two sides of the Atlantic. As a consequence, the 
fight against cartels evolved from transnational to `transatlantic', requiring 
unprecedented efforts and collaboration between the U.S. and the E.U. The respective 
legal and enforcement regimes are still quite different: in U.S. cartels are commonly 
treated with criminal sanctions whereas the principal sanction available to the 
Commission is the imposition of fines. Notwithstanding the different approaches, the 
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fight against cartels has been recently very successful on both sides of the Atlantic. This 
success can be partly attributed to the "leniency revolution". Leniency policies provide 
discounted fines or even positive transfers (for only few systems) to companies willing 
to cooperate with the enforcing authorities. 
Our paper, however, is not on leniency. Instead we aim to shed some light on 
the effectiveness of cartel deterrence in presence of managerial firms. The assumption of 
managerial firms reflects the observation that this is the nature of the majority of firms 
that raise the attention of antitrust authorities. Recent cases in the EU, like the TV and 
computer monitor tubes and in the US, as the LCD producers price fixing case clearly 
witness this. Besides reflecting different approaches to cartel punishment, these cases 
highlight how the corporate structure of the vast majority of the firms involved features 
managers who have been delegated decisions on behalf of the company by its owners or 
shareholders. 
In this context, we aim to provide a comparison of the effectiveness of the 
different types of punishments for cartel deterrence. In our approach, an antitrust 
authority can deter the cartel adopting two types of fines. The first type hits the profits of 
the firm and it is the typical instrument considered in the literature (Motta and Polo, 
2003). The second type of fine is instead focusing on the manager. The split between 
ownership and control can lead to non-profit-maximizing behaviour if the incentives of 
managers are not aligned with those of owners. This happens as managers may be 
interested in maximizing their own utility and do not necessarily share the profit 
maximizing goals of owners. A fine on the manager's contract and its delegated powers 
constitutes an hurdle to the goal of the manager of maximising the firm's size. This 
stylised modelling device does not fully capture the idea of criminal punishment 
through, for example, imprisonment; however, it constitutes a first attempt to evaluate a 
type of punishment targeted mainly at managers. 
Model, Analysis, and Welfare Implications 
We consider a duopoly in which two managerial firms 1 and 2 compete а la 
Cournot in the final product market. Managers aim to maximize a combination of firms' 
profits and sales and this is captured by the following objective function (Vickers, 1985; 
Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002):  
= = 1,2i i i iM q iθΠ +  
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where iθ  is the relevance of sales and it is a measure of delegation. For simplicity, we 
assume that the inverse demand is linear ( =p a Q− ) and the marginal cost is constant 
and equal to c  for both firms. 
Managers 1 and 2 can decide to reach a collusive agreement or to deviate 
(playing non-cooperatively). Collusion is sustained through a grim trigger strategy: if 
one firm deviates from the collusive agreement, it is punished by reverting to Cournot 
competition forever. Let (0,1)α ∈  be the common discount factor of the managers. 
The policies adopted by the antitrust authority are intended to deter collusion. 
To this goal we suppose that the authority can use two types of fines. The first type hits 
directly the profits of the firm; the second type hits the contract delegating powers to the 
managers. 
Starting from the profit-based fine, the two managers can reach collusive 
agreement which can be detected by the antitrust authority with the probability ρ . A 
successful prosecution of the cartel and the global amount of fine is denoted by F  
implying that each firm pays / 2F . Given the probability of being caught ρ , we 
assume that the expected fine is not prohibitively high to make firms profits negative. 
Managers can sustain collusive agreement over time if and only if their discount factor is 
sufficiently high and satisfies the following condition: 
( )2
9 32= 1 .
17PB
F
A
ρ
α α
θ
 
 ≥ +
 + 
 
If managers are delegated decisions on behalf of the firm, the antitrust authority 
may punish them more directly. One way to model this scenario is to assume that the 
colluding managers' delegation is given by ,fθ ρ−  where fρ  is the expected 
delegation-based fine. Managers have an incentive to form a cartel if and only if: 
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]
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=
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The two types of fines can be compared and conditions can be found out for 
which one is more effective than the other in deterring collusion. In particular, we find 
that, the higher is the power that owners delegate to the managers, the more effective is a 
punishment that hits the managers more directly. More precisely, if owners retain the 
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most of the decisional power, a profit based lump-sum fine is more likely to be more 
effective instrument in deterring cartels. 
Take into account now revenue equivalence and suppose that the antitrust 
authority has limited resources only generated by the fines imposed to cartel members. 
In this context, the antitrust authority may be particularly interested finding the most 
effective instrument, given a value of the expected revenue it aims to achieve. 
Proposition 2 Under revenue equivalence, an antitrust authority can deter collusion 
between managerial firms more effectively using a delegation-based fine (more directly 
hitting managers) rather than a profit based lump-sum fine (more directly hitting 
shareholders).  
The previous proposition suggests that the delegation based fine is distortive 
but is more effective in deterring collusion than the lump-sum profit based fine. There is 
an intuitive explanation for this result: unlike the lump sum fine, the delegation based 
fine affects also the deviation profits; in particular, the best response output of the 
deviating firm is increased by the fact that the rival firms expects to be fined. 
Finally, computing total welfare and assuming that no restriction on the two 
instruments is imposed, the results are similar in spirit to the analysis of deterrence in the 
previous section: the relative size determines which instrument leads to a higher 
expected welfare. More interesting is to perform the full comparison of the welfare 
effects under revenue equivalence, i.e. imposing that the revenue of the antitrust 
authority is identical in the two scenarios. The following result can then be stated: 
Proposition 3Under revenue equivalence, provided that fines are not prohibitive, a 
delegation based fine is welfare enhancing if and only if > ( )f tρ θ  with ( )t θ  
increasing in θ . Conversely, if ˆ0 < < ( ) < ( )f t tρ θ θ  with ( )t θ  increasing in θ , a 
delegation based fine is not only decreasing welfare compared to a profit based fine but 
also compared to the status quo of no intervention.  
Brief discussion 
This paper addresses the effectiveness of different types of instruments in 
deterring cartels. In particular, we focus on fines levied on profits and fines hitting the 
delegation powers given to managers; with the latter, we aim to capture an instrument 
that hits more directly managers. As the majority of firms involved in cartel cases are 
managerial, we analyse these two types of antitrust instruments in the context of the 
delegation model of Vickers (1986). Our results indicate that the effectiveness of each 
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type of instrument is closely related to the amount of powers delegated to the managers: 
intuitively, a delegation based fine is more likely to effectively deter collusion the more 
power owners have delegated to managers. This type of fine is the most effective if the 
antitrust authority aims at revenue equivalence: the distortionary effect of a delegation 
based fine reduces further the ability of managers to collude compared to a profit based 
fine. The distortion, however, has negative effects for consumers if managers are patient 
enough and firms still collude despite the antitrust efforts. In that case, we identify an 
important trade-off that has been largely overlooked in the existing literature between 
effective ex-ante deterrence and consumers' surplus and welfare if collusion still takes 
place. 
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The Monge property on a matrix was named this way by Hoffman (1963) 
honoring the works of the 18th-century French mathematician G. Monge, who used the 
property in a context of a soil-transport problem. This property has been applied in many 
different areas such as operations research, coding theory, computational geometry, 
greedy algorithms, computational biology, statistics or economics. We refer to the 
surveys in Burkard (2007) or Burkard et al. (1996) for references, specific applications 
or properties. Our work addresses the following question posed in page 151 in Burkard 
et al. (1996): “Are there other fields where Monge matrices play a role?” 
We try to contribute to this general question with a new work, mixing Monge 
matrices and assignment problems. Our main interest is to describe the core and two 
specific core allocations, the sectors-optimal allocations, in an easy and practical way, 
when dealing with Monge assignment cooperative games. Roughly speaking, our results 
agree with the “flavor” that adding the Monge conditions to the assignment matrix 
simplifies the analysis of the aforementioned solutions. The optimal (linear sum) 
assignment problem is that of finding an optimal matching, given a matrix that collects 
the potential profit of each pair of agents. Some examples are the placement of workers 
to jobs, of students to colleges, of physicians to hospitals or the pairing of men and 
women in marriage. Once an optimal matching has been found, one question arises: how 
to share the output among the partners. This question was first considered in Shapley and 
Shubik (1972). 
They associate each assignment problem with a cooperative game, or game in 
coalitional form. In the assignment, each coalition of agents must consider the maximum 
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profit they could attain by themselves as the worth of this coalition. The most relevant 
solution concept in cooperative games is the core. The core of a game consists of those 
allocations of the optimal profit (the worth of the grand coalition) such that no 
subcoalition can improve upon. Thus, we agree to share the profit of cooperation by 
means of a core allocation, no coalition has incentives to depart from the grand coalition 
and act on its own. 
Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of the assignment game is a nonempty 
polyhedral convex set and it coincides with the set of solutions of the dual linear 
program related to the linear sum optimal assignment problem. 
In this paper we study the assignment games, called Monge assignment games, 
where the matrix satisfies what is called the Monge property. Roughly speaking, the 
(inverse) Monge property is described by the fact that each 2 × 2 submatrix has an 
optimal matching in the main diagonal. This property can also be identified as the 
supermodularity of the matrix, interpreted as a function on the product of the set of 
indices with the usual order.  
Monge matrices have been used in Operations Research, in different fields such 
as combinatorial optimization (see Burkard et al., 1996 or Burkard, 2007), coalitional 
game theory (see Okamoto, 2004), algorithmic issues (see Bein et al., 2005), or statistics 
(see Hou and Prékopa, 2007). 
For square Monge assignment games, the central tridiagonal band of the matrix, 
that is the main diagonal, the upper diagonal and the lower diagonal, is sufficient to 
determine the core. As a result, and differently to the general case, not all inequalities are 
necessary to describe the core explicitly, and in this case the buyer-seller exact 
representative of the matrix (Núñez and Rafels, 2002b) can be computed by a closed 
formula. Two important points of the core, the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal 
core allocations, are computed with the aid of the previous representation. 
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Abstract We introduce learning in an N-player dynamic game of international 
pollution, while planers are facing with ecological uncertainty. We analytically find and 
compare the feedback non-cooperative strategies of players under three different 
behavioral and information assumptions: Bayesian learner, adaptive learner and 
informed player. Besides we find out that while uncertainty due to anticipation of 
learning ends up to a decrease in total emissions, depending on functional form of 
distributions and beliefs itself, the effect of structural uncertainty could be either an 
increase, decrease, or even no change in the emissions of individual players and also 
total emissions. While the first observation is totally in line with the available literature 
the latter results are rather new and more controversial. Moreover, we find out that a 
more optimistic player may either emit less or more than a less optimistic one, 
depending on how beliefs affect their expectations about the unknown variable. Then we 
show that if one learner player feels more risk while others beliefs do not change, this 
player will decrease his emission and others react to this decrease by increasing their 
emission but they are never strong enough to overcome the direct effect. 
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Traditionally, the focus of contest theory has been on models that view contests 
as isolated events. See, for example, Tullock (1980), Nitzan (1994), Congleton, Hillman, 
and Konrad (2008), Konrad (2009). However, most often contests are parts of larger 
environment. In many such economic environments, contestants care about not only 
winning the contest, but also the prize allocation in case of losing. This situation is 
known in the literature as identity-dependent externalities. There are many examples of 
contests with identity-dependent externalities in sports, rent seeking, lobbying etc. See 
examples in Funk (1996), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996), Das Varma (2002), 
Klose and Kovenock (2011).  
In this paper we analyze contests with identity-dependent externalities. We 
suggest a new approach how to analyze contests. Our approach is based on a particular 
set of determinants. First, we calculate each determinant in this set. Then, we show how 
to find a full-participation equilibrium based on the calculated determinants.  
We demonstrate that our set of determinants can establish both the existence 
and uniqueness of the full-participation equilibrium. In order to guarantee a unique full-
participation equilibrium, all determinants in our set of determinants have to have the 
same sign. This simple requirement and a standard assumption that all players prefer 
winning to losing are sufficient.  
Our new approach is very general. We demonstrate how to find equilibria in the 
classic symmetric and asymmetric contests without externalities based on our set of 
determinants.  
Finally, we analyze a particular n=3 player case. It turns out that in this case our 
approach helps to find a unique equilibrium which might or might not be the full-
participation equilibrium. 
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Matveenko [2] studied dynamics of a system of n agents with mutual positive 
externalities. Each agent i in period t is described by a positive number tix  referred as a 
value. Development of the i-th agent is being described as changes in her value. Discrete 
time periods 0,1,...t =  are considered and it is supposed that the value of the agent in the 
following period, 1t + , depends on her own value and the values of some other agents in 
the previous period, t. The development of the system is constrained both by potential 
possibilities of the agents to grow, 1t ti ii ix a x+ ≤ , and by the limitations of sizes of 
externalities created by other agents, 1 1,t ti ij jx a x+ +≤  i j≠ . Here ija = +∞  if agent j creates 
no externality used by agent i or if the externality created by j never becomes binding for 
i. A natural assumption of efficiency results in the following equations characterizing the 
equilibrium path given initial values 0 01 ,..., nx x : 
1
1,...,
mint ti ij jj nx a x
+
=
= , 0,1,...; 1,...,t i n= = , 
which can be written as  
 1 , 0,1,...,t tx A x t+ = ⊗ =  (1) 
where 1,t tx x +  are the vectors of values, A is the matrix of coefficients, and tA x⊗  is a 
multiplication by use of operations of an idempotent semi-ring, , min⊗ = ⋅ ⊕ = (see the 
pioneering research by Vorobiev [5], and see e.g. [1] for recent references on the tropical 
(idempotent) mathematics). It is important to notice that an externality can be 
nonbinding until an agent i is “small”, but when the agent develops the latter can face the 
limitation of insufficient development of another agent or a group of agents. The 
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behavior of the system (1) is fully defined by properties of the matrix A. In the two-agent 
case, for example, the long-run growth factor is equal to 11 22 12 21min{ , , }a a a aα =  but the 
system can demonstrate different patterns, such as convergence to an eigenvector with 
stable growth factor, stable decline, convergence to a limit cycle, etc. An important 
result is that a small change in an element of the matrix A can lead to a radical change of 
a pattern of behavior of the system (so called butterfly effect or catastrophic bifurcation) 
[3]. Such system can be applied, e.g., to modeling agglomeration externalities [4].  
In the present work we consider a transferable value version of the model 
formulated as the following game. Each player i, who possesses a value tix  chooses 
transfers tijy  of nonnegative parts of her value to other players, where 
,
0 t t ti ij i
j N j i
T y x
∈ ≠
≤ = ≤∑ . The dynamics now is described by the system 
1 , 0,1,...,t tx A x t+ = ⊗ =  where tx  is the vector of after transfer values, 
,
, 1,...,t t t ti i i ji
j N j i
x x T y i n
∈ ≠
= − + =∑ . Each player i is interested in a short-run (stepwise) 
maximization of her growth factor, 1 /t ti ix x+ , i.e. in a stepwise maximization of the value 
1t
ix
+ , or in a long-run maximization of 0/i ix xτ  where τ  is a terminal period of time. We 
find conditions under which the short-run goals are consistent with the long-run goals. 
The game with the short-run maximization is studied by use of response curves. For the 
three-players game, it is shown that, under some conditions, the short-run Nash 
equilibrium is achieved also in a process of local adjustment of the transfers. In the two-
players game, the cases of 0DetA <  and 0DetA >  are principally different, and under 
0DetA > , which means small externalities, an inconsistency between the short-run and 
the long-run goals takes place; in this case a cooperative solution can be used. 
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Hybrid cloud is a promising architecture to the modern market oriented cloud 
ecosystems. In this context public cloud with unlimited capacity provides solution to 
handle unexpected message peaks of variable Internet traffic and private cloud capacity 
for typical load. 
We consider a non-cooperative game 1} ),,{ (ni i iN P pu=Γ =< >  with player set 
{1,2 },, nN = … , strategy sets 21 nP P P× × ×…  and utility functions ( ), 1, ,i p iu n= …   
Here the players are the Private Clouds (PrC). The resources of the clouds are 
, 1, ,i ir n= … . Each PrC chooses a price ip  for the resource. There is a demand R  in the 
market. The customers observing the profile of the prices 1,( , )np p p…=  are distributed 
among the PrC in logistic manner. 
So, the portion 
1
exp{ }( , )
exp{ }
i i i i
k
i n
k
k k k
p
p
rp r
r
α β
γ
α β
=
+
−
=
−
+
∑
 
of the demand is attractive to the i  -th PrC, , ,1i n= … . Introduce the costs ic  for i  -PrC 
to serve the customers, , ,1i n= … . Thus the net revenue of the iPrC  depending of the 
demand R  is equal to 
( , )( ).i i iR p r p cγ −  
If the demand R  becomes larger than the summarized resources of the PrC 
1 nr r+…+  then the PrC-s have apply to Public Clouds (PuC) and buy additional 
resources in PuC. The price for the resource of the PuC is described by some function 
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( )p F L=  in dependence of the current load L  of the PuC. ( )F L  is non-decreasing 
continuous function. 
We suppose that the demand is random variable distributed with CDF ( )G R  , so 
it is possible that the demand will be sufficient large. Suppose also that there are m  
PuCs 1, , mPuC PuC…  which have some initial loads 1, , mL L… . Without loss of generality 
suppose that 1 1m mLL L +≤…≤ ≤ = ∞ . So, the PrC-s apply at the beginning to the first 
cheapest PuC and after the load of 1PuC  reaches the value 2L  then they apply to both 
1 2,PuC PuC  etc.  
The equilibrium in this clod computing game is derived. 
The research was supported by Russian Fund for Basic Research (project 13-
01-91158) and Division of Mathematical Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences 
(program Algebraic and combinatorial methods of mathematical cybernetics and new 
information systems). 
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In the paper the two-sided mate choice model of Alpern, Katrantzi and Ramsey 
(2010) [3] is considered. The problem is following. The individuals from two groups 
(males and females) want to form a long-term relationship with a member of the other 
group, i.e. to form a couple. Each group has steady state distribution for the age of 
individuals. In the model males and females have lifetime m  and n  respectively. The 
total number of unmated males is greater than the total number of unmated females and 
m n≥ . The discrete time game is considered. In the game unmated individuals from 
different groups randomly meet each other in each period. If they accept each other, they 
form a couple and leave the game, otherwise they go into the next period unmated and 
older. It is assumed that individuals of both sexes enter the game at age 1 and stay until 
they are mated or males (females) pass the age ( )m n . The aim of each player is to form 
a couple with individual of minimum age. Other two-sided mate choice model was 
considered in the papers [1, 2, 4-7]. Alpern, Katrantzi and Ramsey (2010) derive 
properties of equilibrium threshold strategies and analyse the model for small m  and n . 
We derive analytically the equilibrium threshold strategies and investigate players' 
payoffs for the cases 2,3n =  and large m . 
The work is supported by Russian Fund for Basic Research (project 13-01-
91158-ГФЕН_a) and the Division of Mathematical Sciences of RAS (the program 
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"Algebraic and combinatorial methods of mathematical cybernetics and new information 
system"). 
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There are many real situations where there is a restriction in the coalition 
formation. Here we consider a TU-game with restricted cooperation which is presented 
by an undirected communication graph first developed by Myerson. The network 
relations are formally represented by graphs whose nodes are identified with the players 
and whose arcs capture the pairwise relations. The relation can be interpreted as an 
information transfer or resource distribution or transport connection. The nodes can be 
individuals or organizations or countries or web-pages. 
It brings a communication (networking) game determined by a triple which 
consists on finite set of players, characteristic function and a graph of relations between 
players. A useful solution of the communication game is the Myerson value. 
But computing the Myerson value is not easy problem. We propose a sufficient 
simple procedure to calculate the Myerson value for TU-game with special characteristic 
function. 
Consider a game where the graph g is a tree which consists on n nodes and 
characteristic function is determined by the scheme proposed by Jackson: every direct 
connection gives to coalition S the impact r, where 0 1r≤ ≤ Moreover, players obtain an 
impact from non-direct connections. Each path of length 2 gives to coalition S the 
impact 2r a path of length 3 gives to coalition the impact 3r etc. So, for any coalition S 
we obtain 
( ) 21 2
1
‍ ,
L
k L k
k L k
k
v S a r a r a r a r a r
=
= + +…+ +…+ =∑  
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where L is a maximal distance between two nodes in the coalition; ka s the number of 
paths of length k in this coalition.  
( ) 0,   .v i i N= ∀ ∈  
We propose here the procedure of allocation the general gain ( )v N o each 
player i N∈ Stage 1. Two direct connected players obtain r. Individually, they don't 
receive nothing. So, each of them hopes to receive at least / 2r If player i has some 
direct connections then she receives the value / 2r imes the number of paths of length 1 
which contain the node i. 
Stage 2. Three connected players obtain 2r so each of them must receive 
2 / 3r Arguing the same way we obtain the allocation rule of the following form:  
( ) 21 2
1
, ‍ ,
2 3 1 1
ii i i L
L kkL
i
k
AA A AY v g r r r r
L k=
= + +…+ =
+ +∑  
 where ikA s the number of all paths of length k which contain the node i. 
We have proved that the determined allocation rule is coincides with the 
Myerson value. 
For large n it is difficult to apply the formula (2) to compute the Myerson value. 
We propose to simplify the computing using the generating function approach. 
Consider the tree ( , )pg N E= ith the root in the node p. Introduce the 
generating function  
1
( ) ‍
L
p k
p k
k
x xϕ α
=
= ∑  
here pkα s the number of paths which consist on k nodes (length 1k − and contain the 
node p. 
To find this value we use modified algorithm proposed by Jamison for 
computing the generating function for the number of sub-trees of a tree g which contain 
k nodes of the tree g. 
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We consider a non-cooperative two players game, in wich we use an arbitration 
scheme with quadratic payoff function and noninform distribution of probabilities. The 
equilibrium in this game in mixed strategies is found. 
We consider a non-cooperative zero-sume game in wich two players L  и M  
(The Labour and the Manager) have a dispute on an improvement in the wage rate. The 
player L  makes an offer x , and the player M  --- an offer y , x  and y . are arbitrary 
real numbers. If x y≤ ,there is no conflict, and the players agree on a payoff equal to 
2
x y+
. If, otherewise, x y> , the players call in the arbitraror A . . Denote the arbitration 
decision by z . In the papers [1,2] we use for the settlement between players the final 
offer arbitration procedure. The payoff in this game has a form: ( , ) ( , )zH x y EH x y= . , 
where  
 
,
2
, ,( , )
, ,
, ,
z
x y if x y
x if x y x z y zH x y
y if x y x z y z
z if x y x z y z
+ ≤
 > − < −= 
 > − > −

> − = −
. (1) 
The equilibrium in the game in mixed strategies was found. 
Now we use an arbitration scheme wich quadratic payoff function. Namely, let 
[0; )x ∞∈ + , ( ;0]y ∞∈ −  and the arbitrator chooses the number 0 with the probability p  
160 
 
and the numbers 1−  and 1 with equal probabilities 
1
2
p−
, where 0 1p< < . The payoff 
in this game has a form: ( , ) ( , )zH x y EH x y= , where 
 
 
2
2
,
( , ) ,
,
z
x if x z y z
H x y y if x z y z
z if x z y z
 − < −
= − − > −
 − = −
  (2) 
 
Denote by ( )f x . and ( )g y  the mixed strategies of the players L  and M , 
respectively. We have,  
0
0
( ) 0,      ( ) 1;      ( ) 0,        ( ) 1;f x f x dx g y g y dx
+∞
−∞
≥ = ≥ =∫ ∫  
By symmetry it follows that the value of the game is equal to zero, and the 
optimal strategies must be symmetric in respect to y-axis i.e. ( ) ( )g y f y= − . Hence, it 
suffices to construct the optimal strategy only for one player, for example L . 
Theorem. If 
1[ ;1)
3
p∈
, then for the player L  the strategy  
 2
0, 0 ,
1( ) , 2
2
0, 2
if x c
p cf x if c x c
p x
if c x
 ≤ <
 += ⋅ < < +

 + < < +∞
  (3) 
where 1 pc
p
−
= , is optimal. 
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In [De Meyer (2010)], the market was modeled as a repeated exchange game 
between the informed sector and the remaining part of the market. In this setting, the 
informed agent is using his information strategically and this implies a very particular 
class of dynamics for the price process: The main result in that paper claims that, 
independently of the trading mechanism used to model the exchanges, the price process 
will be a so called Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation (CMMV). This class of 
dynamics contains as a particular case the classical log normal dynamics of Black and 
Scholes. In that paper, the uninformed sector was modeled as a single risk neutral agent. 
In the present paper, we introduce risk aversion for the uninformed agent and consider 
one speci_c exchange mechanism. Prices at equilibrium are not martingales any more, 
but we prove that under a \martingale equivalent measure" depending on the utility 
function of the uninformed agent, the price process is a CMMV. 
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Stochastic (Markov) games were introduced by Shapley (1953, Ref.4), whose 
original formulation has since been expanded by others to include a broader range of 
problems in game theory. Gillette (1957, Ref.2) introduced a limiting average payoff for 
non-terminating stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. In the theory of 
stochastic (Markov) games, Mertens and Neyman (1981, Ref.3) proved the existence of 
a value and near (epsilon) optimal strategies of the players in the limiting average payoff 
case. Stern (1975, Ref.5), in his Ph.D. thesis first studied one player control stochastic 
games and proved the existence of a value in a semi-Markov (stationary) strategies for 
limiting average payoffs. Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1981, Ref.8) proved the 
existence of value and stationary strategies for one player control stochastic games under 
both discounted and limiting average payoff criteria. They also proved the ordered field 
property for one player control stochastic games. Vrieze (1983, Ref.6) proposed a finite 
algorithm for one player control finite undiscounted stochastic games by solving one 
linear programme only. 
Zero-sum two-person semi-Markov games were studied by Lal and Sinha 
(1992, Ref.1) which is a generalisation of stochastic (Markov) games. Under some 
ergodicity conditions, they proved the existence of value and optimal stationary 
strategies of the players for limiting average payoff semi-Markov games. 
This paper considers two person zero-sum finite semi-Markov games under 
limiting average payoffs where the transition probabilities and the transition time 
distributions do not depend on the actions of a fixed player at all states. Though one 
player control undiscounted stochastic games have value and optimal stationary 
strategies for the players in the same Archimedean ordered field (Ref.8), it is not true for 
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one player control undiscounted semi-Markov games in a general multichain structure 
(see Ref.7). So, we consider one player control undiscounted unichain semi-Markov 
games. Under unichain assumption, we prove the existence of value and stationary 
optimal strategies for the players by solving just one LP and its dual. The ordered field 
property follows from this LP algorithm. 
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We study the ordered field property in the subclasses of two person finite AR-
AT semi- Markov stochastic games with discounted payoffs. Though zero-sum 
discounted AR-AT stochastic games satisfy the ordered field property (Raghavan, Tijs 
and Vrieze [1985]), it is not true for AR-AT semi-Markov games, in general. Stochastic 
(Markov) games were introduced by Shapley [1953]. Semi-Markov games are 
generalizations of stochastic (Markov) games with random transition times which were 
studied by Lal and Sinha [1992]. They established the existence of a value and stationary 
optimal strategies of the two players in the discounted case. 
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a particular class of semi-Markov games 
which was 
studied by Raghavan, Tijs and Vrieze [1985], in the Markov case and modify it 
to obtain some new subclasses which has the ordered field property. We have found two 
new subclasses namely AR-AT-AITT and AR-AIT-ATT of AR-AT semi-Markov games 
that satisfy the ordered field property. These two subclasses of semi-Markov games have 
application in our real life as we have shown by two examples in this paper. 
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Introduction 
The analysis of coalition formation - in particular in the context of externalities - has 
become an important topic in economics (see for instance [1] for an extensive overview). 
Examples not only include firms that coordinate their output or prices in oligopolistic 
markets (cartels), jointly invest in research assets (R&D-agreements) or completely 
merge (joint ventures), but also countries that coordinate their tariffs (trade agreements 
and customs unions) or their environmental policy (international environmental 
agreements). This article contributes to the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition 
formation. This approach consists in modeling coalition formation as a two-stage game; 
the goal is to determine equilibrium coalition structures. Roughly speaking, in the first 
stage, each player chooses a membership action which leads to a coalition structure. In 
the second stage each coalition in this coalition structure chooses its ‘physical’ actions. in 
a base game.*  
                                                 
*In this footnote we give a short description of this approach (see e.g. [3] for more). Suppose 
= {1, , }N n  is a set of players. A coalition structure is a sequence   1= ( , , )m  consisting of 
disjoint non-empty subsets of N  whose union is N . Let C  be the set of possible coalition structures. If   
is a game in strategic form and  C , then ( )  denotes the game in strategic form with as players, also 
referred to as 'meta-players', the coalitions in  , with for each meta-player as strategy set the Cartesian 
product of the strategy sets in   of the members of the meta-player, and with the payoff function of a meta-
player the aggregate payoff function of its members. The Nash equilibria of ( )  are called coalitional 
equilibria. Having said this, we now can formulate the two-stage game. Formally, the fundamental objects are: 
(1) a set of players N . (2) A game in strategic form   with these players, called the base game. (3) Sets 
( )
i
M i N  and, with 
1
:=
n
M M M  , a so-called membership rule :R CM  (and may be 
also (4) a sharing rule). It  is assumed that for each  C  the game ( )  has a unique coalitional 
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For the new approach it is important to have results that guarantee uniqueness 
of coali- tional equilibria. Conditions should be such that they can be easily checked for 
the base games that appeared so far in these models, like Cournot and public good 
games. As far as we know, general uniqueness results for coalitional equilibria of such 
games are not present in the literature. There it is just assumed that one deals with a 
situation where coalitional equilibria are unique or that one deals with a simple concrete 
example where uniqueness explicitly can be shown. The problem is not the existence but 
the semi-uniqueness, i.e. that there exist at most one equilibrium. Developing an abstract 
general uniqueness result is the main objective of this article. 
Uniqueness comes down to existence and semi-uniqueness. For games in 
strategic form, continuous payoff functions together with quasi-concavity of conditional 
payoff functions implies (by virtue of the Nikaido-Isoda theorem or one of its slight 
extensions) existence of a Nash equilibrium under an appropriate compactness property. 
So for such games existence is not a real issue, but semi-uniqueness is. Semi-uniqueness 
for coalitional equilibria even is a larger issue as for handling such equilibria one has to 
leave the comfortable usual setting of one dimensional strategy sets. Indeed (as we have 
seen footnote 1) a coalition is formally treated as meta-player whose strategy set is the 
Cartesian product of the strategy sets of the players in this coalition. 
In order to obtain our semi-uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria we 
develop a semiuniqueness result for Nash equilibria of games in strategic form with 
higher dimensional strategy sets. This result can be considered as a generalisation of a 
result in [2] to higher dimensions. It can handle various aggregative base-games with 
one-dimensional strategy sets. We identify a class of such games; this class contains 
various Cournot and public good games. 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
equilibrium. Let ( )
i
V  be the individual payoff of player i N  in this equilibrium; this defines 

1
:= ( , , ) : n
n
V V V C  , called valuation. (A weaker appropriate assumption would be: each game 
( )  has at least one coalitional equilibrium and for each player it  holds that he has the same payoff in each 
of these equilibria.) Thus the valuation V  assigns to each coalition structure   for each player i  an 
individual payoff ( )
i
V . The game in strategic form G  is defined as follows: its player set is N , the 
strategy set for player i  is iM  and his payoff function is ... Finally, the Nash equilibria of G  induce via the 
membership rule R  the equilibrium coalition structures. 
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Imagine a situation whereby, in order to find a suitable partner, five single 
women and five single men are going to participate in Singles Party. To cover 
arrangements expenses, refreshments, beverages, orchestra and rewards, the entrance fee 
is 50€ *. Thus, the cashier will be at the disposal of an amount of 500 €. Just before the 
party ended all have been kindly asked to disclose their priorities: women asked to 
disclose priorities about men, and men, visa versa, about woman. Those who agreed 
have been promised to collect a Box of Delights †; otherwise, the Box is not available. 
Players who hide their priorities are blind by default and cannot participate in the game. 
We also suppose that there was a plenty of time during the party making these priorities 
(preferences) clear to everyone. Below we continue to those who will participate in the 
game, in addition to delights, setting up the rules of payoffs in the form of mismatch-
compensations and rewards. We call them all as participants. In particular, when all 
participants have gone on dating, the game ends, and, therefore, no reasonable 
justification exists for the payment of rewards and compensations. 
We use index i  for a woman notation, and an index j  for a man. Let all the 
guests participate in the game; all five women, { }1,..., ,...5i , and all five men, 
{ }1,..., ,...5j . Let during the evening the mutual priorities (preferences) have been 
                                                 
*  Note that red colour points at negative number. 
†  In case the Box is undesirable it will be possible to get 10€ in return.  
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disclosed. Each woman i , 1,5i = , disclosed her priorities iw  towards men, and each 
man j , 1,5j = , towards women as jm . Setting priorities straight, the priorities may be 
arranged into two 5 5×  tables: ,i jW w=  and ,i jM m= : the rows in table W  are some 
horizontal permutations iw  of numbers 1, 2,3, 4,5 ; vertical permutations jm , stand in 
columns of the table M . At the end of the evening, priorities iw , jm  in writing, were 
handed over to the organizers. Below, in Table-1, priorities ijw  (numbers 
1,5 1,2,3,4,5= ) might repeat themselves in columns of table W . Repetitions may also 
happen in rows of the table M , i.e., a woman at identical priority level may be preferred 
by more than one man, and a man by many women. As proposed by Võhandu, * mutual 
regrets , , ,i j i j i jr w m= +  occupy the cells in table R . 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5   M1 M2 M3 M4 M5  
 W1 1 5 3 2 4  W1 3 4 2 1 2  
 W2 5 4 1 2 3  W2 1 3 4 2 4  
W =  W3 3 5 4 2 1 M+ =  W3 5 2 3 4 3 R= =  
 W4 2 5 3 1 4  W4 4 5 1 3 1  
 W5 4 3 1 2 5  W5 2 1 5 5 5  
 Women Priorities  Men Priorities  
 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 W1 4 9 5 3 6 
 W2 6 7 5 4 7 
=  W3 8 7 7 6 4 
 W4 6 10 4 4 5 
 W5 6 4 6 7 10 
 Mutual Regrets 
Table-1 1 1 
Suppose that some fortunate participants, those with low level of mutual 
regrets, went to dating, and will receive in advance a reword – a prepaid ticket to 
happening, restaurant, concert, etc.  
                                                 
* Võhandu, L.V. (2010). Kõrgkooli vastuvõttu korraldamine stabiilse abielu mudeli rakendusena, 
Õpetajate Leht, reede, veebruar, nr.7/7.1, in Estonian. 
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Others, those unlucky ones, i.e., with higher levels of mutual regrets, may claim 
compensations because they were left empty-handed – only unsuitable partners 
remained. Suitable participants at the low levels of mutual regrets were already 
occupied. 
What happens in case no one founds a partner? Let, for a moment, the mismatch 
compensation will be set up individually, and equals, 12, , 10i j i jc r= ⋅ €. In fact, due to 
profit motive, it will be unwise to compensate participants in proportion to mutual 
regrets ,i jr , because of misrepresentation, cheating, imposture, and the like. Doing so, 
for example, couple ( )5,5  may raise their compensation up to 50€! Therefore, arrangers 
of the party are ready to follow a principal of maximum upon minimum compensation.  
In Table-1, the lowest mutual regret among all participants is 1,4 3r = . All not 
yet occupied men i  and women j  will receive, following our principal, the same 
compensation 12 1,4 10 15r ⋅ = €. It is also more profitable from the cashier point of view. 
Thus, the balance of payoffs for all participants, inclusive 10€ cost of delights, will be 
negative: 50€ + 15€ + 10€ = 25€, e.g., -50€ as the entrance fee, 15€ received as 
mismatch compensation, and 10€ as the cost of delights. 
What happens in case the couple ( )1, 4  decides to date? Assume that, he/she, 
both of them,will receive a reward for a date. Let, for simplicity the reward equals to or 
is higher of a doubled grade of mismatch compensation. The entire table R  should be 
dynamically reorganized to reflect the fact that ( )1, 4  are occupied, and the rest, i.e., the 
women { }2,3,4,5  and men { }1,2,3,5 , no longer can count on ( )1, 4  as potential 
partners. Therefore, priorities will fall; the scale 1, 2,3, 4,5  packs together. We say the 
scale will dynamically shrink to 1, 2,3, 4 . Table-1 transforms, into:  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5   M1 M2 M3 M4 M5  
 W1       W1       
 W2 4 3 1  2  W2 1 3 3  3  
W =  W3 2 4 3  1 M+ =  W3 4 2 2  2 R= =  
 W4 1 4 2  3  W4 3 4 1  1  
 W5 3 2 1  4  W5 2 1 4  4  
 Women Priorities  Men Priorities  
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  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 W1      
 W2 5 6 4  5 
=  W3 6 6 5  3 
 W4 4 8 3  4 
 W5 5 3 5  8 
 Mutual Regrets 
Table-2 1 1 
The mismatch compensation did not change and equals to 3,5 15c = €, while 
couple ( )1,4  potential balance 50− € 10+ € 2 15+ ⋅ € =10€ of payment improves. N.B., 
W1 and M4 each receive the reward to date of 30 € in accord with the rule that the 
reward is always higher or equals to the doubled mismatch compensation! For the rest, 
the balance remains negative (in deficit) and equals 15€. The balance of payoffs 
improves as well in case the couple ( )3,5  decides to date. 
The party is over. Decisions have been made about who will enter the dating 
and who is not, and passed in writing to the organizers. What would be in accord with 
the rules and regulations of the game the best collective decision of participants based on 
the maximization principal of the minimum compensation? Who is then going to enter 
the coalition of dating participants? 
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One of the leading resources of Russian economic internal growth in modern 
conditions is the labor force. Currently the focus is on the problem of the economic 
growth in Russia associated with the energy dependency, whereas the problems 
connected with the dependence of the Russian economic system on the cost and quality 
of the labor force, unfairly in the shadows. The study of the reasons for the current state 
of the labor market is definitely important applied problems as well. However, the 
problem of explaining patterns of the labor market evolution is more significant on the 
theoretical level in the long term. 
Urgent problem of the Russian economy is the lack of qualified personnel and 
imbalance of labor supply and labor demand relative to qualifications. Thus, there is 
excess of labor demand over its supply for the market of rare and needed professions, 
which causes the price of labor assignment by the candidates themselves. For the low-
skilled labor market it can be observed the reverse situation. An enormous low-skilled 
labor supply leads to the situation where employers dictate most of the conditions. 
Every person faces a problem of choosing a right path for his future career. In 
most of the cases decisions about profession and the quality of education are made based 
on the imperfect information and incorrect definition of objectives. Employees make 
decisions based not on the market indicators of demand and wages, but on the basis of 
subjective factors. In other words, candidates take into account not quantitative but 
qualitative indicators. 
On the other hand, employers have a dilemma either to hire insufficient 
qualified personnel in a particular field and train until he or she reaches required level of 
qualification, or seek an opportunity to hire skilled personnel. In this case, firms should 
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be guided by the motives for the optimization of personnel costs. Therefore, the 
objective of employers is the choice of their behavior, based on current market 
conditions and adequate quantitative assessment of possible alternatives.  
Described problems reveal the need to study the behavior of agents in the labor 
market in order to find an equilibrium strategy in the long term. It is worth noting that 
the labor market agents also play one of the major roles in this area of Russian economy. 
Their recruiting strategy based on the appropriate quantitative indicators through their 
access to information could be an integral part of the process of equilibrium achieving. 
The labor market can be divided into three sectors according to the level of 
personnel qualification: low-skilled, skilled and highly skilled. Each of these sectors has 
different sets of rules and conditions. Selection of an optimal strategy for responding to 
the behavior of other similar participants can facilitate a potential conflict of interests for 
both employers and candidates. Conflict character of participants’ behavior stipulates the 
use of mathematical tools of game theory to the labor market study. 
Each candidate has an alternative of either accept a job offer, which meets his 
current qualifications, or look for a job which will offer him or her an opportunity of 
getting trained by qualified personnel and in the long run give possibility of a career 
growth. Therefore, employees have two appropriate strategies: to hire already qualified 
personnel or to spend money on training non-qualified personnel. Since availability of 
training candidates can improve their skills and employers can improve the skills of their 
workers. Training and development can be considered within the evolutionary game 
theory. A propensity for trainings will be one of the factors which determines an 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game theory model for both employees and 
employers. 
We introduce further notations for possible employees’ strategies according to 
distinguished sectors: , L S  and H , and notations for the average wage for each of the 
selected sectors: , , l s hw w w  for the low-skilled, skilled and highly skilled workforce, 
respectively. In terms of labor demand the set of possible strategies include two 
alternatives: Q  for the strategy to hire already qualified personnel and E  for the 
alternate behavior. Assume the cost of meeting the skilled and highly skilled level to be 
equal to sc  and ,hc  respectively, for both employees and employers. 
Let us consider firstly low-skilled labor market, where is no need to train 
employees. In non-crisis economic environment, individuals with higher qualifications 
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will not compete for employment in this market. Then the payoff matrix in terms of 
employees could be described as shown in the Table 1. ESS of this game is obviously 
the situation ( ), .L L  Possible to assume that in crisis economic environment all of the 
payoffs of such evolution game can be equal to ( ; )l lw w . A similar situation is in the 
game in terms of employers, where there is no need of any qualification level and, 
therefore, all of the payoffs is equal to ( ; )l lw w . 
Table 1. The payoff matrix in terms of employees 
 L  S  H  
L  ( ; )l lw w  ( ;0)lw  ( ;0)lw  
S  (0; )lw  (0;0)  (0;0)  
H  (0; )lw  (0;0)  (0;0)  
 
For modeling the games of the skilled and highly skilled labor markets it is 
necessary to introduce a parameter of propensity to education for workers wθ  and 
parameter of propensity to training for employers eθ . It is shown in the article that there 
is exists ESS’s dependence on these propensity parameters. Other result of such 
evolutionary games is the necessity for player to be guided by the unavailable 
information about the incentives of the opposite type players. The solution to this lack of 
information is the involvement of recruitment agencies that possess such data. 
For practical application of this model, it is necessary to consider certain 
occupations for each of the sectors. Derived evolutionarily stable strategies determine 
the equilibrium behavior of the labor market with certain allowable intervals for the 
model parameters. 
As a further development, we propose to introduce into the model additional 
parameters that affect the behavior of economic agents in the labor market, such as work 
experience. There are some occupations, in which more relevant is to get practical 
experience rather than to receive theorize education, and vice versa. 
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We consider the class of positive TU games  
= {( , ) :| |< , ( ) > 0 }.G N v N v S for S N+ ∞ ∅ ≠ ⊂  
For ( , )N v G+∈ , | |R Nz ++∈ , let the collection of coalitions { : , , }S S N S N⊂ ≠ ∅  be 
enumerated such that 1 1( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )i i i iz S v S z S v S+ +≤ . Denote  
| |2
=1
2(( , ), ) = { ( ) / ( )} .
N
i i iN v z z S v Sθ
−  
Then | |R Ny ++∈  with ( ) = ( )y N v N  belongs to the proportional prenucleolus of ( , )N v  iff  
| |(( , ), ) (( , ), ) R ( ) = ( ).NlexN v y N v z forall z with z N v Nθ θ ++≥ ∈  
For each ( , )N v G+∈ , the proportional prenucleolus of ( , )N v  is a singleton.  
The following axiomatization of the proportional prenucleolus is a modification of 
Sobolev's axiomatization of the prenucleolus (see [2] or [1]).  
Let a value f be defined on G+ . Consider the following axioms.  
Efficiency. | |( , ) R Nf N v ++∈  and ( , ) = ( )ii N f N v v N∈∑ .  
Proportionality. For any games ( , ),( , )N v N w G+∈ , any | |, R Nx y ++∈ ,  
( ) ( )= ,
( ) ( )
x S y S forall S N S
v S w S
⊂ ≠ ∅  
implies  
= ( , ) = ( , ).x f N v iff y f N w  
Anonymity. Let for games ( , )N v  and ( , )N w′  there exists a bijection 
:N Nπ ′→  such that ( ) = ( )v S w Sπ  for all S N⊂ . Then ( , ) = ( , )i if N v f N wπ ′ .  
Proportional DM consistency. Let = ( , )x f N v , then for each S N⊂ , ,= ( , )x SSx f S v , 
where  
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,
\
( ) ( \ ) = ,
( ) ( )( ) = , .max
( )
x S
T N S
v N x N S for Q S
v Q T x Qv Q for Q S Q S
x Q T⊂
 −
 ∪ ⊂ ≠
∪

 
Theorem 1. The proportional prenucleolus is a unique value defined on G+  that 
satisfies efficiency, proportionality, anonymity, and proportional DM consistency 
properties.  
The proportionality property means that the value f  depends only on the 
values of proportional excesses. It was used by Yanovskaya [3] for axiomatization of 
some proportional solutions instead of covariance property. The proportional DM 
consistency is a modification of Davis-Maschler consistency.  
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In this paper, we analyze the single period newsvendor model to determine the 
optimal order quantity where customer’s balking occurs. This scenario occurs when the 
customers are opposed to buy a product for various reasons, like decreasing quality of 
product, product is not as good as fresh when it reaches under a threshold level, etc. The 
model is investigated by assuming that the holding cost function depends on order 
quantity and the inventory level at which customer balking occurs, depends on holding 
cost. We consider the holding cost which depends on lot-size ( Q ) (in such a special way 
that firstly holding cost increases with the higher inventory lot and at an inventory level, 
holding cost is maximum, then holding cost decreases with the inventory lot and lastly 
holding cost reach a saturated level). The holding cost per unit product is 
( )
2
Q
Qeh Q h
pi
α
α
−
= +  
Using the following Property 2.1, we have some characteristic of the above 
holding cost function as the holding cost function is increasing when Q α≤  a and it is 
maximum at the point Q α=  and the function is decreasing when Q α≥ . Generally 
speaking, the constant part ( h ) is fixed for set up of the storage facility and the variable 
part varies with the lot size Q  in practice. In our model, the inventory level ( ( )K Q  
where balking starts depends on holding cost such as 
179 
 
( )
1 ( )
K Q K
h Q
β
= +
+
 
From the following two figures: holding cost per unit per unit time versus 
ordering size and the inventory level at which customer balking occurs versus holding 
cost per unit per unit time, taking the parameter values 400, 2, 100, 200,h Kα β= = = =  we 
may have a rough idea about the characteristics of holding cost per unit per unit time and 
the inventory level at which customer balking occurs in our model. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Inventory level at which balking occur versus Holding Cost per unit per unit time 
The model allows partial backlogging and permits part of the backlogged 
shortages to turn into lost sales. We develop the model without taking any specific 
distributional form of demand, only assuming the mean and the variance of the 
distribution of demand. Finally, we illustrate the model by numerical examples and 
compare our distribution-free model with the specific distributional form of demand. 
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In a classical mountain situation which is studied in [10] a group of people whose 
houses lie on mountains surrounding a valley or a part of a coast are considered. They want 
to be connected to a drainage system, where they have to empty their sewage. It is obvious 
that the sewage has to be purified before introduction into the environment. So, the sewage 
has to be collected downhill in a water purifier in the valley or along the coast. Consequently, 
each player wants to connect his house with a drain pipe to the water purifier. 
The problem is the higher costs of direct connection to water purifier and 
pumping water from the houses at lower heights to the houses at upper heights. Further, 
being connected to the houses at the same height may be dangerous. 
A mountain situation as described above leads to a connection problem of a 
directed graph without cycles and with some other properties [6]. A connection situation 
takes place in the presence of a group of agents, each of which needs to be connected to 
a source. If links are costly, then agents will evaluate the opportunity of cooperating in 
order to reduce costs. The cost allocation problem arising from a connection situation 
was introduced by [5] and has been studied with the aid of cooperative game theory [4] 
since the paper of [3]. We note that cost allocation problems may arise on many different 
physical networks such as telephone lines, highways, electric power systems, computer 
chips, water delivery systems, railways, etc. On the other hand, many authors have 
shown that to retrieve information needed to assess the exact cost of all the links of a real 
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network is a very hard task [7, 8]. So, we argue that it is more realistic to imagine 
connection situations where the costs of links are identifiable at a level of uncertainty, 
i.e. only the range of the costs is known, and no probability information on the 
realization of costs is given. Such connection situations with uncertain costs may be 
represented using graphs where the costs associated to the edges are intervals of real 
numbers. In the sequel cost allocation problems arising from connection situations, 
where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers are studied in [9]. 
Recently, [11] model mountain situations by introducing multiple sources called 
a forest situation. If we consider interval mountain situations with more purifiers, then 
we get special minimum interval cost connecting interval forest problems, where all 
houses are connected with at least one purifier. 
In this study, we extend the obtained results in [11] to forest situations with 
interval data. We use the notion of cooperative interval games [1, 2] to tackle the cost 
sharing problem to a forest situation. We deal with cost monotonic allocation rules for 
forest situations. Further, we study optimal connection problems and related interval cost 
sharing problems of forest situations with interval data. 
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This paper considers the disagreement point axioms to characterize the status 
quo-proportional solution and is inspired by paper [2], where these axioms are used to 
provide new characterizations of the egalitarian bargaining solution. Though the 
egalitarian and status quo-proportional solutions [1] are closely related (under 
logarithmic transformation of utilities the proportional excess transforms into the 
egalitarian excess due to Kalai) the problems appear because of absence of convexity 
requirement for definition of the status quo-proportional solution.  
Disagreement point monotonicity is an axiom which requires a player’s payoff 
to strictly increase in his disagreement payoff (status quo payoff). 
We transfer some results by Rachmilevitch to our case, and provide another 
characterizations of the status quo-proportional solution. 
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The new class of voting games, in which the number of players and their power 
indexes are changing coherently, is considered. As a power index Shapley–Shubik value 
is taken. 
The new entering player is interested in receiving a given value of his 
component of Shapley–Shubik power index by investing 1( , , )nα α α= …  in the game. We 
consider the problem, how to find a minimal investment, which guaranties the given 
value of Shapley–Shubik power index for the newcomer. The mathematical statement of 
the problem is given, some properties of the minimal investment are considered and 
Monte–Karlo method for the calculation of minimal investment is proposed. 
The results are illustrated by numerical example. 
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The history of as s ignment  games  goes back to the XIX. century to Bohm- 
Bawerk’s [1] horse market model. Later Shapley and Shubik [20] introduced the formal, 
modern concept of assignment games. 
One of the most popular solution concepts for TU-games is the Shap ley  value 
(Shapley [18]). Numerous axiomatizations of the Shapley value are known in the 
literature. In this paper we focus on the following ones: (1) Shapley’s original 
axiomatization [18] by efficiency, the null player property (originally stated together as 
the carrier axiom), symmetry and additivity (also discussed by Dubey [5] and Peleg and 
Sudholter [14]), (2) Young’s [21] axiomatization replacing additivity and the null player 
property by strong monotonicity (also discussed by Moulin [11] and Pinter [15]), (3) 
Chun’s [4] replacing strong monotonicity by coalitional strategic equivalence, (4) van 
den Brink’s [2] replacing (in Shapley’s original axiomatization) additivity and symmetry 
by fairness, and (5) Hart and Mas-Colell’s [9] approaches using the potential function 
and a related reduced game consistency. 
First, we examine these characterizations of the Shapley value on the class of 
assignment games, and conclude that none of these characterizations is valid on this 
class in the sense that they do not characterize a unique solution. 
After these negative results, we show that when considering an assignment 
game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game 
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and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph where buyers are connected with sellers 
only, Myerson [12]’s component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the 
Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, the axioms have a natural 
interpretation for these games. 
An assignment game is fully described by the as s ignment  s ituat ion  being a 
set of buyers, a set of sellers, and for every buyer a valuation of the good offered by each 
seller. Instead of defining an assignment game as a communication graph game, we will 
directly work on the class of these assignment situations. For such assignment situations, 
component efficiency of a graph game solution boils down to s ubmarket  efficiency  
stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that 
submarket, where a s ubmarket  in an assignment situation is a set of buyers and sellers 
such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers 
outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered 
by sellers inside the set. 
Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that 
only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular 
seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount. We show that 
these two axioms do characterize the Shap- ley solution for assignment situations being 
the solution that is obtained by applying the Shapley value to the corresponding 
assignment game. We will refer to the Shapley solution for assignment games simply as 
their Shapley value. So, we obtain a positive result by viewing an assignment game as a 
communication graph game. 
Besides introducing and axiomatizing his solution, Myerson [12] also shows 
that it is s tab le for superadditive graph games in the sense that two players never get 
worse off when building a link between them. The Shapley value for assignment 
situations is valuat ion monoton ic in the sense that the payoffs of a buyer i and a seller 
j do not decrease if only the valuation of buyer i for the good offered by seller j 
increases. 
In this paper first we apply the axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-
games mentioned above to the class of assignment games, and show that they do not 
give uniqueness on this class. Then we consider assignment games as communication 
graph games and characterize the Shapley value for assignment situations by submarket 
efficiency and valuation fairness. 
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Nash’s (1950) bargaining problem is a fundamental problem in economics. It 
consists of two components: a feasible set of utility allocations, each of which can be 
achieved via cooperation, and one special utility allocation – the disagreement point – 
that prevails if the players do not cooperate. A solution is a function that picks a feasible 
utility allocation for every problem. The axiomatic approach to bargaining narrows down 
the set of “acceptable” solutions by imposing meaningful and desirable restrictions 
(axioms), to which the solution is required to adhere. 
Weak and common restrictions are the following: weak Pareto optimality – the 
selected agreement should not be strictly dominated by another feasible agreement; 
symmetry – if the problem is symmetric with respect to the 45° -line then the players 
should enjoy identical payoffs; independence of equivalent utility representations – the 
selected agreement should be invariant under positive affine transformations of the 
problem. I will call a solution that satisfies these three restrictions standard. 
Two other principles that take center stage in this paper are independence and 
monotonicity. Informally, the former says that if some options are deleted from a given 
problem but the chosen agreement of this problem remains feasible (it is not deleted) 
then this agreement should also be chosen in the problem which corresponds to the post-
deletion situation; the latter says that if a problem “expands” in such a way that the set of 
feasible utilities for player i  remains the same, but given every utility-payoff in that set 
the maximum that player j i≠  can now achieve is greater, then player j  should not get 
hurt from this expansion. Within the class of standard solutions, these principles are 
incompatible: Nash (1950) showed that there is a unique standard independent solution, 
while Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) showed that there exists a different solution, which 
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is the unique standard and monotonic one. In light of these facts, the question I address is 
how can we reconcile independence and monotonicity in bargaining? 
One way is to give up the restriction to standard solutions. Indeed, doing so re-
solves the issue: there are solutions that are both independent and monotonic, but are not 
standard. For example, the egalitarian solution (Kalai (1977)) satisfies all the 
aforementioned requirements except independence of equivalent utility representations * 
and the dictatorial solution satisfies all of them except symmetry † Neither one of these 
solutions offers a satisfactory resolution to our problem, as independent utility scales are 
necessary if there is no way to compare utilities interpersonally, and violations of 
symmetry are obviously not appealing. The remaining alternative, therefore, is to 
compromise on efficiency. This, in principle, seems reasonable, as there are many 
situations in economics in which some desired goal has a “price,” which is expressed in 
terms of efficiency loss; for example, maximizing revenue in an auction environment 
with independent and private values can only be achieved by an inefficient allocation 
rule. Unfortunately however, in the bargaining model the willingness to compromise on 
efficiency does not take us very far: in Rachmilevitch (2013) I showed that the only 
solution that satisfies all the aforementioned properties except for efficiency is the 
disagreement solution – the solution that picks the disagreement point in every problem. 
Therefore, in this paper I take a different approach, keeping the restriction to 
standard solutions in place. First, I introduce a ranking over solutions – the “more 
independent than” relation – and demand that the solution be at least as independent as 
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. I call this property minimal independence. Next, I 
introduce a weak version of monotonicity, which I call minimal monotonicity. It turns 
out that any standard solution that satisfies minimal independence and minimal 
monotonicity guarantees that each player receives at least the minimum of the payoffs 
that he would have received under the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. I call this 
latter property Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash robustness, or KSNR for short. 
KSNR captures much of the essence of the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solutions: the former is the only independent solution that satisfies KSNR and the latter 
is the only monotonic solution that satisfies KSNR (i.e, “KSNR” can replace “standard” 
in the theorems of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky). There are many well-behaved standard 
                                                 
1is the unique continuous such solution. 
†It is the unique continuous such solution. 
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solutions that satisfy KSNR. This is the case, for example, with a certain family of 
solutions that is due to Sobel (2001). However, I am not aware of a well-behaved 
interesting solution, other than the Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, that satisfies 
minimal independence and minimal monotonicity (artificial such solutions do exist). The 
message of the paper, therefore, is that KSNR offers a compromise between 
independence and monotonicity. It is also, I believe, of interest in its own right. 
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Model with two players  
Let two players (countries or fishing firms) exploit the fish stock during finite 
time horizon. The dynamics of the fishery is described by the equation  
1 1 2 0( )  ,    ,t t t tx x u u x x
αε+ = − − =  
where 0tx ≥  – the size of population at a time t , (0,1)ε ∈  – natural death rate, (0,1)α ∈  
-- natural birth rate, 0itu ≥  – the catch of player i , 1,2i = . 
We suppose that the utility function of country i  is logarithmic and players 
differ in their discount factors. The players' net revenues are  
0
ln(u )‍  ,
n
t
i i it
t
J δ
=
= ∑  
where 0 1iδ< <  – the discount factor for country i , 1,2i = . 
The main question arising here is how to construct the value function for 
cooperative solution in the case when players have different discount factors. In the 
previous work [5] the authors showed how to determine the joint discount factor for the 
case when cooperative gain is distributed proportionally or in a some portion using Nash 
bargaining scheme. Here we will obtain the cooperative strategies without determining 
the joint discount factor using recursive Nash bargaining procedure. 
The cooperative behavior  
We will present two different approaches of bargaining procedure. 
In the first one the cooperative strategies are determined as the Nash bargaining 
solution for the hole planning horizon. So we need to solve the next problem:  
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ( , ) ( , ))( ( , ) ( , ))n nV x V x V x V xδ δ δ δ− − =   
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 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
0 0
( ) ( , ))( ‍ ln( ) ( , )) mln( ax 
n n
t c t c
t t
t t
u V x u V xδ δ δ δ
= =
= − − →∑ ∑  (1) 
where ( , )i iV x δ  are the non-cooperative gains. 
In the second approach, we construct the cooperative solution as a recursive 
bargaining procedure. On each time moment the cooperative strategies are determined as 
the Nash bargaining solution taking the non-cooperative profits as a status-quo point. 
The results of numerical modelling and comparison of the schems are 
presented. 
Also we use the presented approaches for the game where the players have 
different planning time horizons. 
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Semi-symmetric named TU game having at least two symmetric players. We 
say that a game is s -symmetric if it is symmetric w.r.t. coalition S  with cardinality 
{2,..., 1}s n∈ − . A necessary and sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core of 
( 1)n − -symmetric game are presented. This condition is simple and provides a natural 
extension of one for symmetric games. Three classes of such ( 1)n − -symmetric games 
that the core is a singleton and corresponding core-allocations are described. Keywords: 
cooperative TU game, core, balancedness, symmetric core. 
Some of participants in a social, political or economic situation may have the 
identical power (strength). In associated cooperative game they are symmetric. 
Moreover, different agents in the underlying problem may become symmetric players in 
corresponding game. We focus on the study of n -person TU games with ( 1)n −  
symmetric players. A few of their applications: patent licensing game with the firms 
each producing an identical commodity and a licensor of a patented technology; landlord 
game; weighted majority game with one large party and 1n −  equal sized smaller 
parties; market with one seller and symmetric buyers; subclass of games related 
information collecting situations under uncertainty where an action taker can obtain 
more information from other agents; big boss games with symmetric powerless players. 
Known that the core of a game ( , )N ν , where = {1,..., }N n  and : 2Nν → R , 
( ) = 0ν ∅ , is nonempty iff a game is balanced. The balancedness condition for n -person 
game is determined by a system of linear inequalities which coefficients correspond to 
the extreme points of special polytope 2
,
2= { : = 1, }
nn
KK i K
M R i Nλ λ+ ∈Ω ∈
−∈ ∈∑ , where 
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= 2 \ { , }N NΩ ∅ . The number =| ( ) |nnm ext M  of extreme points and their explicit 
representation known only for small n  ( 3m  =5, 4m =41, 5m =1291, 6m =200213). The 
symmetry of all players makes a game especially easy to handle. The criterion for 
existence of its core contains 1n −  inequalities only. But as far as we know there is no a 
similar result for a game symmetric w.r.t. coalition with ( 1)n −  players. Using the 
concept of symmetric core we provide the simple condition for nonemptiness of the core 
( )C ν  of such game.The notion of symmetric core ( )symC ν  was introduced in ([1])  
( ) = { ( ) : = , }.sym i jC x C x x for symmetric players i j Nν ν∈ ∈  
A game is s -symmetric if it is symmetric w.r.t. coalition S , 
| |= {2,..., 1}S s n∈ − .  
Denote the class of s -symmetric n -person TU games by nsG  and without loss 
of generalities assume that = { , 1..., }S h h n+ , = 1h n s− + . The s -core of nsGν ∈  is 
( ) = { ( ) : = ; , }s i jC x C x x h i j nν ν∈ ≤ ≤ . A game nsGν ∈  is s -balanced if ( )sC ν ≠ ∅ .  
The following lemma states that, in fact, the classes of balanced s -symmetric 
games and s -balanced games coincide. Let nsGν ∈ . Then ( )C ν ≠ ∅  iff ( )sC ν ≠ ∅ .  
Since the core is relatively invariant w.r.t. strategic equivalence it is sufficient 
to study a game nsGν ∈  in 0-form. Moreover, as a result of zero-normalization, the 
number of symmetric player can increase. Denote the set of ( 1)n − -symmetric, zero-
normalized, non-negative games by 01( )nnG − + . A game 01( )nnGν − +∈  is determined by 
2( 2)n −  numbers ( )Kν , 1 2K ∈Ω ∪Ω , where 1 = {{2,3},{2,3,4},...,{2,..., }}nΩ , 
2 = {{1,2},{1,2,3},...,{1,..., 1}}nΩ − . The next theorem characterizes ( 1)n − -symmetric 
games with a nonempty core. Let 3n ≥ , 1H ∈Ω , 2T ∈Ω , | |=H h , | |=T t . The core of a 
game 01( )nnGν − +∈  is nonempty iff the system  
 1( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )n t nT H N H N
h h
ν ν ν ν ν
− −
+ ≤ ≤  (1) 
is consistent  
Notice that (1) consists of ( 1)( 2)n n− −  inequalities. 
The core existence not always solves the problem of selecting a game outcome, 
because the core may be a relatively large set and even coincides with imputation set. 
Ideal is considered the case when the core contains one imputation only. But several 
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examples have been built for which the unique core element provides a counter-intuitive 
payoff ([2]). The last theorem gives the sufficient conditions under which the core of 
0
1( )
n
nGν − +∈  is a singleton. Let 4n ≥ ; 1 2 01, ( )nnGν ν − +∈ ; 1( )C ν ≠ ∅ , 
2( )C ν ≠ ∅ . Let also 1ν  
satisfies the equality  
1 ( \ {1, }) = ( )
2
n N n N
n
ν ν
−
−
 
and 2ν  satisfies at least one of two equalities  
2 ( \1)( \1) (1,2) = ( ), ( \ ) = ( ).
1 1
n NN N N n N
n n
ν
ν ν ν ν ν
−
+ +
− −
 
Then 1 1( ) = { }C xν , 2 2( ) = { }C xν , where  
1 1
1 ( ) ( )= (0, ),..., ),
1 1
N Nx
n n
ν ν
− −
 
2 2
2 2 2 ( \1)) ( \1)= ( ( ) ( \1), ),..., ).
1 1
N Nx N N
n n
ν ν
ν ν−
− −
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The Shapley NTU solution is shown to be consistent according to a 
generalization of the reduced game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell on the subclass of 
TU games, by considering payoff configurations as solution outcomes. Moreover, the 
Shapley NTU solution is characterized on a wide class of NTU games by means of this 
consistency property plus certain plausible axioms, namely: maximality, covariance, 
symmetry, a null-player axiom, and an additional axiom requiring certain coherence in 
the payoffs of the intermediate coalitions. 
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We study some kinds of spaces of preferences which can be used in models of 
decision making with quality criteria. Formally, a space of preferences in the form of 
triple objects , ,A α β< >  is given, where A  is an arbitrary set (a set of alternatives), α  
and β  are binary relations on A  satisfying the conditions: 1α α −∩ = ∅  (asymmetry), 
1β β− =  (symmetry) and α β∩ = ∅  (disjointness). The relation ρ α β= ∪  is called a 
preference relation. Most important classes of spaces of preferences are the following: 
1. The class of linear preferences; 
2. The class of transitive preferences;  
3. The class of acyclic preferences; 
4. The class of order preferences. 
Let , ,P A α β=< >  and 1 1 1, ,P A α β=< >  be two spaces of preferences. A space 
1P  is said to be a completions for space P , if inclusions 1 1,α α β β⊆ ⊆  hold; a 
completion is a proper if at least one of these inclusions is strict.  
We find conditions under which a given space of preferences has a completion 
belonging to indicated above classes of preferences and its combinations also. An 
algorithm for constructions of all completions of order preferences up to linear order 
preferences is given.  
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The ever increasing pace of ICT development and globalization generates a 
dramatic shortening of the products’ life cycle, which in turn decreases the possibility of 
sustainable competitive advantages for the firms. Richard D’Aveni [1] has analyzed this 
phenomenon distinguishing different arenas of hyper-competition. One of the major 
elements highlighted is the core capacity of managing breakthroughs, in particular 
through the mastering of timing and knowhow associated with products and services. In 
this respect, there is no doubt that change management is a core competency for a firm 
which aim is a sustainable development. Now implementation of change management 
may present a variety of difficulties, among which the following ones, on which the 
present paper will focus: reluctance to share information and to change [4,6} . The works 
developed in Experimental Psychology, and especially Kahneman and Tversky’s 
Prospect Theory [5} have highlighted decision biases like anchoring, procrastination, 
sensitivity to loss, stubbornness, mirroring, or status quo which all lead the individual 
under consideration to take inappropriate decisions, which most of the time have as 
hidden objective to comfort his/ her position and hence not accept to change. Whence 
the necessity for the management of the firm to proceed to an accurate cost-benefit 
analysis of change versus status quo for each decision maker. As a result of this analysis 
the management of then firm may decide to allocate incentives to the personnel 
concerned.  
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Considering the firm as structured in departments which have a relative 
autonomy in terms of information sharing, and change adoption, a previous paper has 
built a game theoretic model of the issues at stake [7}. This model has considered 
several hypotheses about the consequences for a department to receive information 
which is relevant from the global perspective of the company. The starting point was to 
consider that a department i can decide to send or not to send to a neighboring 
department j an information relevant to a possible change in the conduct of affairs, while 
department j if receiving such information from department i, may decide to act 
accordingly and especially to implement change in consistence with the information 
received. At the most elementary level, the problematic can be analyzed through a series 
of standard 2x2 games in which the players strategic sets could refer either to 
information sending or to change adoption. Various cases have been considered 
depending on the respective values for each player of costs, benefits, and incentives 
received from the company’s general management. At a second level, the model has 
used the Replicator’s Dynamics to define conditions under which cooperation between 
connected departments can prevail. At a third level, the initial model was extended to 
matrix games in which each party should simultaneously consider whether to send 
information or not and whether to adopt changes possibly stemming from the 
information received or not. An evolutionary analysis of these 2x4 games was not 
performed due to the possible difficulties to find an analytical solution of the dynamic 
system.  
Now this obstacle can be removed, thanks to the results recently found by 
Ellison & Rudnianski about the existence of equivalence relations between standard 
quantitative games and a particular type of qualitative games called games of deterrence 
[2,3]. More precisely these equivalence relations enable to translate standard 
evolutionary games into evolutionary games of deterrence which display identical 
asymptotic properties. In turn, it has been shown [3] that the asymptotic properties of 
these evolutionary games of deterrence can be derived from the playability properties of 
the players strategies in the static game of deterrence. There is then no need to solve the 
corresponding dynamic system.  
On these bases, the present paper will in a first part recall the results available in 
the analysis of conditions required for successful change management through the 
standard game theoretic approach. In a second part after having recalled the core 
properties of matrix games of deterrence, the paper will develop the equivalences 
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between evolutionary standard matrix games and evolutionary matrix games of 
deterrence. A third part will then use these equivalences to analyze the conditions of 
success in non-elementary issues of change pervasion. In particular success of change 
pervasion will be associated with the playability properties of the games of deterrence 
under consideration.  
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Introduction 
What is a game? Mathematically speaking, a game has players, strategies and 
scores to explain why the players win or lose. Games which are modelled with 
differential equations are called differential games. Common examples are pursuit-
evasion games which are abstract models for pursuers who try to catch evaders who are 
running away. E.g., 
Lady in the lake. A man is moving around a circle, and a woman is moving 
from the center of the circle heading to its boundary. The man is trying to have minimum 
distance to the woman, while the woman is maximizing the distance by moving 
accordingly. 
Lion and man game. The goal is to find a strategy for the pursuer (lion) to 
capture the evader (man) in a given environment. Capturing means that the man and the 
lion are at the same position after a finite time. Besicovitch was the first who showed 
that with a certain strategy evasion from the lion is possible. The man wins the game if 
he can avoid capture indefinitely. Both the lion and the man have identical motion 
capabilities [2].  
The pursuit-evasion differential games including several players with geometric 
or integral constraints were extensively studied. The development of the field could be 
traced through its history by consulting the classical researches on differential games, 
such as works by R. Isaacs and L.A. Petrosyan [3,4]. 
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Main Result 
Suppose a pursuit-evasion differential game of countably many players in 
Hilbert space with integral constraints. Motions of the players are described by the 
ordinary differential equations of second order. Indeed, in the space 2L  consisting of 
elements 1 2= ( , , , , ),kα α α α   with 
2
=1
<kk α
∞
∞∑ , and inner product =1( , ) = k kkα β α β
∞∑ , the 
motions of the countably many pursuers iP  and the evader E  are defined by the 
equations  
0 1: ( ) = ( ), (0) = , (0) =i i i i i i iP x t u t x x x x  , 
0 1: ( ) = ( ), (0) = , (0) =E y t v t y y y y  , 
where 0 1 0 1 2, , , , , , , ,i i i ix x x u y y y v L∈  iu  is the control parameter of the pursuer iP , and v  is 
that of the evader E . The control functions of players are subject to integral constraint. 
The duration of the game is fixed. The payoff functional is the greatest lower bound of 
the distances between the pursuers and the evader when the game is terminated. The 
pursuers try to minimize the payoff functional, and the evader tries to maximize it. We 
fix the index i  and study an auxiliary differential game of two players. We construct a 
suitable strategy for the pursuer and then we show that if the energy of the pursuer is 
more than that of the evader, then the pursuer catches the evader by using constructed 
strategies. Finally we define an amount as the value of the game and prove the accuracy 
of our guess. 
In addition, we consider a non-inertial evasion differential game of several 
pursuers and one evader with simple motions and integral constraints on the control 
functions of the players. We find an adequate condition for the evader to escape from all 
pursuers by presenting explicit strategy for the evader. We show that the proposed 
escape is possible, no matter what control is adapted by the pursuers. The problem 
studied in this research is new. In the case of geometric constraints, a similar problem 
was solved by F.L. Chernous'ko [1], and later it was extended by V.L. Zak to many 
different differential games with geometric constraints [5]. However, in the case of 
integral constraints the problem was open. 
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The first game-theoretical stock trading model with asymmetric information has 
been introduced in the paper of B. De Meyer and H. Moussa Saley [1]. The discrete 
modification of the repeated insider trading model with beforehand unlimited number of 
steps has been investigated in the paper of V. Domansky [2]. The choice of the infinite 
number of steps is caused by enormous combinatorial difficulties appropriated to the 
analysis of bidding with finite number of repetitions. Thus evaluation of the optimal 
parameters, such as the game value, the optimal strategies, for the games with finite 
number of steps seems to be impossible. However, in this paper we obtain the 
asymptotic formula for the error term of the insider's profit arising if the private 
information unexpectedly becomes common knowledge at step N  (this automatically 
leads to the stopping of bidding). 
The paper considers the n -stage bidding model with two risk neutral agents for 
the risky asset (the one type shares), solved in [2] for the case of =n ∞ . The liquidation 
share price is determined by a chance move at the zero step for the whole bidding period 
and takes on two different integer values: either 0 with probability 1 p−  or m  with 
probability p . Player 1 is informed about the chance choice, while Player 2 is not. Both 
players know p . Player 2 knows that Player 1 is the insider. Before bidding begins each 
player has sufficient amount of money and shares. 
At each step of bidding both players simultaneously propose integer prices for 
one share. The player proposing the higher price buys one share from his opponent at 
this price. If proposed prices are equal then no transaction occurs. After each step prices 
proposed at this step are publicly announced. Each player aims to maximize his final 
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portfolio (money plus money equivalent of acquired shares). The number of bidding 
stages is unlimited ( =n ∞ ). 
The model is reduced to the repeated zero-sum game with incomplete 
information on the side of Player 2. The game with infinite number of steps has been 
solved, namely the game value and the optimal strategies of both players have been 
found for any prior probability p . The insider's optimal strategy generates the simple 
random walk on lattice of posterior probabilities of high share price with absorption at 
extreme points. At each step until the absorption the insider's strategy guaranties him the 
benefit equal to 1/2. For the limited time the revealing of the insider's information occurs 
with probability 1. 
This paper considers the situation of unexpected stopping of bidding at stage 
N . We obtain the formula for the profit of Player 1 in the N -stage game if he applies 
the strategy which is the optimal one for the game of unlimited duration. 
Let the initial probability of the high share price be = /p k m . Let ( )mN kβ  
denote the average number of steps of the simple random walk with absorption at 0 or 1 
starting at the point /k m  till a future moment N . Then the expected insider's profit 
( / ) = ( , | / )infm m mN NL k m W k mτ σ τ  is given by  
1( ) = ( ).
2
m
N NL k kβ  
Here  
{Θ }( ) Θ 11 ({Θ })kN k k N k kk N Nβ ≤= + ≥E P , 
where ,k kE P  are the expectation and the probability, respectively, for the random walk 
starting at the point /k m , kΘ  is the random time of absorption. 
The recursive equation on ( )mN kβ  holds  
1
1 1( ) = ( 1) ( 1) 1
2 2
m m m
N N Nk k kβ β β+ + + − +  
with the boundary conditions (0) 0, ( ) 0.m mN N mβ β≡ ≡  
It is well known that  
( ) = ( ) .k m k kβ∞ −  
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The error term of the insider's profit arising in the case of revealing the private 
information at stage N  is given by  
( )1( ) = ( ) ( ) .
2
m m m
N Nk k kε β β∞ −  
Applying the methods of solving partial differential equations we obtain the 
complete asymptotic expansion of ( )mN kε . 
Thus we obtain the following theorem. 
Theorem. If Player 1 exploits the strategy mσ  in the game ( / )mNG k m , then 
his guaranteed gain ( / )mNL k m  is given with the formula  
( )( / ) = ( ),
2
m m
N N
m k kL k m kε− −  
where  
[ /2]
2
=1
1 (2 1) (2 1) (2 1) (2 1)( ) = sin ctg 1 ctg ,cos
2 2 2
m
m N
N
l
l k l l lk
m m m m m
π π π π
ε
− − − − + 
 
∑  
with [ ]α  being the integer part of α . 
Corollary. The strategy mσ  is a mNε -optimal strategy of Player 1 for the 
finitely repeated game ( )mNG p  of length N , where = ( / )cos
m N
N O mε π , i.e. the “error 
term” ( )mN kε  decreases exponentially. 
It is to be noted that the value mNε  is to be regarded as the price of sudden 
revealing of insider information on stock market. If it is the case then mNε  means the 
insider's loss comparatively his expected profit in bidding of unlimited duration. 
For = 3m  the solution of the game 3 ( )NG p  is found in terms of recursive 
sequences (see paper of V. Kreps [3]). We make a comparison of solution of this game 
(insider's profit in the case of his optimal behaviour) with his profit 3 ( / 3)NL k , = 1,2k , 
obtained above. It is shown that for sufficiently large n  the insider's optimal strategy in 
the bidding game of infinite duration proves to be a rather good approximation of his 
optimal strategy for the n -stage game. 
The study was partially supported by the grant 13-01-00462-a of Russian 
Foundation for Basic Research. 
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Repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information (RGII) were introduced 
by R. Aumann and M. Maschler in the sixties (see [1]). Their aim was to develop a 
theory of multi-stage two-player interactions with participants having different amount 
of information about the interaction. Multi-stage structure allows players to obtain 
additional information about the interaction observing their opponents actions at 
previous stages. 
Let us briefly describe such a game ( )NG p . Before the game starts a random 
state k  is chosen from the set of states K  according to a prior distribution p . Player 1 
is informed of k  and Player 2 is not. Then at each stage = 1,..n N  Player 1 and Player 2 
simultaneously select their actions ( , )n ni j  from the sets of actions I  and J , 
respectively, using the information they have at this stage. Before the next stage the 
selected actions are publicly announced. One-stage payoff (i.e., the contribution of this 
stage to the total gain of Player 1) is given by ,in n
kA j  where 
kA  is one-stage payoff 
matrix at a state k . After the last stage Player 2 pays 
=1 ,
N
n in n
kA j∑  to Player 1. 
Of course, players are allowed to randomize their actions using behavioral 
strategies. Hence the value is defined as usual, i.e., [ ( )]NV G p  is the expected total gain 
of Player 1 when both players play optimally. 
The main feature of RGII is that the impact of information asymmetry on the 
game value represents the price of information in long interactions. So it is natural to 
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consider only the games where the private information is the only strategic advantage of 
Player 1. In other words, we will assume that the non-revealing game, i.e., matrix game 
with the matrix ( ) = ( ) k
K
A p dp k A∫  (this game arise if Player 1 forgets his private 
information) has zero value for any ( )p K∈∆ . For such games [ ( )]NV G p  is the price of 
information by itself. One of the main questions of the theory is about asymptotic 
behavior of [ ( )]NV G p  as N →∞ . 
It is well-known (see [1] and [5]) that for some games with finite K , I  and J  
the value can grow like C N  and can not grow faster (this property is usually called 
`` N -law''). It was recently shown in [6, 7] that for infinite K  `` N -law'' can be 
violated and examples of games with the value behaving like 
1
2CN α+  for any 
(0,1)α ∈  were constructed. On the other hand, it is interesting to describe classes of 
RGII with slower value growth. For the discrete models of finance market with 
asymmetric information it was recently observed (see [2] and [4]) that the value remains 
bounded as N →∞ . Games considered in these papers have the following property: the 
optimal strategy of Player 2 in the non-revealing game is piecewise constant as a 
function of p . Our aim is to describe how this property affects the asymptotic behavior 
in general case. The main result is the following theorem. 
Theorem: Assume that a RGII ( )NG p  with finite K , I  and J  has the 
following properties:  
• the value of the non-revealing game ( ) = kkk KA p p A∈∑  is zero for any 
( )p K∈∆ ;  
• there exists a piecewise constant function : ( ) ( )y K J∆ → ∆  with finite 
number of different values and such that the vector ( )y p  is an optimal strategy of Player 
2 in ( )A p  for any p .  
Then the value [ ( )]NV G p  is uniformly bounded as a function of N  and p .  
It is important to note that V. Domansky and V. Kreps [3] showed that the 
conditions of the theorem are necessary and sufficient in the case of two-element ,I J  
and K . 
The study is supported by the grants 13-01-00462 and and 13-01-00784 of 
Russian Foundation for Basic Research and by the Chebyshev Laboratory (Faculty of 
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Mathematics and Mechanics, St.-Petersburg State University) under the grant 
11.G34.31.0026 of the Government of the Russian Federation.  
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We consider infinitely repeated game of special type, that is 2 person game. The 
players can have short or long memory. In paper "Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains 
strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent" by William H. Press and Freeman J. 
Dyson it has been shown that the player with long memory does not have any 
advantages and there exists a strategy that dominate any evolutionary opponent. The 
paper is dedicated to the expanding approach to other classes of infinitely repeated 
games "2 by 2". 
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Today, companies face increasing dynamic conditions and volatile markets. 
Varying demands, shorter product lifecycle times and increasing diversity of products as 
well as unsteady economic situations force enterprises to react more flexible compared 
to some years ago (cf. Daxböck et al. 2011, p. 7; Schuh et al. 2012, p. 3 ; Stich et al. 
2012, p. 123).  
Central planning approaches regarding production- and logistics processes are 
matched to a particular moment of the enterprises conditions. These planning-oriented 
systems are not able to react spontaneously on changing boundary conditions (cf. 
Schmitt et al. 2011, p. 748). But exactly this ability becomes more and more a key factor 
of success for enterprises. Other approaches reduce central planning in favor of 
decentralized activities, which provide better possibilities to flexibly react according to 
the current situation (cf. Schmitt et al. 2011, p. 749). Thus integration into the value-
added process is given in decentralized approaches. Nevertheless decentralized 
approaches have a big disadvantage as well. Central planning approaches often result in 
best solutions for the considered scope, a so called global optimum. Decentralized 
activities are performed with a smaller perspective as the decision-maker takes into 
consideration for example only the processes he is responsible for. Hence in decentral 
approaches a global optimum will often not be achieved. 
Therefore for successful management of production- and logistics processes it is 
necessary to find an optimal way between detailed central planning and spontaneous 
decentral reactions to occurred changes. As a suitable approach for solving this problem, 
self-optimizing mechanisms could be integrated into the production planning and control 
as well as in supply chain processes (cf. Behnen et al. 2011, p. 103). Self-optimizing 
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systems are “[…] systems that are able to effect independent (“endogenous”) changes of 
their inner states or structure based on varying input conditions or interferences. In 
production processes, according target values can be e.g. capacities, number of pieces, 
quality, costs or processing times” (Wagels; Schmitt 2012, p. 162). Self-optimizing 
systems have the capability to react autonomous and flexible to changing boundary 
conditions. They continuously carry out three activities (cf. Brecher et al. 2011, p. 13): 
1. Analysis of the current situation,  
2. Determination of objectives and  
3. Adjustment of the behavior of the system to reach the defined objectives. 
The project “Cognition-enhanced, Self-Optimizing Production Networks” 
which is part of the Aachen Cluster of Excellence (CoE) founded by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) focusses on self-
optimizing production planning and control from the level of machine control up to the 
level of supply chain management. In this regard both, human decision making as well 
as integrating the perspective of production and quality management, will be considered. 
Test-beds for experimental research in a real production environment to validate and 
enhance the outcome will be build. The objective is to develop prototypes of cybernetic 
solution components based on self-optimizing feedback loops. 
When performing the research activities, in particular focusing on the supply 
chain level, parallels to applying game theoretic models  became obvious. The parallels 
regarding the described need for a decentral approach and adequate consideration of 
dynamic boundary conditions will be described in more detail in the following:  
• First of all supply chains which are composed of legally independent 
enterprises are decentral “by nature” as each partner of the supply chain 
pursues the goal of continuously optimizing with regard to his own 
objectives (cf. Hennet; Arda 2008, p. 399). Nevertheless everyone has to 
take into consideration decisions made by decision-makers of the other 
enterprises in the supply chain (cf. Reyes 2005, p. 1421). So each partner of 
the supply chain has to make the best decision for himself taking into 
account the other participants, as this is the case in game theoretic problems.  
• In addition when taking into consideration dynamic boundary conditions as 
described before decisions should be made with regard to observed events 
beforehand (cf. Reyes 2005, p. 1430). As in game theoretic decision models 
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decisions often are predicated on an analysis of previous situations (cf. 
Hennig 2001, p. 6), another analogy to game theory is obvious. 
Furthermore there are parallels between the above described activities of self-
optimizing systems and dynamic games. In dynamic games  
• an analysis of the current situation could be carried out (first attribute of 
self-optimizing Systems) and 
• the decision-making could be adjusted to reach predefined objectives (cf. 
Holler; Illing 2006, p. 13) (third attribute of self-optimizing Systems). 
When only these two aspects of self-optimization are covered a system is called 
an adaptive system (cf. Schmitt et al. 2011, p. 750). For a self-optimizing system only 
the determination of objectives is missing (second activity of self-optimizing systems). 
That means, the objectives are given in advance. 
Hence inspired by the research activities in the project “Cognition-enhanced, 
Self-Optimizing Production Networks” and focusing on the application area of 
procurement it will now be examined how solution concepts of game theory can help to 
develop an adaptive method that can support planners in their decision-making better 
than conventional methods. With the described increasing dynamic conditions and 
volatile markets in mind, applying game theory in this application area seems to be a 
promising approach to reach better results as this is the case with conventional methods 
which are harmonized to a particular moment of the enterprise. 
As a first step, the state of the art in this field was analyzed. In the context of 
these research activities, the focus will be on the process-related aspects of game theory 
and players, who are in successive value-added steps of a supply chain. First results of 
the survey of the state of the art in comparison to the planned research will be shown in 
the conference and the conference paper respectively. The results point out a deficit in 
the planned research area. 
Further research activities will be carried out in three steps which will be 
explained very briefly in the following: 
• In the first step the question of which game-theoretic solution concepts can 
be applied in the application area of procurement will be answered. For this 
purpose a list of existing generic game-theoretic concepts will be provided. 
Subsequently the solution concepts will be opposed to the application area 
by the use of a morphology. In this way it is ensured that exactly the 
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solution concepts which are relevant in the application area of procurement 
are considered in the following research steps. 
• Based on this analysis the aim of the second step will be to determine 
relevant logistics parameters and to analyze the correlation between them. 
This step gives a well-grounded basis for the derivation of instructions for 
setting up the decision model in the third step. 
• The third and final step includes the development of a decision model based 
on the prior findings and therefore entails the setup of the adaptive method. 
In this regard it is planned to implement the method algorithmically and to 
investigate the advantage of the developed method based on game theoretic 
concepts by using data from a real production environment. 
A more detailed description of the research activities as well as initial results 
will be presented in the conference and in the conference paper respectively. 
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Double agency problem is not very much studied by economists. Just some it's 
aspects are reflected in literature, f.e.: results of incentive contracts usage, middle 
management remuneration problems, corporate conflicts influence on the management 
incentives.  
Suggested game-theoretical model gives an opportunity to analyze the choice of 
efforts' level by employees and management turnover in case of business reorganization.  
Shareholder is indifferent choosing the compensation scheme for his 
employees, but as for top-management, this choice is significant. If the company's profit 
during the game is constant, shareholder would be interested to be dishonest and not to 
pay bonuses to his employees and managers. But if the company's profit increases 
shareholder has no more incentives to be dishonest. Management change threat may be 
the reason for the worse compensation plan choice. This becomes a reason for the 
decrease of the employees efforts level.  
The main tendencies of Russian and foreign oil companies remuneration during 
the crisis period of 2008-2010 were analyzed to illustrate some results of the model.  
Trying to decrease their own risks top managers of the companies reduce the 
ratio of variable parts of their remuneration, which depends on their performance. 
Annual bonuses are paid for production, ecology and safety goals. LR plans are oriented 
mostly for financial parameters. That's why the shareholders' requirement to limit the 
option payments or to reinvest this remuneration part in company's shares seems to be 
significant. As for the model demonstrated it is important to note that all the players are 
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oriented for the financial results of their work. It is significant for both: LR and SR 
periods.  
Crisis period became the start point for the remuneration schemes change in a 
whole world . And this change gave different results for different groups of employees 
and managers (depended on the level of their motivation). Unfortunately shareholders 
could not react immediately and that became the reason for some inertia in changing 
compensation plans. This results seems to be the same as Casamatta and Gumboldt has 
got. They also mentioned the fact that shareholders change remuneration plans with 
some time lag. 
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In the paper we study games with coalition structures. In general setting, it is 
supposed that players in one coalition can communicate with each other. However, if we 
assume that some of interactions between players in the coalition are not possible, we 
face the game with coalition structure but with restricted cooperation. In our setting 
restricted cooperation is associated with a network generating the structure of players 
communication. Therefore, having both network and coalition structure fixed, a payoff 
distribution can be proposed using auxiliary calculated worth of each coalition of 
players. Unfortunately, not always all coalition structures for a fixed network are 
appropriate for all players involved in the conflict. That is why it is reasonable to find 
``proper'' or ``stable'' in some sense coalition structures and extract them from the bunch 
of all possible coalition structures and given network. In the paper we introduce the 
definition of stability of the coalition structure with respect to a cooperative allocation (e. 
g. the Shapley value, ES-value) for a given network and coalition structure of players. 
The results are based on theoretical propositions and illustrated with examples. 
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In this work the logistics market with the three carriers is considered. This 
market consists of a chain of several units of production and supply. In this article we 
will consider the group of the clients in need of services for the transportation of the 
goods and the supplier of this service. Customers who come to the market are 
asymmetrical because they have different characteristics. The paper presents the 
equilibrium in asymmetrical customers game in the market that contains three firms. 
Each firm is a service provider that fulfills for the client order and sets its own scheme of 
customer payment. 
Let us introduce the parameters that describe each client. As each client is a 
company or a firm that is involved in a continuous cycle of production and delivery. 
Client has a set of obligations that must be done before other links in the chain. Denote 
by , = 1, ,ir i n  specific losses of customer order fulfillment. These losses arise due to 
missed opportunities that could be implemented at the time while the client is waiting for 
the order. Let , = 1, ,iR i n  be the penalty that may be incurred by the client if the total 
time of the order exceeds a certain expected limit T . This penalty is associated with the 
obligations of the customer to the another firms, clients, creditors, etc. 
Let us introduce the parameters that describe each firm. We propose that all 
firms have a different customer order fulfillment scheme and also they have different 
price policies. The first firm serves customers in the order of queue and charges a fixed 
cost 1c  for the order fulfillment. The second firm serves all customers together. This 
firm charges a cost 22c  for the unit time of service and also firm charges the fixed cost 
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21c . The third firm serves customers in the order of queue as a first firm and charges 
only a cost for the unit service time 32c . 
So we can define the average losses of customer for the each firm respectively:  
(11) (12) (1)
1 1= ( ) { , },i i i i i iQ r E E c R EI Tτ τ τ+ + +  
(22) (2)
2 22 21= ( ) { , },i i i i iQ r c E c R EI Tτ τ+ + +  
(31) (32) (3)
3 32= ( ) { , },i i i i i i iQ r E r c E R EI Tτ τ τ+ + +  
where 1 11 12=τ τ τ+ , 2 22= ,τ τ  3 31 32= ,τ τ τ+  11 31,τ τ  - are waiting service times for the first 
and third firms and 12 22 32, ,τ τ τ  – are maintenance times for each firm. 1 2 3, ,τ τ τ  are random 
variables exponential distributed with parameters 1 2 3, ,µ µ µ  respectively. 
1, ,
{ , } =
0, < ,
if t T
I t T
if t T
≥


 
To solve the problem of finding equilibrium in the market that contains three 
logistics firms with asymmetrical clients we use game-theoretical approach. 
Now we define the non-antagonistic game in normal form: 
( )=< ,{ } ,{ } >ji i N i i NN p H∈ ∈Γ , where 
= {1, , }N n  - set of players, 
( ){ }ji i Np ∈  – set of strategies, (1) (2) (3)= ( , , )i i i ip p p p , ( ) [0,1]jip ∈  – the probability of 
choice firm j  by client i , = 1,2,3j  
{ }i i NH ∈  – set of payoff functions.  
(1) (1) (3) (3)
1 2 3= ( (1 ) ) =i i i i i i i iH p Q p p Q p Q− + − − +  
(1) (3)
1 2 3 2 2= ( ( ) ( ) ).i i i i i i ip Q Q p Q Q Q− − + − +  
In the work the Nash equilibria for this market are found. And uniqueness of 
these equilibria are proved. In some cases uniqueness are proved for completely mixed 
strategies. 
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The m -person transportation game over the network ( ),G X N=  is considered. 
The players { }1, ,i m M∈ = have to reach the target vertexes z Xi ∈ , from given initial 
vertexes y Xi ∈ , with minimal costs. The corresponding cooperative TU game is 
investigated, as solution the Shaply Value is choosen. Suppose ( )* * *, ,1x y x z xl= = = is 
cooperative trajectory minimizing total costs. Compution of Shaply Value for subgames 
along the cooperative trajectory *x shows time-inconsistency of Shapley Value. 
The regularisation procedure leading to the time-consistent Shaply Value is 
proposed. 
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We consider a game-theoretic model of competition in airline market. Each 
airline k K∈  holds its route network and route assigned aircrafts. Particular route is 
characterized by origin-destination city pair, subset of legs in airline network and route 
price. Route price is taken as a sum of prices on each leg. 
A multinomial logit model is used to describe passenger choice of the particular 
route between origin-destination city pair. Let’s assume, that passenger preference 
depends on price and number of route legs 
( )
( )
' '
' ,
, ,
j j
j j
O D
p n
j O Dp n
j R v v
eM j R v v
e e
α β
α βρ
− −
− −−
∈
= ∈
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We study Nash equilibrium in airline price game with payoff given as 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )min ,  – , , , 
k k
k k k
k k e j j e O D e
j R ee E e E
p p D M C cost v e v e C k Kπ
∈ ∈
  = ∈ 
  
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
 
Airlines can cooperate and form alliances to merge their resources. Airline 
alliance is represented as a single player in airline price game. Following approach in 
[2], we study alliance revenue management problem as a two stage game with passenger 
demand described by multinomial logit model. In the first stage, airlines agree on the 
fixed proration rates. In the second stage, each airline tries to maximize its profit in (1) 
independently by allocating seats to each route in operating aircrafts 
( ) { }, min ,
k
k j j j kj
j L
x p D M xπ β = +∑

 
( ) ( )( )''min ,min – , , , 
Sj
k
S
j j j O D ek jk Kj I e E
p D M x cost v e v e C k K
∈
 + ∈ 
 
∑ ∑

 (1) 
where kL  is a set of routes, which are operated only by k -th airline and kI  is a set of 
interline routes ( 2jK ≥ ). 
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The characteristic function is given by 
( ) { } ( ) ( )( )*max min , – , ,
S
S S
S S
j j j j O D e
x j R e E
v s p D M x cost v e v e C
∈
 
=  
  
∑ ∑

 
We present computational results in proposed model of price competition using 
route network in Russian airline market. 
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Each of several evaders surrounded by a group of pursuers in the plane may 
safely break out of the encirclement only by passing between two particular pursuers. 
We discuss a basic game of a faster evader E  and two slower pursuers 1P  a-nd 2P . E  
seeks to cross the intercept 1 2PP  once, to leave the pursuers far behind and, in addition, to 
maximize the closest distance to either of them during the period of manoeuvring. This 
game may be also considered as a generalization of the problem of optimal routing of an 
aircraft in a threaten environment with constraints on the path length for two ``moving'' 
radars [1]. In [2], the game of E  and 1 2{ , }P P P=  has been studied for simple motions of 
all players. For a given safe distance 0l > , the optimal trajectories are constructed with 
use of the main equation and corresponding characteristics for the states on a barrier that 
bounds the region of escape [3]. Additionally it was assumed that all players travel on 
straight lines as long as 1| |EP  and 2| |EP  greater than l . After approaching one of the 
pursuers, e.g., 1P  to l , E  maintains the constraint 1| |EP l= . In the process, E  and 1P  
move along curved paths and 2P  runs along the same straight line until the game ends at 
a state with 1 2| | | |EP EP l= = . The control variables may be derived from the path equations 
as the time derivatives. Assumed that solving the game for each 0l > , one fills out the 
playing space with the optimal trajectories and constructs an optimal feedback strategy. 
In our paper, we examine several evasion strategies that based on evaluations of the 
guaranteed results on straight line motions. 
Let 2( )Ez t ∈  and 
2( )
iP
z t ∈  obey the equations  
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where 0t ≥ , ( ) (cos( ),sin( ))e α α α= , ( ), ( )it tψ ϕ ∈ , 0 1,iω< <  0Ez  and 
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z  are initial 
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initial state and 0( , , , )i it zρ ψ ϕ  be the distance to iP  as a function of time when the players 
run in the directions corresponding to the constant angles 1,ψ ϕ  and 2ϕ . 
First, we look at the one-on-one game where E  maximizes the minimal 
distance to iP  with respect to ψ . Let 0 0 0|| ||ii P Er z z= − ,  
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Lemma 4 When starting at some initial state 0z Z∈ , E  moves straight at the 
angle 0 0( )i zψ , iP  can't approach him closer than 0 0( )i zρ  if 0 0( ) 0i zτ ≥ , and closer than 0ir  
otherwise.  
Then, we define analogous concepts for the case when E  maximizes the 
minimal distance to either of 1P  and 2P . Let 0{1,2}Ψ ( )z  be the set of all ψ  such that E  
crosses 0 01 2P P  when moves in the direction determined by ψ ,  
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Lemma 5 If * 01 ( ) 0zτ ≥  and * 02 ( ) 0zτ ≥  then  
 
* 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0
{1,2} 1 1 {1,2} 1
* 0 * 0 * 0 0
2 2 {1,2} 2
( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), )
( ( ), ( ), ( ), ).
z z z z z
z z z z
ρ ρ τ ψ ϕ
ρ τ ψ ϕ
=
=
 (4) 
Theorem 6 When starting at some initial state 0z Z∈ , E  moves straight at the 
angle * 0{1,2}( )zψ , neither 1P  nor 2P  can approach him closer than * 0{1,2}( )zρ .  
Actually, E  may try to improve the described guaranteed result by updating the 
angle ψ  as the game advances. In this case, he must use strategies with memory since 
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the attained minimal distance to the pursuers as well as the constraints on ψ  that ensure 
exactly one crossing of the intercept 1 2PP  depend on the game history. 
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Spatial economics has acquired new life since publication of Krugman's 
pioneering papers. Combined increasing returns, imperfect competition, commodity 
trade and the mobility of production factors Krugman has formed his now famous “core-
periphery” model. Such a combination has contradicted to the mainstream paradigm of 
constant returns and perfect competition, which has dominated in economic theory for a 
long time. Furthermore, to the trade-off between increasing returns and transport costs, 
Krugman has added a third factor – the size of spatially separated markets. The main 
achievement of New Economic Geography (NEG) was to show how market size 
interacts with scale economies internal to firms and transport costs to shape the space-
economy.

In NEG, the market outcome arises from the interplay between a dispersion 
force and an agglomeration force operating within a general equilibrium model. Due to 
Krugman, the dispersion force ensures from the spatial immobility of farmers. As for the 
agglomeration force, he noticed that circular causation takes place because the following 
two effects reinforce each other.

In this framework, however, the internal structure of 
regions was not accounted for.  
In the present paper we consider NEG models, which allows for the internal 
structure of urban agglomerations through the introduction of a land market. To be 
precise, we start by focusing on the causes and consequences of the internal structure of 
cities, because the way they are organized has a major impact of the well-being of 
people. In particular, housing and commuting costs, which we call urban costs, account 
for a large share of consumers' expenditures. At this point we are agree with Helpman, 
for whom urban costs are the main dispersion force at work in modern urbanized 
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economies. In our setting, an agglomeration is structured as a monocentric city in which 
firms gather in a central business district. Competition for land among consumers gives 
rise to land rent and commuting costs that both increase with population size. In other 
words, our approach endows regions with an urban structure which is absent in standard 
NEG models.

As a result, the space-economy is the outcome of the interaction 
between two types of mobility costs: the transport costs of commodities and the 
commuting costs borne by workers. Evolution of commuting costs within cities, instead 
of transport costs between cities, becomes the key-factor explaining how the space-
economy is organized. Moreover, despite the many advantages provided by the inner 
city through an easy access to highly specialized services, the significant fall in 
communication costs has led firms or developers to form enterprise zones or edge cities. 
We then go one step further by allowing firms to form secondary business centers. This 
analysis shows how polycentricity alleviates the urban of urban costs, which allows a big 
city to retain its dominant position by accommodating a large share of 
activities.

Creation of subcenters within a city, i.e. the formation of a polycentric city, 
appears to be a natural way to alleviate the burden of urban costs. Thus, the escalation of 
urban costs in large cities seems to prompt a redeployment of activities in a polycentric 
pattern, while smaller cities retain their monocentric shape. However, for this to happen, 
firms set up in the secondary centers must maintain a very good access to the main urban 
center, which requires low communication costs.

 
Trying to explain the emergence of cities with various sizes, our framework, 
allows cities to be polycentric. Moreover, in our treatment, there are no pre-specified 
locations or numbers of subcenters, and our model is a fully closed general equilibrium 
spatial economy. As mentioned above, emergence of additional job centers is based on 
the urge towards decreasing of urban costs. The feature of the presented paper is that we 
drop very convenient (yet non-realistic) assumption on “long narrow city.” Our analysis 
is extended to the two-dimension because the geographical space in the real world is 
better approximated by a two-dimensional space.  
The model provides two types of agents: firms and workers. The firms produce 
horizontally differentiated good under monopolistic competition with increasing return 
to scale, choosing the location of production (in the Center or on the periphery) and 
maximizing net profit. However, placing the company on the periphery brings an 
additional communication cost. In turn, employees choose the place of job and 
residence, trying to reduce housing and commuting costs, or rather to maximize a 
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difference between the wage and the urban costs. Moreover, workers are also consumers, 
demanding for goods of three types: land for housing, homogenous good produced 
outside the city (traditionally interpreted as agricultural good) and horizontally 
differentiated good. The general equilibrium in this model implies a lack of 
incentives for firms and workers to change position and clearing in all markets, including 
the housing and labor ones.  
The following results are obtained: 
1. Polycentric city structure may exist only if population of city exceeds the 
certain threshold, i.e., too small city cannot bear the burden of polycentricity. Moreover, 
increasing in number of Secondary Business Districts (SBD) implies that per capita 
urban costs strictly decrease. It results in increasing (ceteris paribus) of disposable 
income and indirect utility of the city residents, therefore, developing of the inner city 
structure may be an important policy instrument. 

 
2. Disposable income is positive if and only if city population is not less than 
strictly positive lower threshold a do not exceeds the finite upper bound. It means that 
the effective production (with increasing return to scale) cannot be developed on the 
base of too small settlement, and, vice versa, very large city cannot survive because of 
too heavy burden of urban costs. Increasing in SBD number shifts up the upper threshold 
(i.e., increases city capacity), therefore, extensive development of the city structure can 
be an effective policy instrument for sufficiently large. It cannot help, however, small 
cities to survive as industrial settlements.  
3. Sufficiently high level of trade openness (i.e., sufficiently small trade costs) 
shifts down to zero the lower threshold of city population. It means that under condition 
of almost free trade, small cities could survive as satellites of large ones. Another benefit 
of sufficiently free trade is that real wage (indirect utility) increases for residents in all 
cities, not depending on their sizes, although this effect is more significant for small 
cities. It increases the relative attractiveness for the labor inflow.  
4. This inflow may result in overpopulation of city with given number of SBDs. 
To avoid this overpopulation, City Developer may increase the current SBD number, 
which increases city capacity. Mechanism of determining of endogenous minimum SBD 
number was suggested, which is consistent with empirical evidences. 
This research was supported by the RFBR grant 12-06-00174-a and EERC grant 11-511. 
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At first we produce the basic notations concerning to an α -prenucleolus for an 
arbitrary n -person cooperative TU-game. Consider a cooperative TU-game ( , )N v , 
where = {1,2, , }N n  is the finite set of players and 1: 2Nv R  is a real valued function 
on the family of all subsets of N  with ( ) = 0v ∅ . The dual game *( , )N v  of ( , )N v  is 
defined by  
*( ) = ( ) ( \ )v S v N v N S−  
for all coalitions S N⊆ . 
Denote by 0 ( , )X N v  the set of preimputations of a game ( , )N v , i.e. 
0 ( , ) = { : ( ) = ( )}.nX N v x R x N v N∈  Let x  be a preimputation in a game ( , )N v . 
The excess ( , , )e x v S  of a coalition S  at x  is ( , , ) = ( ) ( ).e x v S v S x S−  So, the dual 
excess *( , , )e x v S  of a coalition S N⊆  at x  is * *( , , ) = ( ) ( ).e x v S v S x S−  
For any fixed 1Rα ∈  we consider the α -excess ( , , )e x v Sα  of coalition S N⊆  
for each 0 ( , )x X N v∈  as follows  
*( , , ) = ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ).e x v S e x v S e x v Sα α α+ −  
For any fixed 1Rα ∈  the α -prenucleolus of a game ( , )N v  is defined as  
0 0( , ) = { ( , ) : ( ( , , )) ( ( , , )) ( , )},lexN v x X N v e x v S e y v S for all y X N v
α α αθ θ∈ ∈N   
where ( ( , , ) )S Ne x v Sαθ ⊂  is a vector of α -excesses which components are arranged in 
nonincreasing order. 
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Denote by ( , )N vN  a set of all α -prenucleoli of a game ( , )N v , then  
1
( , ) = ( , ).
R
N v N vα
α∈
N N

 
It was proved before that the α -prenucleolus of an arbitrary TU-game ( , )N v  
coincides with the prenucleolus of a certain game ( , )N vα , which is constructed as the 
weighted sum of the game and its dual:  
*( ) = ( ) (1 ) ( ), .v S v S v S S Nα α α+ − ⊆  
Using that result, consider the set of α -prenucleoli in 3-person cooperative TU-
games. Without loss of generality, we put the restriction on v :  
({ }) = 0, = 1,3,
({1,2}) < ({1,3}) < ({2,3}).
v i i
v v v



 
Further we replace ({ , })v i j  with note ( )v ij . Denote the difference between 
( )v N  and (12) (13) (23)v v v+ +  as ( )v N∆ , i.e. ( ) = ( ) (12) (13) (23).v N v N v v v∆ − − −  Then the 
set of all α -prenucleoli of the game ( , )N v  is defined by formula 
( , ) =N v ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪a a a a a1 2 3 4 5N N N N N N , where , = 1,5,
a
jN j  is described by the following cases:  
 • for 1 | ( ) |
2 2( (23) (13))
v N
v v
α
∆
≤ −
−
 
(12) (13) (23) (12) ( ) (23) (13) ( )= , , ;
2 2 2 2 2
v v v v v N v v v N + + ∆ + ∆ + +  
  
a
1N  
 • for 1 | ( ) | 1 | ( ) |
2 2( (23) (13)) 2 2( (23) (13) 2 (12))
v N v N
v v v v v
α
∆ ∆
− ≤ ≤ −
− + −
 
1 2 3= {( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ))}N v N v N v
α α αν ν νa2N , where 
1
(13) (12) ( ) (2 1)( (23) (13))( , ) = ( ( )) ,
2 4 4
v v v N v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − −+ + ∆  
2
(23) (12) ( ) (1 2 )( (23) (13))( , ) = ( ( )) ,
2 4 4
v v v N v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − −+ + ∆  
3
(13) (23) ( )( , ) = ;
2 2
v v v NN vαν + ∆+  
 • for 1 | ( ) | 1 | ( ) |
2 2( (23) (13) 2 (12)) 2 2(2 (23) (13) (12))
v N v N
v v v v v v
α
∆ ∆
− ≤ ≤ +
+ − − −
 
1 2 3= {( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ))}N v N v N v
α α αν ν νa3N , where 
1
(13) (12) ( ) (2 1)(2 (23) (13) (12))( , ) = ( ( )) ,
2 3 6
v v v N v v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − − −+ + ∆  
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2
(23) (12) ( ) (2 1)(2 (13) (23) (12))( , ) = ( ( )) ,
2 3 6
v v v N v v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − − −+ + ∆  
3
(23) (13) ( ) (2 1)(2 (12) (23) (13))( , ) = ( ( )) ;
2 3 6
v v v N v v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − − −+ + ∆  
 • for 1 | ( ) | 1 | ( ) |
2 2(2 (23) (13) (12)) 2 2( (13) (12))
v N v N
v v v v v
α
∆ ∆
+ ≤ ≤ +
− − −
 
1 2 3= {( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ))}N v N v N v
α α αν ν νa4N , where 
1
(13) (12) ( )( , ) = ,
2 2
v v v NN vαν + ∆+  
2
(23) (12) ( ) (2 1)( (13) (12))( , ) = ( ( )) ,
2 4 4
v v v N v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − −+ + ∆  
3
(23) (13) ( ) (1 2 )( (13) (12))( , ) = ( ( )) ;
2 4 4
v v v N v vN v sgn v Nα αν + ∆ − −+ + ∆  
 • for 1 | ( ) |
2 2( (13) (12))
v N
v v
α
∆
≥ +
−
 
(13) (12) ( ) (23) (12) ( ) (13) (23)= , , .
2 2 2 2 2
v v v N v v v N v v + ∆ + ∆ + + +  
  
a
5N  
These formulas help us to analyze what the effect the parameter α  has on the 
players' payoffs. And which α  is more profitable for each player. 
Note that we have also obtained the formulas for the prenucleolus (in case of 
= 1α ); for the Shapley value and SM -nucleolus (in case of 1=
2
α ); for the modiclus in 
the class of balanced games (in case of = 0α ). 
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In this paper we illustrate how measures of (positional) power and satisfaction - 
both belonging to the theory of voting power - can be used as instruments in order to 
support the implementation of a certain mode of individual behavior in organizations. 
We address the question of how organizational architectures, in terms of their resulting 
allocation of power and satisfaction, can contribute to an organizational environment 
which supports actors to behave according to the `model of man' underlying stewardship 
theory, rather then providing them incentives to follow the `model of man' as 
presupposed by agency theory. 
Agency theory is the predominant theory of individual behavior is 
organizational economics. The `model of man' underlying this theory assumes that actors 
are `rational' and `self-interested': it is assumed that actors have preferences over a set of 
outcomes and will choose that (course of) action which allows them to reach their 
individually most preferred outcome. If there exists a contractual relationship between 
two actors such that one actor (the `agent') has formally agreed to always choose that 
action which will be in the best interest of another actor (the `principal) this will only 
work if the interest of both actors are either aligned or the principal fully monitors the 
behavior of its agent. It is assumed that the former is (usually) not the case as actors are 
considered to have an inherent dislike to perform tasks in the interest of someone else. 
The view regarding the latter is that this is either in contradiction to the idea of 
delegation underlying many contractual relationships between principals and agents 
and/or would be infeasible or too costly. As a result agency theory is mainly concerned 
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with the design of mechanisms, usually some kind of payment scheme, in order to align 
the interest of the agent with that of its principal. Apart from this result a similar view 
can be found in organizational psychology where the above set of assumptions is known 
under `Theory X' (McGregor 1960). In this context, it is also argued that actors prefer to 
obtain clear and strict orders from their principals rather then being in an autonomous 
position which makes them responsible for their own choice of action. 
About two decades ago Donaldson (1990a, 1990b) suggested an alternative 
theory of individual behavior in organizations which he called stewardship theory and 
has found its way in the standard textbooks on governance. This theory is based on an 
alternative 'model of man' originating from organizational sociology and psychology. 
Under stewardship theory the agent having signed an agreement with its principal has 
the incentive to fulfill its role as specified in the contract. Following McClelland (1961) 
and Herzberg et al. (1959) it is assumed that an agent gains intrinsic satisfaction from 
successfully performing inherently demanding work and from exercising responsibility 
and authority. Moreover, it is said that by gaining recognition from peers and superiors 
for such a behavior agents also gain extrinsic satisfaction. In contrast to agency theory 
no pecuniary component is considered here. Thus, even if from an individualistic point 
of view an action would be unattractive, i.e., an alternative action would result in an 
higher level of individual satisfaction, an agent will nevertheless carry out that the 
former action if its role would require this (Etzioni 1975). Again, a corresponding set of 
assumptions can be found in organizational psychology which is know under `Theory Y' 
(McGregor 1960). In the context of this theory it is also noted that the observed behavior 
of agents in line with `Theory X' does not imply that they dislike the performance of 
tasks in the interest of someone else as specified by their contracts. Rather the observed 
behavior is their reaction to their experience of being an agent in world which applies the 
agency theory paradigm. Thus, given the assumed absence of an inner motivational 
problem of agents, the question arises how those can be motivated to behave according 
to stewardship theory. 
While it is well known from that `all people are different' and, hence, will not 
respond in the same way to the same stimuli (Davis 1981), we can still ask the question 
under what conditions it can be expected to be more likely that agents behave more in 
line with the stewardship theory. To put it in the terminology of Argyris and Schön 
(1992) our aim is to aline the `theory-in-use', i.e., the theory actors actually apply, and 
the `espoused theory', i.e., the words they use to convey what they think or do. While the 
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former can be directly observed, the latter has to be identified by asking an actor how it 
would behave under certain circumstances. In this paper our conjecture is as follows: a 
necessary condition for the congruence of an agents theory-in-use and espoused theory is 
that an agent (within an organization) is able to met the tasks it is expected to perform on 
a sustainable basis; otherwise, i.e., if a task demands too much or if a task demands too 
little, an agent will show the patterns of behavior as assumed under agency theory. 
Thus, in terms of organizational design, the task to be performed is to identify 
an organizational architecture, which produces the `right' balance of power and 
satisfaction among the actors within an organization. Making use of stylized examples of 
hierarchical organizational architectures and applying an `action-based approach' to the 
measurement of power and satisfaction in organizations (see van den Brink and Steffen 
2008, 2012a, 2012b), we illustrate how institutional reforms may produce results, which 
instead of the `role-concurring' behavior are rather likely to induce 'self-interested' 
behavior, and vice versa. 
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We present a unified model of contractual networks with divisible surplus and 
matching markets with finite contracts. In both the network and the matching markets 
models, we depart from the usual restriction of bilateral contracts and allow for 
multilateral contracts [4]. We focus on strongly stable contract allocations. A contract 
allocation is strongly stable if it is robust to deviations by any group of agents (allowing 
them to keep any of their previous contracts while forming new ones only among 
themselves). We offer a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of strongly 
stable contractual networks and contract allocations in multilateral matching markets in 
the presence of a sufficiently expressive contractual language. 
In the network model, we drop the anonymity assumption on the allocation rule 
and generalise the results of Jackson and van den Nouweland [5] and Dutta and 
Mutuswami [1], which state that only egalitarian division of surplus on connected 
network components ensures strong stability. The key condition in this paper, which we 
call strong pairwise alignment, is an extension of the pairwise alignment condition 
introduced by Pycia [7]. Strong pairwise alignment states that for any two sets of 
contracts, any agents who are party to every contract in both sets, must have the same 
preferences over the two sets. This condition allows for the presence of technological 
spillovers and complementarities. The paper challenges recent results on the necessity of 
substitutability and coarseness of contractual language for the existence of strongly 
stable contract allocations in matching markets [3]. 
A common criticism of refinements of (pairwise) stable outcomes is that group 
deviations are hard to achieve since they require a lot of coordination on behalf of the 
deviating agents. However, a natural setting where group deviations may occur is in a 
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bargaining process between firms and unionised workers (or workers, who are covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement and are not members of a union). The union acts as 
a credible coordinator of arbitrary deviations by workers: for example, it can ballot 
workers to go on strike. In this context, the set of pairwise stable outcomes may be an 
imprecise predictor of market outcomes and strongly stable outcomes are more accurate. 
The model presented in this paper allows firms to hire both unionised and non-unionised 
workers and allows workers to take on jobs outside the remit of their union. The results 
suggest strongly stable firm-union outcomes in thin labour markets are characterized by 
a generalized Nash bargaining solution. This provides the first micro-founded 
justification for the use of Nash bargaining solution in the analysis of firm-union 
bargaining [2, 6]. 
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Multistep procedure of division of cake of the single size for three persons is 
considered. Participants of negotiations - players of I , II  and III  - on each step receive 
from the arbitrator of the offer 1 2 3( , , )k k kx x x , respectively. These are the random variables 
distributed on the law to Dirikhlet  
31 2 11 11 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3
Γ( )( , , ) ,
Γ( )Γ( )Γ( )
kk kk k kf x x x x x x
k k k
−− −+ +=  
where 1 2 3 1x x x+ + = . 
Lets 1k m= , 2 3 1k k= = . Then  
1
1 2 1 1 2( , ) ( 1) ,     1, , 0.
mf x x m m x x x x y−= + + ≤ ≥  
Everyone players decide to accept the offer or to reject it. The final decision is 
made by consensus. If all players accept their offers then division ( , , )x y z . Otherwise, 
the proposal is ignored and the players come in to the next step 1k −  hoping for the best 
offer in the future. Thus there is a discounting and on the following step players divide 
size cake 1δ < . Bargaining continues until some player accepts the offer or the time of 
bargaining ends. 
Let's enter into strategy consideration. Let 1 1( )xµ  ( 2 2 3 3 3 1 2( ), ( ) (1 )x x x xµ µ µ= − − ) 
is a probability of that the player of ( , )I II III  will accept the proposal of the arbitrator 
1 2 3( , )x x x . Owing to symmetry of game for the second and third player we believe 
2 2 3 1 2( ) (1 )x x xµ µ= − −  
Theorem. The optimal strategies of players in k -th step are  
239 
 
(1) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 { } { }
( ) ,   ( ) mod0.5 2,3i
ik k
i ix H x H
x I x I cmi
δ δ
µ µ
− −≥ ≥
= = = . 
The value of the game satisfies to recurrence relation  
(1)
kH =  
{ }(2) 1 (2) (1) (1) 1 (2) (1)1 1 1 1 1 11 (1 2 ) (1 2 ) ( 2) ( ) ( 2)(1 2 )2
m m
k k k k k kH H m H m H m H bm Hm
δ δ δ δ δ δ+ +− − − − − −   = ⋅ − − − + + + − − +   +
(2)
kH =  
{ (2) 2 (1) 1 (2) (1)1 1 1 11 (1 2 ) ( ) (1 2 )( 2)2
m m
k k k kH H H H mm
δ δ δ δ+ +− − − −= − − − − + ++
 
(1) (2) (2) 2 2 (2) (1) (1) (1) 2 (2)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1( ) ( ( ) 2 ( ) )( 2)( 1)} .
2 2
m
k k k k k k k kH H H H H H H m m Hδ δ δ δ δ δ δ− − − − − − − −+ − − − + − + + +  
If 1δ =  and k ∞→  when  
( )( )3(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (1)1 1 2 1 2 ;
2k k k k k k
H H H H H H= − + − − + + +  
( )( )3(2) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)1 1 2 3 1 2
4k k k k k k
H H H H H H= − + + − + + +  
and we have  
( )(2) (1)1 1 .
2k k
H H= −  
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A macroeconomic model due to E.G. Al'brekht [1] is under consideration. 
Symbol p  denotes the gross product, q  denotes the production costs, h  denotes the 
profit. The function ( , ) =G p q h  is called the macroeconomic potential of the system. We 
assume that the function ( , )G p q  has the form  
0 1 2( , ) = ( ),G p q pq a a p a q+ +  
where coefficients 0a , 1a , have to be defined. 
We know the statistic data * * *( ( ), ( ), ( )), = 0, , ,i i ip t q t h t i N  with admissible error 
ξ .:  
* * *| ( ) ( ) | , | ( ) ( ) | , | ( ) ( ) | .i i i i i ip t p t q t q t h t h tξ ξ ξ− ≤ − ≤ − ≤  
The dynamics of the macroeconomic system are described by the following 
differential equations  
 1 2 0
( , ) ( , )= ( ) , = ( ) , [0, ] = [ , ],N
dp G p q dq G p qu t u t t T t t
dt p dt q
∂ ∂
∈
∂ ∂
 (1) 
 where controls 1( )u t , 2 ( )u t  have the following constraints:  
 1 1 2 2 1 2| |< , | |< , > 0, > 0.u U u U U U  (2) 
We assume that the admissible controls 1( )u t , 2 ( )u t  are elements of the set  
1 2 1 1 2 2= { ( ) = ( ( ), ( )) :[0, ] [ , ] [ , ] are measurable}.u u u T U U U U∀ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − × −TU   
We define coefficients 0a , 1a , 2a  in ( , )G p q  via applying the least-squares 
method to the relations  
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* * *( ) = ( ( ), ( )), = 0,1, , .i i ih t G p t q t i N  
The problem of reconstruction of controls 1 2( ), ( )u t u t  generating motions 
( ), ( )p t q t  close to the statistic data is considered as the optimal control problem relative 
to the pay-off functional  
 
1 2
2 2
* 2 * 2 1 2
0
( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) =
( ( )) ( ( ))= ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) .
2
T
I p q u u
u t u tp t p t q t q t dtε
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
 +
− + − + 
 
∫
 (3) 
Here *( )p t , *( )q t  are linear interpolations of the statistic data, ε  is a small 
parameter. Solutions of the dynamical reconstruction problem are controls that are 
minimizing the pay-off on the set TU . Common sense recommends us to take into 
consideration only realistically reconstructed controls which have no sliding-mode 
intervals. The controls have to generate dynamics deviating from statistics not far from 
ξ . The results of numerical solution are exposed below for the case of stationary model 
(coefficients 0a , 1a , 2a  are constant) and for the nonstationary model (coefficients 0a , 
1a , 2a  are peacewise constant). 
 
A nonrealistic reconstructed control 2 ( )u t  for the stationary model 
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A realistic reconstructed control 2 ( )u t  for the nonstationary model  
 
Relations of the obtained results with other approaches to solutions of ill-posed 
problems are discussed. 
The work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Researches 
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The Lebesgue measure of sets consisting of imputations that dominate or are 
dominated in zero-sum n-person cooperative games or that are preferred by or to a given 
imputation in pure-bargaining games, serves (1) to develop ordered relations and utility 
indicators that allow to narrow down the indeterminacy of vN-M stable sets; (2) to 
obtain most dominant and most preferent imputations for the above games ; (3) to obtain 
the Nash-bargaining product solution for 2-person pure-bargaining cooperative games as 
a particular case; and (4) to develop a one- point solution concept or value for general 
non-zero-sum n-person game. The solution concept is obtained optimizing a general 
welfare indicator measure function and can be expressed in terms of a basic strategic-
equilibriums and the expected coalitional value to each player previous to considering 
the formation of the grand coalition plus a proportional part of the player?s added value 
to the grand coalition in case it forms. To measure preference or dominance in 
imputation simplexes becomes a relatively simple task when the measures of preference 
regions are made with the help of a self-similar geometry developed and introduce here 
for such task. 
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Based on the concept of balanced collections of Bondareva and Shapley, the so 
defined fundamental strategic equilibrium that every n-person cooperative game 
possesses is shown to be a generalization von Neumann and Morgenstern “objective” 
equilibrium for the zero-sum 3-person cooperative game and it is used as an example to 
address the problem of measuring the likelihood of coalition formation. In particular, we 
depart from the defined fundamental equilibrium and its linear programming 
representation to determine the coalitions most likely to form. By assuming that player's 
coalition preferences may be described by player's choice probabilities, we assume the 
existence of players types in the form of Harsanyi's probability P-matrices to compute 
the probability of coalition formation and the player?s expected value for the game 
previous to the formation of the grand coalition. Based on these expected values for the 
players we look for Nash like P-matrix equilibrium in the sense that unilateral deviations 
do not improve the deviant player's expectation. Based on the described fundamental 
equilibrium and on the players expected value for the game, stronger and weaker core 
solution concepts are introduced. 
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A direct-straightforward method for solving linear discrete-time optimal control 
problem is applied to solve control problem of a linear discrete-time system as a mixture 
of multi-criteria Stackelberg and Nash games. For simplicity, the exposure starts with the 
simplest case of linear discrete-time optimal control problem and, by sequential 
considering of more general cases, investigation finalizes with the highlighted Pareto-
Nash-Stackelberg and set valued control problems. Different principles of solving are 
compared and their equivalence is proved. 
Introduction 
 Optimal control theory which appeared due to Lev Pontryagin [2] and Richard 
Bellman [3], as natural extension of calculus of variations, often doesn't satisfy all 
requirements and needs for modelling and solving problems of real dynamic systems and 
processes. A situation of this type occurs for problem of linear discrete-time system 
control by a decision process that evolves as Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg game with 
constraints -- a mixture of hierarchical and simultaneous games For such system, the 
notion of optimal control evolves naturally to the notion of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg 
type control and to the natural principle for solving the highlighted problem by applying 
a concept of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium [9] with a direct-straightforward 
principle for solving. 
The direct method and principle for solving linear discrete-time optimal control 
problem is extended to control problem of a linear system in discrete time as a mixture 
of multi-criteria Stackelberg and Nash games [9] . The exposure starts with the simplest 
case of linear discrete-time optimal control problem [1] and, by sequential considering of 
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more general cases, finalizes with the Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg and set valued control 
problems. The maximum principle of Pontryagin is formulated and proved for all the 
considered problems. Its equivalence with the direct-straightforward principle for 
solving is established. 
Linear discrete-time Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg control problem 
The conference presentation begins with the problem of optimal control and 
their optimal principles, and by considering different types of control and principles 
finalizes with the control of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg type with T  stages and 
1 Tν ν+ +  players, where 1, , Tν ν  are the correspondent numbers of players on stages 
1, , .T  Every player is identified by two numbers: τ  -- stage on which player selects 
his strategy and π  -- player number at stage .τ .. In such game, at each stage τ  the 
players 1, 2, , τν  play a Pareto-Nash game by selecting simultaneously their strategies 
according to their criteria ( 1 2, , ,k k kτ τ τντ  are the numbers of criteria of respective 
players) and by communicating his and all precedent selected strategies to the following 
1τ +  stage players. After all stage strategy selections, all the players compute their gains 
on the resulting profile. Such type of control is named Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg control, 
and the corresponding problem -- linear discrete-time Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg control 
problem. 
The decision control process may be modelled as: 
 
=1 =1
1 1
=1
( , || ) = e max,
= 1, , , = 1, , ,
= , = 1,..., ,
, = 1,..., , = 1, , ,
T t
t t t t
ut
t
t t t t t
t t t
t
f x u u c x b u f
T
x A x B u t T
D u d t T
ν
τπ τπ τπ τπ µ µ
τπ τπ
µ
τ
ν
π π
π
π π π
τ π ν
π ν
−
− −
 
+ →  
 
+
≤
∑ ∑
∑
 

 (1) 
where 0 , ,t nx x R∈  ,
kt tp nc Rτπ µ
×
∈  ,mu Rτπ ∈  ,
kt tp nb Rτπ µ
×
∈  1 ,t n nA R− ×∈  ,n mB Rτπ ×∈  
,kd Rτπ ∈  ,k nD Rτπ ×∈  , = 1, , , = 1, , , = 1, , .tt T ττ π ν µ ν    
By performing direct transformation, (1) is reduced to a sequence of multi-
criteria linear programming problems 
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= 1, , , = 1, , .T ττ π ν   
Equivalence of (1) and (2) proves the following Theorem 1. 
Theorem 17 Let (1) be solvable. The sequence 11 12, , , T Tu u u ν  forms a Pareto-Nash-
Stackelberg equilibrium control in (1) if and only if u τπ  is an efficient solution of multi-
criteria linear programming problem (2), for = 1, , , = 1, , .T ττ π ν   
Pontryagin maximum principle may be generalized for (1). By considering 
recurrent relations  
 =T Tp cτπ τπ , 1=t t t tp p A cτπ τπ τπ+ + , = 1,...,1t T − , (3) 
where = 1, , , = 1, , ,T ττ π ν   Hamiltonian vector-functions are defined as  
( ) = , , = , ,1,ttH u p B b u t Tτπ τπ τπ τπτπ τπτπ +   
where = 1, , , = 1, ,T ττ π ν   and , = , ,1, = 1, , , = 1, ,
tp t T Tτπ ττ π ν   . 
Theorem 2 8 Let (1) be solvable. The sequence 11 12, , , T Tu u u ν  forms a Pareto-Nash-
Stackelberg equilibrium control if and only if  
( )A max ,
:
t
u
u rg ef H u
D u d
τπ τπ
τπ
τπ τπ τπ τπ
∈
≤
 
for = , ,1, = 1, , , = 1, , .t T T ττ π ν     
Theorems are equivalent. 
Concluding remarks 
There are different types of processes control: optimal control, Stackelberg 
control, Pareto-Stackelberg control, Nash-Stackelberg control, Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg 
control, etc. 
The direct-straightforward, dual and classical principles (Pontryagin and 
Bellman) may be applied for determining the desired control of dynamic processes. 
These principles are the bases for pseudo-polynomial methods, which are exposed as a 
consequence of theorems for linear discrete-time Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg control 
problems. 
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The direct-straightforward principle is applied for solving the problem of 
determining the optimal control of set-valued linear discrete-time processes. Pseudo-
polynomial method of solving is constructed. 
The results obtained for different types of set-valued control will be exposed in 
a future paper. 
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The paper shows one of the possible modifications of Raiffa's single point 
solution (Mihola, Valencik, Vlach 2012), which has applications in the analysis of social 
networks associated with investing in social position and creating the structures based on 
mutual covering of violations of the generally accepted principles. These structures are 
formed on the basi of games of Tragedy of commons type when one player detects 
breaking the rules by another player. Hence the first player begins bribing the other 
player and simultaneously covering his back, one player is prejudiced in favour of 
another player. This gives a rise to social networks that significantly affect the formation 
of coalitions in various areas of the social system, including institutions whose mission is 
to protect society against violations of the generally accepted principles. Models follow 
the N-M modified generalized Raiffa solution to analyze the causes of redistence of 
corruption and with it the related social phenomena subsequently utilized to formulate 
measures for the restriction of corruption.  
Raiffa's single point solution was proposed in the early 1950's. Raiffa (1953) 
suggested dynamic procedures for the cooperative bargaining in which the set S  of 
possible alternatives is kept unchanged while the disagreement point gradually changes. 
Recently Diskin et al. (2011) have provided an axiomatization of a family of generalized 
Raiffa's discrete solutions. To make easier the presentation of modifications of Raiffa's 
discrete solution that are based on a different game theoretic model of systems, we first 
describe some details of solution concepts proposed in Diskin et al.  
Diskin et al. deal with the bargaining problem B  which is formed from 
instances ( , )S d  where each S  is a nonempty, closed, convex, comprehensive, and 
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positively bounded subset of nR  whose boundary points are Pareto optimal. They 
propose a solution concept which is composed of two solution functions. One solution 
function specifies an interim agreement and the other specifies the terminal agreement. 
Such a step-by-step solution concept can formally be defined as follows.  
A pair ( , )f g  of functions from B  into nR  is called the stepwise solution if both 
( , )f S d  and ( , )g S d  belong to S  for each instance ( , )S d  of B . Here, the first 
component specifies the interim agreement and the second component specifies the 
terminal agreement. The set of generalized Raiffa solutions is a family of stepwise 
bargaining solutions, where ( , )f S d  is derived from ( , )U S d . ( , )U S d ) is so called ideal 
or utopia point (Kalai, Smorodinsky 1975). Diskin et al. prove that a stepwise bargaining 
solution ( , )f g  satisfies sedmi Axioms and only if it is a generalized Raiffa solution.  
Now we move on to the proposed generalized Raiffa solution for 3n =  S  is 
specified with the function ( , , ) 0S x y z =  and contains all points on the surface and in the 
space below this surface defined by the function. We assume that this set is also a 
nonempty, closed, convex, comprehensive, and positively bounded subset of nR  whose 
boundary points are Pareto optimal. The disagreement point is set also 0 01 02 03( , , )d d d d . 
Let S  be defined as function ( , , ) 0S x y z =  containing all points specified by the function 
on the surface and below the surface. We assume the set is also a nonempty, closed, 
convex, comprehensive, and positively bounded subset of Rn whose boundary points are 
Pareto optimal. The disagreement point 0 01 02 03( , , )d d d d  is also given.  
Let the solution of the system of equations  
01( , , )  0 S x y d =  
02( , , )  0 S x d z =  
03( , , )  0 S d y z =  
be 11 12 13, , x d y d z d= = = , which corresponds to point 1d .  
Points with coordinates  
11 12( , , 0) d d  
11 13( , 0, ) d d  
12 13(0, , ) d d  
(unlike in the original generalized Raiffa 
solution) ( , )    2 / 3( ( , ) – )f S d d NM S d d= + . If we keep in force any other definition of 
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generalized Raiffa solution, we call this solution NM – modified generalized Raiffa 
solution for   3n= . The solution in some way connects two cases:  
1. In the first case the players (each of them) decide to create only a two-person 
fully discriminated coalition, i.e. two players who form a coalition, can give to the third 
player the smallest possible payoff. In our case this payoff equals 01 02 03, , d d d   
2. In the second case the players form a grand coalition i.e. three-player 
coalition.  
The connection between both the cases can be interpreted as follows: Payoffs of 
each player in the formation of fully discriminated coalitions can be seen from his 
perspective as an opportunity cost in relation to the possibility of creating a grand 
coalition. If players create a grand coalition, for obvious reasons they will require payoff 
higher or at least equal to the one they would have required in a two-person coalition. 
The problem is how to evaluate player’s payoffs for the creation of fully discriminated 
two-person coalitions. Here we use (introduced by us) the term average expected payoff, 
which is a multiple of its payoff in a situation where the player is the member of the 
winning coalition, and the probability of this coalition i.e. 11 12 13
2 2 2, ,
3 3 3
d d d .  
"Bridge" by which we’re connecting both the cases (formation of two-player 
coalitions and the grand coalitions above), ie, application of the principle of opportunity 
cost and the introduction of the concept of expected average payoff, implicitly contains 
input "step-by-step" process, which results in a single point solution in the case of grand 
coalition.  
The following applies:  
1. In case of two-person game the generalized Raiffa solution at  1 / 2p=  
coincides with the analogous NM-modified generalized Raiffa solution  
2. If the sum of the payments of players is constant and we do not consider the 
difference between the payoff and the utility from the payoff, introduced NM-modified 
generalized Raiffa solution makes no sense because no Pareto improvement over the 
formation of a fully discriminated two-person coalitions exists.  
One of the applications of our approach is the expression of external factors 
associated with the affinity between the players. By affinity of one player to another, we 
mean the utility which one player gains from formation of coalition with the second 
player, and this utility could be expressed in values in which we express payoffs in the 
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original game. If there is utility for both players, we can talk about mutual affinity, but 
that may vary in size for each of the players. Positive affinity can also be called 
sympathy of one player to another, negative affinity is like antipathy of one player to 
another. The total payoff *ijx  of a player in a coalition with a player with whom he has 
affinity is then equal to his payoff in the base game plus his payoff which corresponds 
with the utility of formation of the coalition ijs :  
*
ij i ijxx s+=  
The sign may be positive (positive affinity, i.e. sympathy) or negative (negative 
affinity, thus antipathy).  
It would seem that if the difference between the two players is one-sided or 
there is mutual affinity and if between any of the players and the third player no affinity 
exists, then it is determined that there will be a coalition between the two players. 
However, that need not be if the third player lowers his payment and so compensates the 
positive affinity. Let’s assume that all players are fully informed about the affinities 
among the players. Then the original system of equations is modified to the following 
system of eqations:  
* *
12 21 12 21( , , 0)     S x x s s= +  
* *
13 31 13 31( , 0, )     S x x s s= +  
* *
23 32 23 32(0, , )     S x x s s= +  
The right side of the equation is interpreted in such a way that the game incurs 
additional payoffs based on the respective affinities. For payoffs in the original game, we 
get:  
* *
1 12 12 13 13
1  (       ), . 
2
x x s x s etc= + + +  
From this result arise the following conclusions:  
1. If one of the players (e.g. the first) has a positive affinity for the other player 
(such as the second player), then in the original game:  
- Payoff of the first player is reduced in proportion to the size of this affinity.  
- Payoff of the second player will increase in proportion to the size of this 
affinity.  
- Payoff of the third player is reduced in proportion to the size of this affinity.  
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(The most, i.e. in the original game, gets the player who is likable for the other 
player, without feeling sympathy for that player or other player.)  
2. If a player is informed about a positive affinity between the other two 
players, he may decrease the demand for his payoff in the original game, this affinity 
compensates and restores the situation in which discrete NM stable set in the extended 
game exists, which we considered in the interpretation of the formation of each of the 
two-person coalitions with equall probability. If the player is not aware of this affinity, a 
coalition, which he is not a member of is created.  
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The goal of the paper is to present a generalization of the famous Scarf theorem 
on the core of cooperative game [3] to the case of fuzzy domination. The approach 
proposed is heavily relies on the concept of balanced collection of fuzzy coalitions, 
introduced by the author [5]. This generalization of the well-known notion of balanced 
collection of standard coalitions makes It possible to introduce a natural analog of 
balancedness for so-called generalized cooperative games (fuzzy games without side 
payments, in terms of [1]). It turned out that similar to the standard games situation the 
new balancedness-like condition plays a crucial role in providing the core of the 
generalized game to be nonempty. Moreover, one of the main results of the paper 
demonstrates that the generalized balancedness assumption is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the nonemptiness of the core of fuzzy game with side payments (an 
extension of the classic Bondareva-Shapley theorem on the core of a standard TU 
cooperative game [2,4]). 
Some applications of the results obtained to the fuzzy-core allocation existence 
problem in the framework of general equilibrium theory are also considered. 
1. Notations and definitions 
Let = {1, , }N n  be a set of players. Put = { | 0 1, },N N iI i Nτ τ∈ ≤ ≤ ∈R  and 
denote by Fσ  the set \{0}
NI  of fuzzy coalitions over N  [1]. As usual, each component iτ  
of 1= ( , , )n Fτ τ τ σ∈  is treated as the level of participation of player i  in the fuzzy 
coalition .τ  Remind [1], that any standard coalition S N⊆  is identified with the 
corresponding indicator function ,NSe ∈R  defined by the formula ( ) = 1S ie  if ,i S∈  and 
( ) = 0S ie  if .i S∉  Further, for each 1= ( , , )n Fτ τ τ σ∈  denote by ( )N τ  the support of 
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fuzzy coalition : ( ) = { | > 0}.iN i Nτ τ τ∈  Finally, in the notations given above, the 
definition of the games under consideration looks as follows: a generalized cooperative game 
(fuzzy game without side payments, according to [1]) is a set-valued map ( )Gτ τ  that 
associates any fuzzy coalition Fτ σ∈  with a subset ( )G τ  belonging to 
( ) .N τR  Each vector 
( )( ) ( )i i Nx Gτ τ∈ ∈  is called an imputation of coalition .τ  Remind [5], that G  is said to be a 
regular game, if the sets { }( )iG e  of imputations of singleton coalitions { } , ,ie i N∈  and the set 
of imputations ( )NG e  of "grand coalition" Ne  are nonempty and closed. Following standard 
game-theoretic terminology, we say that generalized game G  is comprehensive from below, 
if for any Fτ σ∈  it holds: ( )x G τ∈  and y x≤  implies ( ).y G τ∈  
To complete the section, we introduce one more characteristic of the 
generalized game, which makes it possible to propose the proper analog of standard 
balanced game. To this end we extend first the notion of balanced family to the case of 
fuzzy coalitions: a finite subset { }k k K Fτ σ∈ ⊆  is an F -balanced collection, if 
=k k Nk K eλ τ∈∑  for some balancing weights 0, .k k Kλ ≥ ∈  A generalized cooperative 
game G  is said to be F -balanced game, if any vector 1= ( , , )nx x x  belongs to ( )NG e  
whenever its restrictions 
( )N k
x
τ
 belong to the corresponding sets ( ), ,kG k Kτ ∈  for some 
F -balanced collection { } .k k Kτ ∈  
2. Main result 
We say that Fτ σ∈  can improve upon an imputation 1= ( , , ) ( ),n Nx x x G e∈  if 
there exists an imputation ( )y G τ∈  such that >i iy x  for any ( ).i N τ∈  One of the 
fundamental concepts of the paper is the following definition of the core ( )C G  of 
generalized game G : the core of G is the set of imputations ( )Nx G e∈  that no coalition 
Fτ σ∈  can improve upon. 
For any game G  put 1= ( , , )
G G G
nx x x  with 
{ }= sup { | ( )}, ,
G
i i i ix x x G e i N∈ ∈ ∈R  and denote by  ( )NG e  the set of individually 
rational imputations of "grand coalition" of the game : ( ) := { ( ) | }.GN NG G e x G e x x∈ ≥  
The main result of the paper is the following extension of the famous Scarf 
theorem on the core [3] to the case of generalized games.  
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Theorem 9 For any regular, comprehensive from below, and F -balanced 
generalized cooperative game G  with  ( )NG e  to be bounded from above, the core ( )C G  is 
nonempty.  
3. A fuzzy-core extension of Bondareva-Shapley theorem 
As a corollary of theorem 1 we propose an extension of the well-known 
Bondareva-Shapley criterion for nonemptiness of the core [2,4] to the case of 
generalized cooperative games with side payments (theorem 2, below). By our definition 
(cf. [1]), a generalized game G  is a game with side payments, if there exists an extended 
characteristic function : Fv σ → R  such that = vG G  with 
( )
( )( ) = {  | ( )}
N
v NG x x v
τ
ττ τ τ∈ ⋅ ≤R  for any Fτ σ∈  ( x y⋅  means inner product of x  and 
y ). We say that an extended characteristic function v  is V -balanced, if for each F -
balanced collection ,T  and each system { }Tτλ  of balancing weights, it holds: 
( ) ( ).NT v v eττ λ τ∈ ≤∑  Note, that for generalized TU games the following analog of 
classic original holds: generalized cooperative game vG  is F -balanced iff v  is V -
balanced. By applying this analog and theorem 1 we get the following criterion.  
Theorem 10 The core ( )vC G  is nonempty iff v  is V -balanced function.  
To conclude, let us mention a simple and useful extension of the classic 
description of the core of TU game, which ensures a direct proof of theorem 2.  
Proposition 11 The core ( )vC G  of generalized cooperative game with side 
payments, generated by characteristic function : ,Fv σ → R  has the following 
representation  
( ) = { | = ( ), ( ), }.Nv N N FC G x x e v e x vτ τ τ σ∈ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ∈R  
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The basic mechanisms of electricity markets - day-ahead and real-time markets 
- perform as uniform price auctions where a producer’s bid is a monotonous function 
that determines the supplied quantity depending on the price. One popular concept for 
modeling the uniform price auction in electricity markets is the supply function 
equilibrium (SFE) introduced by Klemperer and Meyer, 1989, and developed in many 
papers (see Anderson and Philpott, 2002, Baldick et al., 2000, Green and Newbery, 
1992, Holmberg et al., 2008, Newbery, 2008). The original model permits a bid of a 
producer to be a monotone smooth function of the price and demand function to depend 
on an uncertain parameter besides the price. For each parameter value, the market 
clearing price is determined from the balance of the aggregate supply function and a 
current demand function. A bid profile is called a supply function equilibrium (SFE) if, 
for any demand realization, the bid of each firm maximizes its profit under fixed bids of 
other producers. The solution requires rather full information on the demand function 
and cost functions of all competitors. We study whether the actual behavior at the 
auction corresponds to this concept in the framework of adaptive and learning 
mechanisms’ investigation. 
We study existence and dynamics of strong best responses: a bid of a producer 
is a strong best response (SBR) to a bid profile of other participants if it maximizes his 
profit under any value of the uncertain parameter. We determine the set of SFE 
depending on the maximum demand value and study the SBRD for the symmetric 
duopoly with constrained capacity and generalize the results for the symmetric 
oligopoly. 
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We consider the symmetric duopoly with the cost function ( ) = , > 0C q cq c  , 
constrained capacity q Q≤ , and demand function ( , ) = ( )D p t D t dp− , where > 0d  and 
( )D t  is a maximal demand value depending on random parameter t . SFE bid for this 
case is a continuous monotone function that meets equation : ( )( ) =
( )
S pS p d
p c
′ −
−
 until 
( )S p  equals Q  for some p  or reaches its maximum in p , then staying constant. 
General solution of the equation ( , ) = ( )( ln( ))S p A p c A d p c− − −  depends on the 
integration constant A  (see Newbery (2008)). This function reaches maximum value 
( )q A  under 
1
= ( ) =
Adef
dp p A c e
−
+  at the point of intersection of its graph and the Cournot 
supply schedule ( )d p c− . The inverse function is ( ) = ( ( ) ( ) 1)A q d ln q ln d− + . Denote 
= ( )suptD D t dc
∗ − . 
Theorem 1. If 3D Q∗ ≥  then there exists a unique SFE in the model. The 
equilibrium bid is 
( , ( )) ( )
( ) = , ( )
S p A Q for c p p A
S p Q for p p A∗
≤ ≤
 ≥


  
If < < 3Q D Q∗ , then for any ( ( / 3), ( ))A A D A Q∗∈ , bid 
( , ), ( )
( , ) = ( ( ), ), ( )
S p A p p A
S p A S p A A p p A
≤
 ≥


 determines SFE, and for any ( ( ), ( )),A A Q A D∗∈  where 
( )A D∗  meets the equation 
2( )( ( , ))( ( , )) = ,
4
D QS p A D p A D
d
∗
∗ ∗ −
   bid ( , ) = min{ ( , ), )S p A S p A Q  
also determines SFE. 
If < ,D Q∗  then the capacity constraint is not binding for feasible bids. In this 
case > ( / 3)A A D∗∀  the bid ( , )S p A  determines SFE. For A→∞  SFE tends to Walrasian 
equilibrium. 
For linear demand ( ) = {0, }D p max D dp−  under fixed D  and 0c = , we study the 
best response dynamics depending on the ratio between D  and Q . At every stage 
1,2,τ =  , we search for the BR in the set of the supply functions ( , ) = ( ( ) , )S p min k p Qτ τ . 
So the problem is to find the optimal slope ( )k τ . 
Proposition 1: The best response dynamics depends on the parameter values as 
follows: 
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For 3D Q≥ , ( , ) = { , },S p min Q d pτ τ τ∀ . For any τ  the SFE corresponds to the 
Cournot equilibrium. (Since the demand is high enough, the outcome coincides with the 
Walrasian equilibrium that is equal to the Cournot equilibrium in this case). 
For < < 3Q D Q , ( , ) = { , }S p min Q d pτ τ  at step = 1, , ( , )T D Qτ  , then the best 
response functions repeat in cycle. The length ( , )T D Q  of the cycle is the minimum 
integer number satisfying inequality: 
2
, < 2DT for Q D Q
D Q
 
> ≤  − 
, and 
4 , 2 3QT for Q D Q
D Q
> ≤ <
−
. 
For D Q≤ , ( , ) = { , },S p min Q d pτ τ τ∀ . For τ →∞  the best response dynamics 
converges to the SFE with the outcome corresponding to the Walrasian supply function. 
The generalization of the results for the symmetric oligopoly with capapcity 
constraint. 
Proposition 2: The BRD for the model of n-firm oligopoly with constant fixed 
cost and capacity constraint depends on the ratio between parameters D  and Q  as 
follows: 
For 1D (n )Q≤ −  , ( , ) = { , ( ) }, 1S p min Q k pτ τ τ∀ ≥ , where 1
=0
( ) = ( 1)s
s
k d nττ − −∑ . 
For τ →∞  the BRD converges to the Walrasian supply function; 
For 1 1(n )Q < D < (n )Q− + , at the step = 1, , ( , )T D Qτ   the BR is 
( , ) = { , ( ) }S p min Q k pτ τ , then the BR functions repeat in cycle. The length ( , )T D Q  of the 
cycle is the minimum integer number satisfying inequality 
2=0
4 ( )( 1) >
( ( 1) )
T s
s
Q D Qn
D n Q
−
−
− −
∑ ; 
For 1(n )Q D+ ≤  , ( , ) = { , }, [1, ) 1S p min Q kdp kτ τ∀ ∈ ∞ ∀ ≥ . The BR is rather 
uncertain, but the outcome always corresponds to the Cournot equilibrium coinciding 
with the Walrasian equilibrium in this case.  
Our study together with the previous researches shows ambiguous results on the 
justification for the SFE concept. For the symmetric oligopoly with limited total capacity 
nQ  and maximum demand D , the SBRD exists and converges to the Walrasian 
equilibrium bid if ( 1)D n Q≤ −  or ( 1)D n Q≥ + . However, for each specified interval in 
the intermediate area ( 1) < < ( 1)n Q D n Q− + , the SBRD turns out to be cyclic with its 
special cycle. Under general assumptions on the demand shock distribution, the SBRD 
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does not exist and a simple best response dynamics does not converge. Even for duopoly 
we do not observe the convergence to the unique SFE specified in Theorem 1 for 
* > 3D Q . Our study shows that there is no ground to expect such kind of behavior in 
general: for every particular market structure, convergence of adaptive dynamics 
requires a special investigation. 
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This paper aims to introduce a new model of associated games, and then to 
characterize EANS value, as well as CIS value in the framework of Hamiache (2001), by 
means of associated consistency, continuity and the inessential game property. 
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The class of TU cooperative games rG  with with arbitrary collections of 
feasible coalitions is considered. The non-emptiness of the core for every game from this 
class depends both on the characteristic function and the collection of feasible coalitions. 
If the core is not empty, then it may be unbounded. Following Grabish and Sudholter 
(2012) the bounded core for the class rG  if defined as the union of all bounded faces of 
the core.  
Two axiomatizations of the bounded core for this class of games are given: the 
first for the whole class }rG  (without non-emptiness axiom), and the second for the 
subclass }rG  of games with non-empty bounded cores (with non-emptiness axiom).  
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The provision of public goods constitutes a classic case of market failure which 
calls for cooperative optimization. However, cooperation cannot be sustainable unless 
there is guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle can be maintained 
throughout the planning duration. This paper derives subgame consistent cooperative 
solutions for public goods provision by asymmetric agents with transferable payoffs in a 
stochastic dynamic game framework. This is the first time that discrete-time dynamic 
cooperative game in public goods provision is analyzed. 
1 Introduction 
Public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable in consumption, are not 
uncommon in today’s economy. Examples of public goods include clean environment, 
national security, scientific knowledge, accessible public capital, technical know-how 
and public information. The non-exclusiveness and positive externalities of public goods 
constitutes major factors for market failure in their provision. In many contexts, the 
provision and use of public goods are carried out in an intertemporal framework. 
Cooperation suggests the possibility of socially optimal solutions in public goods 
provision problem. A discrete-time game framework is developed for theoretical 
analysis and practical applications. 
2 Analytical Framework 
Consider the case of the provision of a public good in which a group of n agents 
carry out a project by making continuous contributions of some inputs or investments to 
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build up a productive stock of a public good. The game horizon consists of T  stages. 
We use tK  denote the level of the productive stock and itI  denote the contribution to the 
public capital or investment by agent i  at stage {1,2,..., }.t T∈  The stock accumulation 
dynamics is then 
 01 1
1
,
n
j
t t t t
j
KK I K Kδ υ+
=
= − + =∑ , for {1,2, , }t T∈ …  (1) 
where tυ  is a sequence of statistically independent random variables. 
The payoff of player i  at stage t  is 
 ( ) ( ), i {1,2, , }i i it tK C I n NR − ∈ … =  (2) 
where ( )i tR K  the revenue/payoff to agent i , ( )i itC I  is the cost of investing i itI X∈ . 
The objective of agent i N∈  is to maximize its expected net revenue over the 
planning horizon, that is 
 
1 2
( 1)
, , , 1
1
( ) ( ) ( )() )(1 1
T
T
i i i s i T
s s T
s
KE R rC I q K rυ υ υ
− − −
… +
=
   +   + +
−

∑  (3) 
subject to the stock accumulation dynamics (1). 
Non-cooperative solution to game (1)-(3) is characterized to reflect the market 
outcome. 
3 Subgame Consistent Cooperative Scheme 
It is well-known problem that noncooperative provision of goods with 
externalities, in general, would lead to dynamic inefficiency. Cooperative games suggest 
the possibility of socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems 
involving strategic action. Now consider the case when the agents agree to cooperate and 
extract gains from cooperation. In particular, they act cooperatively and agree to 
distribute the joint payoff among themselves according to an optimality principle. If any 
agent disagrees and deviates from the cooperation scheme, all agents will revert to the 
noncooperative framework to counteract the free-rider problem in public goods 
provision. In particular, free-riding would lead to a lower future payoff due to the loss of 
cooperative gains. Thus a credible threat is in place. 
To fulfil group optimality the agents would seek to maximize their expected 
joint payoff. Let * 1* 2* *( ) ( ), }({ ( ), , )ns s s sK K K Kψ ψ ψ ψ= … , for {1,2, , }Ts∈ … , denote a set of 
strategies that brings about an optimal cooperative solution. The optimal cooperative 
path can be derived as: 
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j
K KK K Kψ δ υ+
=

= −

+

=

∑  for {1,2, , }.t T∈ …  (4) 
We use *sX  to denote the set of realizable values of sK  generated by (4) at stage 
s  and use * *s sK X∈  to denote an element in the optimal set. 
To enable a cooperation scheme to be sustainable throughout the agreement 
period, a stringent condition is needed – that of subgame consistency. This condition 
requires that the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset must remain effective in 
any subgame starting at a later starting time with a realizable state brought about by prior 
optimal behaviour. Hence the players do not possess incentives to deviate from the 
cooperative scheme throughout the cooperative duration. 
Let ( )·,·ξ  denote the agreed-upon imputation vector guiding the distribution of 
the total cooperative payoff under the agreed-upon optimality principle along the 
cooperative trajectory * 11{ }Ts sK += . At stage s  and if the productive stock is *sK , the 
imputation vector according to 
 * 1 * 2 * *( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ),, ( ,s s snss K s K s K s Kξ ξ ξ ξ… =   , for [0, ]s T∈  (5) 
Subgame consistency requires the derivation a “payment-distribution-
procedure” *( , )i ssB K  for i N∈  and {1,2, , }Ts∈ … , which leads to the realization of 
imputation (5) and hence a subgame consistent cooperative solution can be obtained. 
The paper would also consider the infinite horizon situation and provide 
applications with explicit function forms. 
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The study of navigator’s strategic behavior in traffic flow assignment is 
important in context of traffic jams. In a megalopolis, many drivers can use routs 
provided by different navigation systems (navigators) to reach their destinations with 
minimum driving time. Thereby, navigators are interested to provide their customers 
with higher level of service compare to other competitors. 
In the present work the game of two navigation providers is considered. Each 
provider tries to assign the traffic flow of its customers from origin to destination 
through n  paths so as to maximize the appropriate pay-offs. The strategy of Navigator j  
is 1( ,..., )j j jnf f f=  with 0jif ≥  
 
1
n
j j
i
i
f F
=
=∑  (1) 
where 0jF >  for {1,2}j∈ . For estimation of the pay-offs of Navigator j , the following 
utility function is considered that quantifies a trade-off between throughput and delay  
 11 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
n
j
i
i
j
j
f
v f f
d f f
β
=
 
 
 =
∑
 (2) 
where 1 2( , )jd f f  is the function that characterizes the average delay experienced by the 
Navigator j  and β  is a trade-off parameter. Such a utility function is commonly used in 
the literature in applications that are sensitive to throughput as well as delay. It consists 
of the ratio between the expected throughput and the expected delay. Thus it captures 
preferences towards higher throughputs and penalizes large delays. 
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The strategies 1* 2*( , )f f  constitute a Nash equilibrium, if for any strategies 
1 2( , )f f  the following inequalities hold: 
 1 2* 1* 2*1 1( , ) ( , )v f f v f f≤  (3) 
 1* 2 1* 2*2 2( , ) ( , )v f f v f f≤  (4) 
It is expected that delay function is not unique for all n  paths of network but 
different for each of them. That means existence of vector 
( )1 ,...,j j jnd d d= ( )1 , ,j j jnd d d= …  where jid  characterize delay on i  -th path for 
Navigator j . Another assumption is about the explicit form of delay function  
 , 1,
m
j i i
i
i
f hd i n
g
+
= ∀ =  (5) 
where , {1,2}j m∈  when j m≠ j m≠ ., 0ih ≥  characterizes the flow of drivers who are 
not customers of either Navigator 1 or Navigator 2 and 0ig >  characterizes capacity of i  
-th path (larger ig  corresponds to larger capacity of i  -th path). 
Moreover, the following assumption about linear nature of pay-off holds 
 1 2 11 1
1
1( , )
n
i
i i
v f f f
d=
= ∑  (6) 
 1 2 22 2
1
1( , )
n
i
i i
v f f f
d=
= ∑  (7) 
In case (6) and (7) are concave in 1f and 2f  respectively, it will be possible to 
exploit Kuhn – Tucker conditions for seeking equilibrium strategies 1* 2*( , )f f . So there 
appeared intermediate result that state 
1* 2*( , )f f  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there are non-negative 1ω  and 
2ω  (Lagrange multipliers) such that 
 
*
*
for 0
for 0
j j
ii
m j j
i i i
fg
f h f
ω
ω
= >

+ ≤ =
 (8) 
where 1,i n= , {, 1,2}j m∈  and j m≠ . 
Based on such an expression of equilibrium strategies the main result of this 
work (an explicit form of equilibrium strategies of navigation providers) can be 
formulated in the following form: 
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Nash equilibrium in a game of two Navigators with pay-offs (6) and (7) is 
achieved by the following strategies using  
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=
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where 1k and 2k can be found from the following conditions: 
 1j j
j
k kFφ φ +< ≤  (11) 
where {1,2}j∈  and  
 
1
for {1, }t t it ii
t i
h hg t n
g g
φ
=
 
= − ∈ 
 
∑  (12) 
and jk n=  in case j nF φ> . 
It should be noted that this problem can be considered either in an optimization 
scenario. Moreover, as many navigation providers will understand behavior of other 
players, they can increase the level of service quality. We expect that the present 
approach will be able to generally to the case of more than two users. However, this is a 
topic for future research. 
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This paper studies a principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal 
delegates to a risk-neutral agent the decision of whether to pursue a risky project or a 
safe one. The return from the risky project is unknown and the agent can acquire costly 
unobservable information about it before taking the decision. The problem has features 
of moral hazard and hidden information since the acquisition of information and its 
content are unobservable to the principal. The optimal contract suggests that the 
principal should only reward the agent for outcomes that are significantly better than the 
safe return. It is also optimal to distort the project choice in favor of the risky one as a 
mechanism to induce the direct revelation of the uncertain state. In a managerial context, 
the findings explain why options and profit sharing compensation induce better decision 
making from CEOs, as well as why excessive risk taking might be optimal. 
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This paper introduces a variant of the vehicle routing problem with several 
distributors under competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and wholesale 
price. Under this scenario a solution may contain unserved customers and elementary 
routes with no customer visits. The problem is described as a vehicle routing game 
(VRG) with coordinated strategies. 
We provide a computable procedure to calculate strong equilibrium in the VRG, 
which is stable against deviation of any coalition. Following the procedure we solve 
iteratively optimization subproblems for a single distributor, reducing the set of unserved 
customers on each iteration. 
We proof, that strong equilibrium of two types exists in a VRG and provide 
conditions for the third one to exist. We also introduce a semi-cooperative strong 
equilibrium which helps to reduce a set of strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game. 
Our methodology is suited for parallel computing, and could be efficiently 
applied in routing of vehicles with a few compartments. It is calculated a numerical 
example for three person VRG with six cars and twelve customers. 
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